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Once we commit ourselves to such big verbal creatures as "offers for
bilateral contracts" or "offers for unilateral contracts," instead of
analyzing the transaction in terms of promises and consequences, the
other mistakes follow almost naturally and inevitably.
-Samuel J Stojarl
INTRODUCTION
Longstanding conventional wisdom has commonly characterized
the insurance policy as a subspecies of unilateral contract, 2 although
this classification of policies has been a relatively underdeveloped part
of insurance law scholarship. 3  Tradition also regarded unilateral
The Authors are, respectively, Professor of Law, William S. Richardson School of Law,
University of Hawaii, and Doris S. & Theodore B. Lee Professor of Law, William S. Boyd
School of Law, University of Nevada Las Vegas. Thanks to Bill Boyd, Bob Jerry, Erik Knutsen,
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Scales, John White, and participants at the February 2010 AALS Contracts Section Conference at
UNLV, and the members of AALS Contracts listserv for ideas and insights on this topic. Thanks
also to Jeanne Price, David McClure and Shannon Rowe for valuable research assistance.
We are particularly appreciative of Professor Perillo's thoughtful comments on an earlier
draft of this Article, as they helped us solidify our views. In an April 5, 2010 email, Professor
Perillo asked whether our "quarrel is really with the law of the conditions" and challenged us to
take on that "bigger project." We agree that a rigid application of the law of conditions has often
impeded justice, particularly because insurance contracts are already troubled by inherent
inequalities between the parties. However, rather than upending the law of conditions or asking
that insurance become more of an exception within contract law than it already is, we believe that
insurance contracts can be liberated from the harsh effects of several contract doctrines, including
conditions, by recognizing their bilateral nature.
Professor Perillo also questioned whether our characterization of forfeiture provisions in
insurance policies as liquidated damage provisions in disguise was accurate. When a
policyholder loses coverage for a seemingly trivial failure to provide notice or to cooperate with
the insurer, conventional analysis is that the policyholder forfeits coverage for noncompliance
with a condition. We view these provisions as an insurer's attempt to impose liquidated damages
upon the policyholder-no coverage as a penalty for breach. To view it this way invites courts to
evaluate these provisions under a test of reasonableness in light of actual damages.
I The False Distinction Between Bilateral and Unilateral Contracts, 64 YALE L.J. 515, 524
(1955).
2 See JOSEPH M. PERILLO, CALAMARI AND PERILLO ON CONTRACTS § 2.10, at 58 (6th ed.
2009); I ARTHUR LINTON CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 1.23, at 95 (Perillo rev. ed. 1993);
accord MARK S. DORFMAN, INTRODUCTION To RISK MANAGEMENT AND INSURANCE 151 (8th
ed. 2005) ("Most insurance contracts are unilateral contracts."); GEORGE E. REJDA, PRINCIPLES
OF RISK MANAGEMENT AND INSURANCE 99 (9th ed. 2005) ("An insurance contract is a unilateral
contract."); EMMETT J. VAUGHAN & THERESE VAUGHAN, FUNDAMENTALS OF RISK AND
INSURANCE 167 (8th ed. 1999) (same); see also, e.g., Niagara Fire Ins. Co. v. Scammon, 100 Ill.
644 (Ill. 188 1); Viele v. Germania Ins. Co., 26 Iowa 9 (Iowa 1868); Gen. Credit Corp. v. Imperial
Cas. & Indem. Co., 95 N.W.2d 145 (Neb. 1959); Rittenhouse Found., Inc. v. Lloyds London, 277
A.2d 785 (Pa. 1971).
3 See infra notes 66-72 and accompanying text. Unlike insurance texts designed for
insurance and business curricula, legal texts on insurance frequently do not even mention the
unilateral/bilateral contract distinction. The most commonly used one and two-volume treatises
fit this mold. See, e.g., LORELIE S. MASTERS, JORDAN S. STANZLER & EUGENE R. ANDERSON,
INSURANCE COVERAGE LITIGATION (2d ed. 2004) (no discussion of the unilateral/bilateral
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distinction as applied to insurance policies); PETER J. KALIS ET AL., POLICYHOLDER'S GUIDE TO
INSURANCE COVERAGE (1997) (same); BARRY R. OSTRAGER & THOMAS R. NEWMAN,
HANDBOOK ON INSURANCE COVERAGE DISPUTES (13th ed. 2006) (same); ALLAN D. WINDT,
INSURANCE CLAIMS & DISPUTES (3d ed. 1995) (same). But see 3 ERIC MILLS HOLMES,
HOLMES' APPLEMAN ON INSURANCE §§ 4.2, 11.2 (2d ed. 1998) (extensive multi-volume
insurance law treatise touches on the unilateral/bilateral contract distinction). Of course, treatise
writers in glass houses should not throw stones. See, e.g., JEFFREY W. STEMPEL, STEMPEL ON
INSURANCE CONTRACTS (3d ed. 2006 & Supp. 2009) (no discussion of unilateral/bilateral
distinction).
The same lack of interest in the unilateral/bilateral distinction pervades insurance law
casebooks. See, e.g., KENNETH S. ABRAHAM, INSURANCE LAW AND REGULATION: CASES AND
MATERIALS (4th ed. 2005) (no mention of unilateral/bilateral dichotomy); TOM BAKER,
INSURANCE LAW AND POLICY (2d ed. 2008) (same); EMERIC FISCHER, PETER NASH SWISHER &
JEFFREY W. STEMPEL, PRINCIPLES OF INSURANCE LAW (Rev. 3d ed. 2006) (same); ROGER C.
HENDERSON & ROBERT H. JERRY, II, INSURANCE LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS (3d ed. 2001)
(same); ALAN I. WIDISS, INSURANCE: MATERIALS ON FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES, LEGAL
DOCTRINES, AND REGULATORY ACTS (1989).
It appears that one needs to go back half a century to find even modest discussion of the
unilateral/bilateral distinction as applied to insurance policies. See, e.g., EDWIN W. PATTERSON,
ESSENTIALS OF INSURANCE LAW § 11, at 65 (2d ed. 1957) (setting forth traditional view of
insurance policy as unilateral contract and devoting one long paragraph to the matter). Only one
modem casebook even touches on the issue and it does not use the word "unilateral" in its short
discussion. See LEO P. MARTINEZ & JOHN W. WHELAN, CASES AND MATERIALS ON INSURANCE
LAW 59 (5th ed. 2006).
With a typical bilateral contract, the parties exchange performances and receive the
benefits of performance simultaneously, and a breach is generally easily identifiable.
With insurance policies, on the other hand, the insured tenders performance in the form
of payments of premiums and the insurer is obligated to perform only if some event
identified in the policy triggers the performance-recall the concept of a condition
precedent.
Id.
Examination of the unilateral or bilateral nature of insurance policies has been an
underdeveloped aspect of general contracts scholarship as well. All contracts treatises and
casebooks at least touch on the unilateral/bilateral dichotomy. However, many casebooks do so
only through a case involving the issue and most treatises devote little attention to the distinction.
See, e.g., E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS § 3.4 (4th ed. 2004) (dedicating two pages of
900-page treatise to the unilateral/bilateral distinction; noting that the Restatement (Second) of
Contracts abandons the terminology). But see id. § 3.3, at 111 n.5 (noting existence of reverse-
unilateral contracts that result "from an offer of a performance for a promise, rather than an offer
of a promise for a performance" (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 55 cmt. a
(1981))). Few casebooks or treatises mention insurance policies as an example of a unilateral
contract and only the Calamari and Perillo treatise gives the matter significant attention. See, e.g.,
IAN AYRES & RICHARD E. SPEIDEL, CONTRACT LAW 305 (7th ed. 2008) (setting forth a
"unilateral contract sampler" of eight cases, none involving insurance policies); RANDY E.
BARNETT, CONTRACTS: CASES AND DOCTRINE 342-68 (4th ed. 2008) (extensive focus on
unilateral contract issues but no mention of insurance policies); BRIAN A. BLUM & AMY C.
BUSHAW, CONTRACT: CASES, DISCUSSION, AND PROBLEMS 117-28 (2003) (covering
unilateral/bilateral distinction without mention of insurance policies); STEVEN J. BURTON,
PRINCIPLES OF CONTRACT LAW 52-58 (3d ed. 2006) (no mention of insurance as unilateral
contract); MICHAEL L. CLOSEN ET AL., CONTRACTS: CONTEMPORARY CASES, COMMENTS, AND
PROBLEMS 112-29 (1992) (discussing unilateral contracts at length but not mentioning insurance
policies; includes Peters v. Mut. Benefit Life Ins. Co., 420 N.W.2d 908 (Minn. App. 1988), an
employment case where plaintiff was a terminated agent for the insurer rather than a
policyholder); THOMAS D. CRANDALL & DOUGLAS J. WHALEY, CASES, PROBLEMS, AND
MATERIALS ON CONTRACTS 59-66, 76 (4th ed. 2004) (setting forth traditional dichotomy without
mentioning insurance policy); JOHN P. DAWSON ET AL., CONTRACTS 372-77 (8th ed. 2003)
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contracts as relatively rare. 4  Karl Llewellyn viewed them as the
equivalent of "bearded ladies" found in the "freak tent" of a circus.5
Commercial contracts that were not rewards or bonuses were viewed as
rarer still, with brokerage arrangements traditionally standing as the
leading example of commercial unilateral contracts.6  Moreover, the
Restatement (Second) of Contracts implicitly abolished the
terminology,7 although it was subsequently argued with some force that
(covering unilateral/bilateral distinction without mention of insurance policies); DAVID G.
EPSTEIN ET AL., MAKING AND DOING DEALS: CONTRACTS IN CONTEXT 109-29 (2d ed. 2006)
(addressing unilateral contracts and acceptance by performance but not using insurance policies
as example); E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS § 3.4 (4th ed. 2004) (setting forth traditional
dichotomy without mentioning insurance policy); id. §§ 67-69, at 152-58 (no mention of
insurance as type of unilateral contract); JEFF FERRIELL, UNDERSTANDING CONTRACTS § 1.02[C]
(2d ed. 2009) (outlining unilateral/bilateral dichotomy but making no mention of insurance); LON
L. FULLER & MELVIN ARON EISENBERG, BASIC CONTRACT LAW 86-88, 504-35 (8th ed. 2006)
(same); JAMES F. HOGG ET AL., CONTRACTS: CASES AND THEORY OF CONTRACTUAL
OBLIGATION 223-48 (2008) (extensive discussion of unilateral/bilateral distinction but no
mention of insurance policies); CHARLES L. KNAPP, ET AL., PROBLEMS IN CONTRACT LAW:
CASES AND MATERIALS 33-63 (6th ed. 2007) (no mention of insurance policies in discussion of
dichotomy); GEORGE W. KUNEY & ROBERT M. LLOYD, CONTRACTS: TRANSACTIONS AND
LITIGATION 75-93 (2d ed. 2008) (no mention of insurance as type of unilateral contract); JOHN
EDWARD MURRAY, JR., CONTRACTS: CASES AND MATERIALS 125-32 (6th ed. 2006) (discussing
concept with no mention of insurance policies); JOHN EDWARD MURRAY, JR., MURRAY ON
CONTRACTS § 17 (4th ed. 2001) (same); SAMUEL WILLISTON, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF
CONTRACTS § 1:17 (Richard A. Lord ed., 4th ed. 2007) (covering unilateral and bilateral concepts
with no express mention of insurance policies and citing to only two cases, amongst the scores
cited in the section, where an insurer is party: Nat'l Sur. Co. v. City of Atlanta, 106 S.E. 179 (Ga.
1921), and Schoffv. Combined Ins. Co. of Am., 604 N.W.2d 43 (Iowa 1999)).
4 See Mark Pettit, Jr., Modern Unilateral Contracts, 63 B.U. L. REV. 551, 551 (1983)
("[Liack of support for the unilateral contract idea in the cases required [legal scholars] to
illustrate the concept with ridiculous hypotheticals about climbing greased flagpoles and crossing
the Brooklyn Bridge."); accord FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS, supra note 3, § 3.24, at 183 ("The
popularity of the Brooklyn Bridge hypothetical has been due in part to the lack of more practical
illustrations."); see also infra Part I regarding the development of the unilateral/bilateral
distinction and the origin of the now-famous Brooklyn Bridge hypothetical.
5 K.N. Llewellyn, On Our Case-Law of Contract: Offer and Acceptance, 1, 48 YALE L.J. 1,
36 (1938) [hereinafter Llewellyn, On Our Case-Law ofContract (Part I)].
6 See infra Part 1; see also contracts treatises and casebooks cited supra note 2. The vast
bulk of unilateral contract cases cited, reproduced, or discussed in these sources involve efforts by
plaintiffs to collect a reward or prize, or the attempt of a broker (usually real estate) to recover a
commission. See FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS, supra note 3, § 3.24. Certain cases in the reward
genre are perennially popular. See, e.g., Carlill v. Carbolic Smoke Ball Co., [1893] 1 Q.B. 256
(Ct. App.) (U.K.) (payment of reward/penalty where user of purported influenza prevention
device contracts the flu); see also Leonard v. Pepsico, 88 F. Supp. 2d 116 (S.D.N.Y. 1999)
(collector of millions of "Pepsi points" not entitled to collect reward of military plane from
television advertisement because advertisement was an obvious farce and it contained insufficient
detail to constitute an offer rather than an invitation to make an offer); Lefkowitz v. Great
Minneapolis Surplus Store, Inc., 86 N.W.2d 689 (Minn. 1957) (first customer in line claims
reward of free fur coat). Another commonly included case, Petterson v. Pattberg, 161 N.E.2d 428
(N.Y. 1928), involves a mortgagor's thwarted attempt to pay off the mortgage early in response to
the mortgagee's offer because the mortgagee sold the mortgage to a third party and managed to
blurt out that fact to the mortgagor before the mortgagor tendered payment.
7 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 32, 62 (1981); see also infra Part 1. The
Restatement (First) of Contracts stated "[a] unilateral contract is one in which no promisor
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courts never abandoned the distinction8 and that the concept served a
perhaps surprising modem function in protecting weaker parties to
arrangements that did not quite qualify as traditional contracts. 9
One can argue that the unilateral or bilateral status of the insurance
policy is something like Holmes's clavicle of the cat: a vestige from
another era with little or no modem relevance.10 We contend that in the
case of insurance, the distinction is unhelpful and that the unilateral
characterization is less persuasive than deeming insurance policies
bilateral contracts. But, whether correct or incorrect, helpful or
distracting, concepts and classifications are important. The
characterizations and labels affixed to objects and activities
understandably affect their use and perceptions about them. To name
something is to know it." Conceptualizing the insurance policy as
unilateral (or reverse-unilateral)1 2 enshrines an incorrect understanding
of the nature of insurance contracting, the insurance policy, and the
receives a promise as consideration for his promise. A bilateral contract is one in which there are
mutual promises between two parties to the contract; each party being both a promisor and a
promisee." RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONTRACTS § 12 (1932).
8 See Pettit, supra note 4, at 551 (suggesting that, based on analysis of its appearance in
reported cases, "[the] unilateral contract never died, but is alive and thriving as never before").
9 See id. at 552 ("Of particular importance is the use of unilateral contract to establish one-
way obligations of such institutions as employers, governments, and schools toward individuals
with whom they deal. Unilateral contract has become an important concept in defining
relationships that arise in our increasingly organized society."); id at 594 ("In the modern cases
judges generally use unilateral contract to impose liability" on employers, governments, schools
and other defendants against whom plaintiffs are seeking to enforce purported rights.); see also
David G. Epstein & Yvette Joy Liebesman, Bearded Ladies Walking on the Brooklyn Bridge, 59
ARK. L. REV. 267, 296 (2006) (noting Pettit's research and finding 435 reported decisions issued
between 2000 and 2006 that used the term "unilateral contract" although it was "less clear" how
the concept was being deployed and to what result).
10 See O.W. Holmes, Jr., Common Carriers and the Common Law, 13 AM. L. REv. 609, 630-
31 (1879) ("[E]ach new decision follows syllogistically from existing precedents. But as
precedents survive like the clavicle in the cat, long after the use they once served is at an end, and
the reason for them has been forgotten, the result of following them must often be failure and
confusion from the merely logical point of view.").
11 Actually, Dewey made the observation with the aid of a less prominent coauthor. See
JOHN DEWEY & ARTHUR F. BENTLEY, KNOWING AND THE KNOWN 147 (1949) ("[N]aming is
seen as itself directly a form of knowing .... ). More expansively, Dewey and Bentley asserted
that the labels or signposts used to characterize thinking or conduct themselves became important
factors in the construction of thought and analysis. See id. ch. 5, at 147 ("in a natural factual
cosmos in course of knowing by men who are themselves among its constituents, naming
processes are examined as the most readily observable and most easily and practicably studied of
all processes of knowing.").
12 See infra notes 75-79 and accompanying text (explaining the characterization of insurance
policies as a type of "reverse-unilateral" contract on the theory that the performance by the
policyholder, through payment of the premium, antedates performance by the insurer); see also
PERILLO, supra note 2, § 2.10, at 58 ("In the usual unilateral contract, the promise is made by the
offeror. However, there exists an unusual kind of contract called a reverse-unilateral contract. In
a reverse unilateral contract the offeree makes the only promise."); id. (using insurance policy as
express example of reverse-unilateral contract); Epstein & Liebesman, supra note 9, at 285
(reiterating concept generally without consideration of application to insurance).
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insurer-policyholder relationship. It is, in our view, more wrong than
right13  and distracts rather than illuminates or assists. More
importantly, it fails to appreciate the degree to which insurance policies
differ from most contracts,14 the harms caused by the characterization,
and the degree to which insurance policy construction needs liberation
from this archaic dichotomy even more than contract law generally.15
Treating insurance policies as unilateral contracts appears to be
both conceptually wrong and largely pointless in that insurance disputes
are less often about contract formation and more often about the scope
and availability of coverage provided under the policy.1 6  More
important, use of the unilateral construct produces inconsistent,
incorrect, and unfair results in application.' 7 One might defend the
characterization as one that permits the policyholder (as the purportedly
non-promising party) to terminate the policy at will without penalty.' 8
But this freedom is a bit like Anatole France's biting witticism that
under law, both rich and poor alike are free to sleep under a bridge.19
Policyholders 20 generally will benefit much more from fair application
of the insurance protection they have purchased (a goal undermined by
the unilateral characterization) than from somewhat greater freedom to
switch or drop insurance policies. On balance, the unilateral
characterization of insurance policies, to the extent it possesses
continued force, hurts policyholders and undermines the operation of
insurance more than it protects either party or promotes the economic
and social goals of insurance. 21 Any legal rule or categorization that
does more harm than good deserves to be interred.
Part I of our exploration addresses the history, theory, and doctrine
of unilateral contracts, while Part II notes the degree to which the
insurance policy-as a "reverse-unilateral" contract-is a particularly
13 See infra Part IlIl.A.
14 See infra Part II.
15 See infra Part III.
16 See infra Part Il.A.
17 See infra Part III.C.
18 See infra notes 124-27 and accompanying text.
19 See ANATOLE FRANCE, THE RED LILLY: IMMORTALS CROWNED BY THE FRENCH
ACADEMY (1894) ("The law, in its majestic equality, forbids the rich as well as the poor to sleep
under the bridges, to beg in the streets, and to steal bread.").
20 For clarity and ease of reference, this article uses the term "policyholder" rather than
"insured" whenever possible. Technically, of course, there is a distinction in that a person or
entity can be "an insured" under the policy even if it is not the person or entity that procured the
insurance, paid the premiums, or is named in the policy. See FISCHER ET AL., supra note 3, apps.
A-G (reproducing representative policies with a definition of who is "an insured" that is broader
than the named policyholder or purchaser). For example, the employees of a commercial
policyholder, when acting within the scope of their employment, are usually "insureds" for
purposes of liability policy protection. See, e.g., Insurance Services Office (ISO), CG 00 01 10
01 (2000), sec. II, reprinted in FISCHER ET AL., supra note 3, app. E, at 11.
21 See infra Part III.C.
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rare bird even within the ornithology of traditional contract
characterization. 22  Part III addresses the problems presented by a
unilateral categorization of insurance policies, including not only its
questionable utility and shaky conceptual foundations that fail to
appreciate the special sphere of insurance, but also the largely
deleterious practical problems presented by the unilateral model of
insurance policies. 23  We conclude that common law should
characterize insurance policies as bilateral agreements and should
evaluate their terms and conditions under this model. Courts should
abandon the presumption that insurance contracts are unilateral and
instead should remain faithful to contract law's preferences for
bilateralism and promises over unilateralism and conditions.
II. THE UNILATERAL/BILATERAL DISTINCTION:
HISTORY, THEORY, AND DOCTRINE
According to classical contract doctrine, a traditional unilateral
contract is different from a bilateral contract because it always and
necessarily contains a promise on only one side. 24 In exchange for that
promise, the promisor seeks a performance and only a performance
from the other party-no promise of performance will do. It is at the
instant of completion of performance that the contract is formed, and
fully executed on one side. 25 On the other hand, in a bilateral contract,
an offer may be accepted by a return promise or by the beginning of
performance. 26 At the moment the promise is made or promised
22 For example, Professor Perillo, discussing the reverse-unilateral concept, found that the
"most common reverse unilateral contract arises where the offeree silently accepts services that
are rendered with the expectation of payment." See PERILLO, supra note 2, § 2.10, at 58.
Without naming it as such, Professor Williston described the reverse-unilateral contract in his
1924 treatise. WILLISTON, supra note 3, at 31 ("If the offer contemplates the formation of a
unilateral contract, it may be that the offeror proposes to exchange his own promise for an act of
the offeree or, conceivably, that the offeror proposes to exchange an act on his part for a promise
which he requests from the offeree." (emphasis added)).
23 See infra Part III.
24 As Professor Perillo explains: "Every contract involves at least two contracting parties. In
some contracts, however, only one party has made a promise and therefore only this party is
subject to a legal obligation. Such a contract is said to be unilateral. In contrast, a contract where
both parties have promises is bilateral." PERILLO, supra note 2, § 2.10(a), at 56-57; see also
contracts casebooks and treatises cited supra note 3 (expressing a similar concept of unilateral
and bilateral contracts).
25 See RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONTRACTS § 57 (1932); PERILLO, supra note 2, § 2.10;
FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS, supra note 3, § 3.4; I. Maurice Wormser, The True Conception of
Unilateral Contracts, 26 YALE L.J. 136, 136 (1916) [hereinafter Wormser, True Conception]
("When an act is thus wanted in return for a promise, a unilateral contract is created when the act
is done.").
26 See RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONTRACTS § 53 cmt. a (1932); PERILLO, supra note 2, §
2.10; FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS, supra note 3, § 3.4.
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performance begins, a bilateral contract is formed and each party is
bound.27
The unilateral/bilateral distinction, although a staple of twentieth
century contract law, particularly as taught in law schools, was of little
or no import until well into the late nineteenth century. 28 Harvard Law
School Dean and case method inventor Christopher Columbus
Langdell 29 is generally credited with elevating the unilateral/bilateral
distinction to contract law's great dichotomy,30 which was embraced as
the conventional wisdom, even though the distinction was familiar
enough to have been used in opinions issued prior to or
contemporaneous with Langdell's casebook. 3' Although it was not a
27 See RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONTRACTS § 52 cmt a. (1932); PERILLO, supra note 2, §
2.10; FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS, supra note 3, § 3.4.
28 See C.C. LANGDELL, A SUMMARY OF THE LAW OF CONTRACTS, § 183, at 248 (2d ed.
1880) [hereinafter LANGDELL, A SUMMARY OF THE LAW OF CONTRACTS]; WILLISTON, supra
note 3, § 13, at 11 n.42 (using dichotomy and ascribing to Langdell); Epstein & Liebesman, supra
note 9, at 271-77 (noting that the unilateral/bilateral classification of contracts arose during the
nineteenth century and is generally credited to Langdell); see also C.C. Langdell, Mutual
Promises as a Consideration for Each Other, 14 HARV. L. REV. 496, 498 (1901) (responding to
Williston's implicit criticism regarding the utility of the dichotomy).
29 At least Langdell is commonly credited with establishing the case method. But see Epstein
& Liebesman, supra note 9, at 271 n.9 (noting that legal historian James Willard Hurst viewed
John Norton Pomeroy as the father of case method while contracts scholar Williston saw Harvard
Professor James Barr Ames as the initiator of case method at Harvard (citing JAMES WILLARD
HURST, THE GROWTH OF AMERICAN LAW: THE LAW MAKERS 261 (1950) and SAMUEL
WILLISTON, LIFE AND LAW: AN AUTOBIOGRAPHY 205 (1941) (also stating that Langdell was
primarily a lecturer during much of his career because of poor eyesight))).
30 See C.C. LANGDELL, A SELECTION OF CASES ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS 985-1094 (2d
ed. 1879); see also CHRISTOPHER COLUMBUS LANGDELL, A SELECTION OF CASES ON THE LAW
OF CONTRACTS (1st ed. 1871); LANGDELL, A SUMMARY OF THE LAW OF CONTRACTS, supra note
28 (slightly revised version of Langdell's Second Edition). As Epstein and Liebesman note,
Langdell's original casebook "had none of Langdell's words" and contained "only a few hundred
cases, without commentary." Epstein & Liebesman, supra note 9, at 271. The second edition,
however, also contained a "250-page summary at the end of the casebook, like an early version of
Gilbert's" and "was obviously written primarily to help students learn contract law from the
casebook." Id. at 271-72. It was in this summary that Langdell used the terms unilateral and
bilateral. Id. at 272.
31 See, e.g., Fid. & Deposit Co. v. Burden, 30 F.2d 610, 613 (2d Cir. 1929) (Hand, J.,
dissenting) (applying New York law, surety arrangement "became a unilateral contract when the
surety performed"); London Assurance Corp. v. Thompson, 62 N.E. 1066, 1067 (N.Y. 1902)
("insurance policies are unilateral contracts") (in context, however, it may be that the court used
the term "unilateral" to mean a contract of adhesion); Cont'l Ins. Co. v. Wickham, 35 S.E. 287,
289 (Ga. 1900) (insurance policy is a unilateral contract); Niagara Fire Ins. Co. v. Scammon, 100
Ill. 644 (Ill. 1881) (same); Douglas v. Knickerbocker Life Ins. Co., 83 N.Y. 492, 503 (N.Y. 1881)
(characterizing insurance policy as a unilateral contract); Cobb v. Ins. Co. of N. Am., 11 Kan. 93,
98 (Kan. 1873) (insurance policy is "wholly a unilateral contract"); Viele v. Germania Ins. Co.,
26 Iowa 9 (Iowa 1868) (insurance policy unilateral).
English courts appear to have embraced the unilateral/bilateral distinction by the mid-
nineteenth century. See, e.g., Fishmonger's Co. v. Robertson, (1843) 134 Eng. Rep. 510, 523
(noting that there are "'a great number of cases of contract not binding on both sides at the time
when made, and in which the whole duty to be performed rests with one of the contracting
parties' (quoting Kennaway v. Treleavan, (1839) 151 Eng. Rep. 211, 213)); id. at 524 n.3
(labeling such arrangements as "perfect unilateral contracts"); Phillips v. Aflalo, (1842) 134 Eng.
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common feature of case law, the unilateral/bilateral dichotomy feature
appears to have become established contracts orthodoxy by the early
twentieth century, 32 as reflected in the Williston treatise, 33 the Corbin
treatise, 34 and other authorities of the era. 35  There was, however,
debate about the accuracy of the unilateral/bilateral terminology and its
utility. 36
The unilateral/bilateral dichotomy was driven home (and arguably
made starker) in a prominent law review article by Professor I. Maurice
Wormser,37 who created one of law's most famous illustrations: the
Brooklyn Bridge hypothetical. In the oft-told hypothetical, one party
offers $100 to a second party if he will walk across the Bridge, thereby
creating and completing a contract that is unilateral because the promise
Rep. 348, 352 ("There may be a contract binding on one party and not on the other; as in the case
of a guarantee, which is of this nature: 'if you will supply goods to a third person, I will see that
you are paid.' In such a case it is optional whether the party will supply the goods."); see also M.
POTHIER, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF OBLIGATIONS OR CONTRACTS 89 (1826) (labeling
contracts as reciprocal and unilateral, using a loan with a promise to repay as an example, a
transaction that would now be viewed as a reverse-unilateral contract). Although Pothier was
French, his translated work was highly influential in England and elsewhere. Certainly by the
twentieth century, classic English law treatises embraced the unilateral contract concept. See,
e.g., 1 FREDERICK POLLOCK ET AL., PRINCIPLES OF CONTRACT AT LAW AND IN EQUITY: A
TREATISE OF THE GENERAL PRINCIPLES CONCERNING THE VALIDITY OF AGREEMENTS IN THE
LAW OF ENGLAND AND AMERICA 22 (7th ed. 1906) (citing early cases and noting that "[a]n offer
proposing a unilateral contract becomes a binding promise immediately upon the performance of
the act or acts requested").
32 See, e.g., SIR WILLIAM R. ANSON, PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF CONTRACT 26 n. 1 (Arthur
L. Corbin ed., 3d ed. 1919); POLLOCK, supra note 31 (stating that the unilateral/bilateral contract
distinction was well-established by the end of the nineteenth century or the early twentieth
century).
33 See WILLISTON, supra note 3, § 13, at 11 n.42.
34 See ANSON, supra note 32, at 26 n.1; ARTHUR LINTON CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS §
21(1950).
35 See, e.g., I ADDISON, C. G., ADDISON ON CONTRACTS: BEING A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF
CONTRACTS 7 (Horace Smith ed., 8th ed. 1888) ("When the contract binds one person to another
without any engagement being made by the latter, it is unilateral.").
36 See Epstein & Liebesman, supra note 9, at 273-75 (noting and citing criticism).
37 See Wormser, True Conception, supra note 25. Notwithstanding that the Wormser article
is cited in only twenty-two law review articles (as of December 1, 2009), it is mentioned in nearly
every contracts treatise or casebook that gives significant attention to the unilaterallbilateral
distinction which is, as noted supra note 2, nearly every contracts treatise or casebook.
Wormser's view of unilateral contracting was stark in the sense, as discussed below, that
he viewed the offeror as having unfettered rights to withdraw or modify the offer until the last
instant before completion of performance, regardless of the seeming unfairness this posed for an
offeree who had completed ninety-nine percent of the task without gaining any benefit of the
bargain. As Epstein and Liebesman note, however, Langdell's casebook "distinguishes bilateral
contracts from unilateral contracts on the basis of what the offeree does or says rather than on the
basis of what the offeror said." See Epstein & Liebesman, supra note 9, at 272. As a result,
Langdell would have found enforceable unilateral contracts created in situations involving partial
performance or substantial (but imperfect) performance, thus expressing a considerably kinder
and gentler vision of unilateral contracting than that advanced by Wormser in his 1916 Yale Law
Journal article. See id. (referring to hypotheticals involving offer of compensation for painting
fence earlier in article).
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of payment is accepted, not by the promise of trekking over the Bridge,
but by completion of the trek itself.38 In addition, "only one party is
bound"-the offeror-hence classification of the arrangement as
unilateral rather than bilateral. 39
[I]n unilateral contracts, on one side we find merely an act, on the
other side a promise. On the other hand, in bilateral contracts, [a
party] barters away his volition in return for another promise....
[T]here is an exchange of promises or assurances .. . [and] both
parties .. . are bound from the moment that their promises are
exchanged. 40
However, although the offeror is bound to pay upon completion of
the walk across the Bridge, in Wormser's view, he retains the power to
withdraw the offer without penalty until the last second prior to
completion of the crossing. 41 This view, even though apparently largely
accepted at the time, came under consistent fire from contract scholars
because of its inherent unfairness. The hapless offeree could get ninety-
nine percent of the way across the Bridge and end up with nothing, not
even quantum meruit compensation for his time and effort. Similarly,
the imaginary offeree of perhaps the second most famous unilateral
contract hypothetical-someone climbing up a flagpole to obtain a
prize-could be thwarted inches from the top of the pole by a cruel and
cackling offeror. 42
Professor Wormser was aware of, but undaunted by, such displays
of bleeding heart empathy:
The objection is made, however, that it is very "hard" upon B
that he should have walked half-way across the Brooklyn Bridge and
should get no compensation . ... Critics of the doctrine of unilateral
38 As outlined by Professor Wormser:
Suppose A says to B, "I will give you $100 if you walk across the Brooklyn
Bridge," and B walks-is there a contract? It is clear that A is not asking B for B's
promise to walk across the Brooklyn Bridge. What A wants from B is the act of
walking across the bridge. When B has walked across the bridge there is a contract,
and A is then bound to pay to B $100. At that moment there arises a unilateral
contract. A has bartered away his volition for B's act of walking across the Brooklyn
Bridge.
See Wormser, True Conception, supra note 25, at 136.
39 See id. ("When an act is thus wanted in return for a promise, a unilateral contract is created
when the act is done. It is clear that only one party is bound. B is not bound to walk across the
Brooklyn Bridge, but A is bound to pay B $100 if B does so.").
40 See id
41 See id. at 136-38.
42 By 1939, these hypotheticals must have been firmly established in law teaching, prompting
Llewellyn to complain that real life business cases have little to do with "the idiosyncratic desires
of one A to see one B climb a fifty-foot greased flagpole or push a peanut across the Brooklyn
Bridge" that apparently preoccupied classrooms. K. N. Llewellyn, Our Case-Law of Contract:
Offer and Acceptance, II, 48 YALE L.J. 779, 785 (1939) [hereinafter Llewellyn, Our Case-Law of
Contract (Part II)]; see also Pettit, supra note 4, at 551 (noting widespread use of flagpole-related
hypotheticals, including greased flagpoles, to illustrate unilateral contracting).
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contract on the ground that the rule is "hard" on B, forget the
primary need for mutuality of withdrawal and in lamenting the
alleged hardships of B, they completely lose sight of the fact that B
has the same right of withdrawal that A has.... [T]he doctrine of
unilateral contract is thus as just and equitable as it is logical. So
long as there is freedom of contract and parties see fit to integrate
their understanding in the form of a unilateral contract, the courts
should not interfere with their evident understanding and intention
simply because of alleged fanciful hardship. 43
In response to the perceived unfairness, a consensus arose that the
beginning of performance in response to a unilateral contract offer
permitted enforcement of the contract if the offeree completed the
task.44 However, mere preparation to perform was insufficient; the task
sought needed to have been commenced. 45 Eventually, even Professor
Wormser accepted this view and conceded that his earlier position was
incorrect. 46 During the same time period, the doctrines of promissory
43 See Wormser, True Conception, supra note 25, at 138. In addition to lacking empathy for
the Bridge walkers and flagpole climbers of the world, Professor Wormser also appears to have
harbored a view of the importance of mutuality that is now regarded as incorrect. Courts have
stated, and do occasionally still, that there cannot be a contract unless other parties are bound.
However, this view, at least in absolutist form, is widely regarded as incorrect by mainstream
contracts scholars and case law. See, e.g., PERILLO, supra note 2, § 4.12, at 177 (arguing that the
phrase that "both parties must be bound or neither is bound ... is an over-generalization. The
doctrine is not one of mutuality of obligation but rather one of mutuality of consideration....
The concept of 'mutuality of obligation' has been thoroughly discredited."); id. (noting that the
Restatement (Second) of Contracts does not always require mutuality of consideration and that
"[i]n a unilateral contract there is no mutuality of obligation"); FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS,
supra note 3, § 3.2; FULLER & EISENBERG, supra note 3, at 87 (arguing that the notion of
"principle of mutuality" asserted "as a general rule of contract law that both parties must be
bound or neither is bound . .. needs more qualification than it usually receives in judicial
opinions" and in fact "requires a good deal of qualification"); WILLISTON, supra note 3, § 7:13
(same).
44 See RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONTRACTS § 45 cmts. a & b (1932); Peter M. Tiersma,
Reassessing Unilateral Contracts: The Role of Offer, Acceptance and Promise, 26 U.C. DAVIS L.
REV. 1, 7 (1992) (noting academic support for part performance formation of unilateral contracts
and adoption of the view in the Restatement (First) of Contracts). Academic support for this
view existed around the time Wormser staked out his extreme position. See, e.g., Clarence D.
Ashley, Offers Calling for a Consideration Other Than a Counter Promise, 23 HARV. L. REV.
159, 164 (1910); Henry W. Ballantine, Acceptance of Offers for Unilateral Contracts by Partial
Performance of Service Requested, 5 MINN. L. REv. 94, 96-97 (1921); Arthur L. Corbin, Offer
and Acceptance, and Some of the Resulting Legal Relations, 26 YALE L.J. 169, 191-92 (1917)
(beginning of part performance of the requested act precludes the offeror from effectively
revoking and gives contract rights to the performer who completes the act); D.O. McGovney,
Irrevocable Offers, 27 HARV. L. REV. 644, 658-60 (1914).
45 See, e.g., Ever-Tite Roofing Corp. v. Green, 83 So.2d 449 (La. Ct. App. 1955) (making a
distinction between the actual beginning of performance, which establishes a contract, and mere
preparation to perform, which does not).
46 See I. Maurice Wormser, Book Review, 3 J. LEGAL EDUC. 145, 146 (1950) [hereinafter
Wormser, Book Review] (reviewing EDWIN W. PATTERSON & GEORGE W. GOBLE, CASES ON
CONTRACTS (1949)). Wormser noted that his 1916 article was quoted in the casebook but
"[s]ince that time I have repented, so that now, clad in sackcloth, I state frankly, that my point of
view has changed. I agree, at this time, with the rule set forth in the Restatement of the Law of
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estoppel and substantial performance, both of which could also protect
the bridge walker and the flag climber, were also gaining support. 47
The resulting taming of the potential unfairness of the unilateral
contract helped to cement its status as part of the legal lexicon. The first
Restatement of Contracts formally recognized the unilateral/bilateral
dichotomy and divided the universe of contracts accordingly. 48
However, the Restatement also established a presumption in favor of a
bilateral characterization of contracts where feasible, 49 reflecting the
prevailing common law approach.50 Notwithstanding its firm place in
the contracts establishment, the concept of the unilateral contract
continued to be questioned and even attacked, initially and most
Contracts of the American Law Institute, Section 45" that the beginning of performance by a
unilateral contract offeree creates enforceable contract obligations and limits the offeror's rights
of revocation. Id.; RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONTRACTS § 45 (1932).
47 See PERILLO, supra note 2, §§ 6.1-6.4; FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS, supra note 3, § 2.19;
GRANT GILMORE, THE DEATH OF CONTRACT (1974) (noting the rise of promissory estoppel and
substantial performance doctrine during mid-twentieth century); Kevin M. Teeven, Origins of
Promissory Estoppel: Justifiable Reliance and Commercial Uncertainty Before Williston's
Restatement, 34 U. MEM. L. REv. 499, 563 (2004).
48 RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONTRACTS § 12 (1932).
49 The relevant section provides:
In case of doubt it is presumed that an offer invites the formation of a bilateral contract
by an acceptance amounting in effect to a promise by the offeree to perform what the
offer requests, rather than the formation of one or more unilateral contracts by actual
performance on the part of the offeree.
Id. § 31.
The Restatement (First) of Contracts justified the presumption as fairer and more benign,
explaining, "[i]t is not always easy to determine whether an offeror requests an act or a promise to
do the act. As a bilateral contract immediately and fully protects both parties, the interpretation is
favored that a bilateral contract is proposed." Id. cmt. a.
50 See, e.g., Davis v. Jacoby, 34 P.2d 1026 (Cal. 1934) (courts have preference to construe
contracts as bilateral if possible). Like chestnuts of unilateral contracting such as Carlill v.
Carbolic Smoke Ball, Davis v. Jacoby has been popular in contracts casebooks. In Davis the
California Supreme Court construed an uncertain contract as bilateral to protect the reliance
interests of a couple induced to relocate from Canada to take care of elderly friends in response to
an offer of compensation through the older couple's estate upon death. Id. However, the elderly
husband/promisor died before making the will that was to have provided the promised
distribution, thereby revoking his offer prior to the younger couple's performance. Id. Thus,
under the traditionalist perspective of the early twentieth century, if the arrangement was
unilateral, the contract under the prevailing views of the time had not adequately been accepted
and formed so as to create enforceable rights. But if bilateral, the arrangement resulted in an
enforceable contract because the younger couple had accepted through assuring that they would
come to the aid of their older friends.
Well before mid-century the Restatement (First) of Contracts and cases like Davis v.
Jacoby had established a preference for bilateral characterization of contracts. The intellectual
and judicial inclination favoring bilateralism was thought sufficiently important that Davis v.
Jacoby is often reproduced contracts casebooks. See, e.g., BLUM & BUSHAW, supra note 3, at
117-28; BURTON, supra note 3, at 52-58; CRANDALL & WHALEY, supra note 3, at 59-66, 76;
DAWSON ET AL., supra note 3, at 372; EPSTEIN ET AL., supra note 3, at 118-23; FULLER &
EISENBERG, supra note 3, at 86-88, 504-35; HOGG ET AL., supra note 2, at 235; KUNEY & LLOYD,
supra note 2, at 76.
2010] MISCLASSIFYING THE INSURANCE POLICY 97
prominently by leading law professor Karl Llewellyn 5' and later more
directly by then-prominent Australian contracts scholar Samuel
Stoljar. 52
However, the unilateral/bilateral dichotomy continued to hold its
ground as part of mainstream contracts theory for some time, although
gradually losing ground in academic and lawmaking circles. The
Uniform Commercial Code, largely authored by Llewellyn, did not
incorporate the concept,53 while the Restatement (Second) of Contracts
also attempted to shed the unilateral/bilateral contract dichotomy. 54 The
Restatement (Second) of Contracts dropped references to unilateral and
bilateral contracts in its black letter text, determining that the terms
confused rather than clarified the law of contracts and stating, "[iut has
not been carried forward because of doubt as to the utility of the
distinction, often treated as fundamental, between the two types."55
In the courts, however, the dichotomy retained support and
arguably even enjoyed a renaissance of sorts. The unilateral construct
was applied to a range of emerging contract matters involving claims of
at-will employees and persons seeking to enforce government
entitlements, 56 while continuing to be used in cases involving rewards
and prizeS57 or brokerage commissions.58  The courts' use of a
unilateral contract construction as a mechanism to protect weaker
parties gives the authors pause at any impulse to abolish this genre of
contract altogether. 59 Despite that, it appears to us that the arguably
beneficial roles of the doctrine could be equally achieved under theories
of promissory estoppel, equitable estoppel, and attachment of due
51 See Llewellyn, On Our Case-Law of Contract (Part I), supra note 5, at 36; Llewellyn, Our
Case-Law of Contract (Part II), supra note 42, at 813-14.
52 See Stoljar, supra note 1.
53 See PERILLO, supra note 2, § 2.10, at 59-60 (noting that the UCC does not make a
unilateral/bilateral distinction and that section 2-206(1)(b), which states that an ambiguous offer
to purchase goods "invites acceptance either by performance or promise," prevents use of a
"unilateral contract trick").
54 See Epstein & Liebesman, supra note 9 (discussing the history of and rationale for
abandoning the unilateral/bilateral terminology).
55 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 1 cmt. f, reporter's note (1981).
56 See Pettit, supra note 4, at 551-52.
57 See Tiersma, supra note 44, at 79 (rewards and prizes continue to be a leading area of
unilateral contract analysis); Mark B. Wessman, Is "Contract" the Name of the Game?
Promotional Games as Test Cases for Contract Theory, 34 ARIZ. L. REV. 635, 645-54 (1992)
(noting that unilateral contract theory is often applied to rewards, prizes, games, and contests).
58 See FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS, supra note 3, § 3.4 (brokerage cases are a significant
example of unilateral contract decisions).
59 As described by Professor Pettit, these modem applications of unilateral contract theory
tend to provide rights to persons or entities that can largely be described as litigation's "little
guys" who might otherwise be taken advantage of by larger, wealthier, more sophisticated
litigants. See Pettit, supra note 4, at 551-52; id. at 594 ("In the modem cases judges generally use
unilateral contract to impose liability. They begin by finding an implied promise by the
defendant and then justify enforcement of that promise solely by invoking the unilateral contract
idea.").
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process rights to the creation of reasonable expectations of an
entitlement from governments. 60
Although the Restatement (Second) of Contracts eliminated
"unilateral" and "bilateral" contracts from its lexicon, it did not
eliminate the concept that some contracts could be accepted only by
performance, and that they were fully executed on one side by that
performance. 61 Moreover, even while abandoning the dichotomy, the
Restatement (Second) of Contracts retained a preference for bilateral
construction of contracts in a roundabout fashion, providing that, "[i]n
case of doubt an offer is interpreted as inviting the offeree to accept
either by promising to perform what the offer requests or rendering the
performance, as the offeree chooses." 62
The preference for bilateralism remains if the offeree may choose
between accepting by promise or performance because "[s]uch an
acceptance operates as a promise to render a complete performance." 63
In cases of doubt, the offeree's performance stands in the place of a
promise by which the offeree is bound and must complete performance.
In addition, despite the retreat in the Restatement (Second) of Contracts
from the unilateral/bilateral dichotomy, courts generally continue to use
the terminology and continue to adhere to the presumption in favor of
bilateralism.64 As contract law entered the twenty-first century, the
often-maligned unilateral contract was perhaps bloody but largely
60 Professor Pettit acknowledges this prospect. See, e.g., id. at 588-96 (noting that notions of
estoppel, public policy, and due process entitlements may support outcomes reached under
unilateral contract approach); id. at 594 ("In most situations, and particularly in contexts in which
courts are expanding the scope of obligation into new areas, there are both promissory and non-
promissory reasons for imposing liability. Recognition and articulation of each might lead to
better-reasoned and more consistent decisions."); id. at 589 ("Although it certainly can be argued
that in the last half-century government has been making more promises and creating more
expectations, the primary explanation for increased judicial intervention lies in social, intellectual,
and political developments and not in the 'promise principle."' (citing P.S. ATIYAH, THE RISE
AND FALL OF FREEDOM OF CONTRACT (1979); Charles Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE L.J.
733 (1964))).
61 See Epstein & Liebesman, supra note 9, at 289-94. The RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
CONTRACTS § 45 (1981) retains the concept of unilateral contracts, substituting the language, by
describing the situation where an offeror "invites an offeree to accept by rendering performance
and does not invite a promissory acceptance."
62 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 32 (1981).
63 Id. § 62.
64 See, e.g., Fosson v. Palace (Waterland), Ltd., 78 F.3d 1448 (9th Cir. 1996) (noting that
under California law a contract is rebuttably presumed to be bilateral); Woodbridge Place
Apartments. v. Wash. Square Capital, Inc., 965 F.2d 1429 (7th Cir. 1992) (applying Indiana law
and determining that when language in loan commitment contract is ambiguous contract is
bilateral); Rode Oil Co. v. Lamar Adver. Co., No. W2007-02017-COA-R3-CV, 2008 WL
4367300, at *6 (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 18, 2008) ("[W]e note that many authorities speak of a
long-established presumption against finding a unilateral rather than a bilateral contract where
there is doubt as to which type of contract was intended.").
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unbowed, with use of the concept continuing in judicial decisions, to the
praise of some commentators. 65
II. THE INSURANCE POLICY AS A "REVERSE-UNILATERAL" CONTRACT
Despite more than a century of debate on the "great dichotomy"
dividing the contracts of the world into unilateral and bilateral, 66 little
had been done to assess insurance policies (although they were
historically viewed as unilateral). Professor Joseph Perillo, the most
prominent contracts scholar 67 to devote any significant attention to the
unilateral/bilateral distinction in insurance, not only placed insurance
policies squarely within the unilateral camp, but also fine-tuned the
conventional assessment by referring to some insurance policies as
"reverse-unilateral." 68 The reverse-unilateral term is used in only a few
cases of any type69 and employed in only two reported insurance
coverage decisions, 70 although the mere description of the insurance
policy as unilateral appears in many more cases71 (but few law review
articles). 72
65 See, e.g., Pettitt, supra note 4, at 551-52.
66 See Llewellyn, On Our Case-Law of Contract (Part I), supra note 5, at 36; see also
Tiersma, supra note 44, at 8-11 (noting the importance of classification in twentieth century
contracts law).
67 Professor Perillo's treatise, PERILLO, supra note 2, is one of the leading treatises in the
field. Professor Perillo has been a member of the Fordham Law School faculty for more than
forty-five years and has authored many scholarly articles and been a prominent speaker and
panelist on contract matters. Consequently, his express insistence that insurance policies are
unilateral contracts carries substantial weight, particularly in view of the relative absence of other
scholarly commentary on the issue.
68 See PERILLO, supra note 2, § 2.10(a), at 58; see also Epstein & Liebesman, supra note 9, at
285 (using the Calamari and Perillo treatise as a basis for reverse-unilateral contract category).
The general concept of a reverse-unilateral contract was described in the RESTATEMENT (FIRST)
OF CONTRACTS § 57 (1932) ("Unilateral Contract Where Proposed Act is to Be Done by
Offeror") and in WILLISTON, supra note 3, at 31.
69 Fewer than ten cases discuss and consider the concept of a reverse-unilateral contracts.
See, e.g., Southtrust Bank v. Williams, 775 So.2d 184 (Ala. 2000) (concerning the enforceability
of an arbitration provision in a checking account); Herman v. Stem, 213 A.2d 594 (Pa. 1965)
(concerning a brokerage commission).
70 See Winters v. State Farm Ins. & Cas. Co., 35 F. Supp. 2d 842 (E.D. Okla. 1999); Nat'l
Union Fire Ins. Co. v. FDIC, 957 P.2d 357 (Kan. 1998).
71 But there are not all that many cases relative to the universe of contract decisions. As of
March 10, 2010, only 223 cases in the LexisNexis database specifically described the insurance
policy as unilateral, although this implicit description appears to be hardwired into the
background assumptions of insurance law. As discussed below, there is a long line of precedent
restricting a policyholder's right to recover on a theory of anticipatory breach or repudiation and
strictly construing requirements listed as conditions in the policy. Both traits are more consistent
with a unilateral characterization than a bilateral characterization. See infra Part III.
72 As of March 10, 2010, only twenty-three articles in the LexisNexis legal periodical
database used the terms "reverse-unilateral." Most used the term to describe "shrinkwrap"
contacts. See, e.g., Steven A. Heath, Contracts, Copyright, and Confusion: Revisiting the
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The insurance policy could be characterized as a unilateral contract
principally because of the perceived absence of a promise on the part of
the policyholder. As discussed in Part I, where only one party to a
contract promises and the other performs, historically the contract has
been deemed unilateral. For the typical unilateral contract, an offer or
conditional promise is first made (e.g., "I'll pay you $100 if you walk
across the Brooklyn Bridge"). The offer is accepted and is completed
by performance following the offer (e.g., the offeree walks across the
bridge, hopefully before any revocation by the offeror). 73
In contrast to typical unilateral formation, in an insurance policy,
the policyholder often makes payment (performance) prior to receiving
promises by the insurer such as indemnity for loss and defense of
liability claims. Because the insurance policy is aleatory, 74 the
policyholder may never receive any indemnity or defense from the
insurer. However, through the insuring agreement contained in the
policy, the insurer in effect promises to provide protection or payment
to the policyholder in the event of a covered occurrence. When
payment by the policyholder precedes the insurer's promise to insure,
the resulting contract is a reverse-unilateral contract and the
Enforceability of "Shrinkwrap" Licenses, 5 CHI.-KENT J. INTELL. PROP. 12 (2005); Deanna L.
Kwong, The Copyright-Contract Intersection: SoftMan Products Co. v. Adobe Systems, Inc. &
Bowers v. Baystate Technologies, Inc., 18 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 349 (2003). A significant
number also described employment-at-will contracts in this manner. See, e.g., Richard A. Lord,
The At-Will Relationship in the 21st Century: A Consideration of Consideration, 58 BAYLOR L.
REV. 707 (2006); Brian T. Kohn, Note, Contracts of Convenience: Preventing Employers From
Unilaterally Modifying Promises Made in Employee Handbooks, 24 CARDOZO L. REV. 799
(2003). A moment's reflection leads to some of the same concerns this Article expresses as to
whether the classification of these arrangements as reverse-unilateral contracts is really correct, a
topic beyond the scope of this Article. One can say with confidence that the concept of the
reverse-unilateral contract, however creative, has not significantly penetrated the legal lexicon.
73 See Wormser, True Conception, supra note 25, at 136. For a fascinating examination of
the tragic historic circumstances producing a Supreme Court opinion permitting the type of
revocation and unfairness attacked by critics of traditional unilateral contract doctrine, see Joseph
M. Perillo, Screed for a Film and Pillar of Classical Contract Law: Shuey v. United States, 71
FORDHAM L. REV. 915 (2002) (describing a case in which citizen giving information leading to
capture of co-conspirator in Lincoln assassination was denied reward due to government's
revocation of offer by means far less prominent than initial offering of reward and because Court
construed offer to require that claimant himself effect capture).
74 See DORFMAN, supra note 2, at 163 (parties to insurance policy "know in advance the
dollars they will exchange will be unequal"); REJDA, supra note 2, at 99 ("An insurance contract
is aleatory rather than commutative" in that the "values exchanged may not be equal but depend
on an uncertain event" while commutative contract "is one in which the values exchanged by both
parties are theoretically equal."). Emmett and Therese Vaughan state that an aleatory contract is
one in which:
[T]he outcome is affected by chance and [] the number of dollars given up by the
contracting parties will be unequal. The insured pays the required premium, and if no
loss occurs, the insurance company pays nothing. If a loss does occur, the insured's
premium is small in relation to the amount the insurer will be required to pay. In the
sense that it is aleatory, an insurance contract is like a gambling contract.
VAUGHAN & VAUGHAN, supra note 2, at 168.
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policyholder is the offeror according to Professor Perillo. 75 Indeed,
insurers typically structure the transaction in this manner so that their
underwriting departments can vet the applicant prior to acceptance and
avoid issuing policies to bad risks. 76 By making an application and
paying the premium, the applicant-cum-policyholder seeks a promise
from the offeree-the insurer. After the premium is paid and the
application approved, the insurer provides its promise to the insured.
Two courts have stated, in accord with the Perillo analysis, that the
insurance policy "is a reverse-unilateral contract in that the applicant's
acts of performance induce insurer's promise."77 Under this approach,
the insurance contract forms upon the payment of a premium by the
policyholder. In exchange for the premium payment, the insurer
promises to provide insurance coverage. "The insured has not made
any promise, but rather, has performed." 78 Because only one promise
(that by the insurer) has been given, "the contract fits within the
standard definition of a unilateral contract."79
There has been some dissent to the unilateral orthodoxy. Professor
Karl Llewellyn, writing in 1939, lamented the characterization of
insurance as unilateral, noting that it just did not feel correct.
Insurance has sometimes been thought a type of contract formed as a
unilateral. Outside of twenty-five cent a week "industrial insurance,"
I do not find it so. Fire insurance "binders"; initial premiums "paid"
by check, whether the check be given with the application or after
approval; blanket coverage billed monthly according to user thereof-
this is the picture as I get it, with most of it in terms of initiation by
agreement and mutual obligation.80
But unlike Llewellyn's criticism of unilateral contracts generally,
his position on insurance as bilateral has not gained traction. The
prevailing view among those few commentators and courts that have
considered it remains that "all forms of insurance are presumed to be
unilateral contracts." 8' Dean Robert Jerry, addressing the question of
75 Professor Perillo explains:
In a reverse-unilateral contract the offeree makes the only promise. For example, if A,
a homeowner, pays $500 to an insurance company asking for the company's promise
to pay A $200,000 if A's house is destroyed by fire, A is the offeror but has made no
promise. Rather A has performed and requested a promise from B, the offeree.
PERILLO, supra note 2, § 2.10(a), at 58.
76 See STEMPEL ON INSURANCE CONTRACTS, supra note 3, §§ 3.01-3.02.
77 Winters v. State Farm & Cas. Co., 35 F. Supp. 2d 842, 845 (E.D. Okla. 1999) (quoting
Nat'1 Union Fire Ins. Co. v. FDIC, 957 P.2d 357, 363 (Kan. 1998)).
78 Combs v. Int'l Ins. Co., 354 F.3d 568, 600 n.18 (6th Cir. 2004).
79 Id.
80 Llewellyn, Our Case-Law of Contract (Part II), supra note 42, at 814.
81 Winters, 35 F. Supp. 2d at 845. When insurance is renewed periodically, courts often
construct the contract as "'a series of unilateral contracts, each beginning with the payment of a
premium for a specified period ... and terminat[ing] at the expiration of that . . . period."'
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whether an insurance contract is bilateral or unilateral, essentially
answered with another question: "Who cares?"
One who labors through this theoretical quagmire is likely to be
disappointed by the following observation: whether an insurance
contract is categorized as bilateral, unilateral, reverse-unilateral or
bilateral-become-unilateral has no apparent significance. However
the offer-acceptance process is described, the result upon the
successful completion of this process is a promise for the breach of
which the law will give a remedy-in short, a contract.82
Although Dean Jerry is correct that the unilateral/bilateral
dichotomy appears to add nothing to our understanding of insurance
disputes, he unduly minimizes its largely negative impact on the
operation of insurance and the resolution of insurer-policyholder
disputes. In an exchange between Professor Perillo and Dean Jerry, the
two* scholars defended both their divergent characterizations of
insurance policies and their differing views as to the consequences of
the characterization of policies. Professor Perillo argued that viewing
the policy as a unilateral contract compels a different result in many
insurance cases than would a bilateral characterization.93 In essence,
Banner Life Ins. Co. v. Mark Wallace Dixson Irrevocable Trust, 206 P.3d 481 (Idaho 2009)
(quoting Guy v. Guy, 560 P.2d 876, 878 (Idaho 1977)).
82 ROBERT H. JERRY, UNDERSTANDING INSURANCE LAW § 31 [a], at 224 (3d ed. 2002). Dean
Jerry shares our skepticism over a unilateral construction. "Although an insurance contract could
theoretically be structured in either form, insurance contracts are usually bilateral." Id. at 223.
83 See Email from Joseph M. Perillo to Robert H. Jerry, II (Mar. 24, 2009) (on file with
Cardozo Law Review) (finding Professor Jerry's view of "no practical significance" to the
characterization question as "astonishing" and contending that judicial enforcement of conditions
in policies, rather than treating these provisions as promises, is heavily influenced by the
unilateral nature of insurance policies). Dean Jerry responded to Professor Perillo:
[T]he problem with [unilateral contract] analysis is that a unilateral contract is not
formed until performance is completed (the offeree can walk away during performance
without liability) and it makes no sense to say that an insurer can cancel a contract at
will any time prior to the end of the contract's term. Likewise, to say that the insurer is
bound to do nothing at the outset of the policy term makes no sense; instead, what the
insurer provides, in exchange for the insured's promise to pay a premium (not that the
insurer's duty will be constructively, and perhaps expressly conditioned on the
insured's performance of that promise) is an immediate promise to pay proceeds (and
to do other things, like defend in the case of liability insurance) on the condition that a
loss within coverage occurs. Indeed, the economics of an insurance contract involve a
present transfer: the insured provides the premium (or promise thereof), and the insurer
provides security through a present promise to assume risk and pay proceeds in the
event of a covered loss. So in every sense of the concept, an insurance contract is an
immediate bilateral exchange with consideration on both sides.
[But] I cannot recall ever seeing a case where the court's labeling of the contract as
"unilateral" or "bilateral" made a difference to the outcome; even if a court goes down
the "unilateral" path, which makes little sense (as noted above), the outcome will be
explainable if the contracts is properly understood as bilateral.
Email from Robert H. Jerry, II to Joseph M. Perillo (Mar. 28, 2009) (on file with Cardozo Law
Review). Dean Jerry also suggested that the General Credit case in the Perillo casebook could be
explained in a manner consistent with characterization of the policy as a bilateral contract. Id.;
2010] MISCLASSIFYING THE INSURANCE POLICY 103
we conclude that Dean Jerry is correct as to the characterization and that
Professor Perillo, although incorrect as to characterization, is right about
the consequences of classification. Part III below explores this seeming
paradox, outlining not only the case for bilateral status but also the
manner in which a unilateral characterization creates mischief in
insurance coverage disputes.
III. PROBLEMS WITH A UNILATERAL CATEGORIZATION OF
INSURANCE POLICIES
The continuing persistence of the unilateral/bilateral dichotomy,
particularly the alleged status of insurance policies as reverse-unilateral
contracts, continues to present problems for the operation of insurance.
As an organizing concept, the unilateral/bilateral or reverse-unilateral
classification does little to help resolve insurance disputes because most
such disputes involve the construction of a concededly applicable policy
rather than disputes over contract formation. 84  As reflected in
Gen. Credit Corp. v. Imperial Casualty & Indem. Co., 95 N.W.2d 145 (Neb. 1959). Professor
Perillo responded:
Your book states that there is no practical reason to label a contract as unilateral or
bilateral. I question that conclusion. Of course, there are conditions in bilateral
contract if they are clearly stated but there is a canon of construction that says if the
language assigning a task is unclear as to its intended legal effect, the preferred
construction is that the language creates a promise rather than a condition. This maxim
cannot logically be applied to a unilateral contract because in a unilateral contact, by
definition, only one party is ever under an obligation and only one party speaks.
Therefore, it makes a difference which classification is chosen. In General Credit and
many cases like it, the court makes the point that only one party (the insurer) speaks. It
treats the contract as unilateral.
You argue that the insurer cannot simply walk away. That is because it has
received consideration for its promise. To my way of thinking, unilateral contract
analysis explains why the insurer cannot sue the insured for not cooperating, etc.
I am aware of a trend that resists treating late notice of an insured event as a
failure of condition. But wouldn't it make more sense to say that conditions in
insurance policies are sometimes treated as sui generis where the insurer is not
prejudiced[?]
Email from Joseph M. Perillo to Robert H. Jerry, II (Apr. 16, 2009) (on file with Cardozo Law
Review).
84 See insurance treatises and casebooks cited supra note 3. Nearly every case reproduced,
discussed, or cited in those sources involves a dispute over the meaning and application of an
insurance policy rather than a dispute over whether a contract was in fact made and a policy
issued. Although insurers often argue that a policy is no longer in effect because of
misrepresentation, fraud, or lapse of premium payment (the last item tending to refute the
traditional view that insurance is always reverse-unilateral because the policyholder performs at
the outset), these defenses seek to terminate or rescind a policy rather than to argue that the
contract was never formed. There may also be issues of lost policies in which the question then
becomes proof of insurance. See STEMPEL ON INSURANCE CONTRACTS, supra note 3, § 3.17.
But, this is not a defense questioning the mechanics of contract formation. There may also be
disputes about whether insurance evidenced by a binder (for property insurance) or conditional
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illustrations such as the Brooklyn Bridge and flagpole hypothetical,
unilateral contract doctrine has largely focused on formation and
revocation of contracts rather than their construction." More troubling,
a closer look at insurance policies and their operation strongly suggests
that they are in fact bilateral agreements in which promises are
exchanged and not the reverse-unilateral oddities of conventional
wisdom. Finally and most importantly, the dominance of the unilateral
characterization of insurance policies has produced problematic results
in insurance coverage cases.
A. Conceptual Concerns: The Questionable Continuing Utility
of the Unilateral/Bilateral Distinction
As discussed above, mid-twentieth century contracts scholars and
contemporary insurance scholars have questioned whether the
unilateral/bilateral contract distinction has any meaning. Karl
Llewellyn was probably unilateralism's most famous critic and his
attack continues to resonate today. He viewed the preoccupation with
unilateralism, and its obsession with performance versus promise, as
running counter to the common sense of real world contracting actors
who seek to attain objectives rather than to engage in a ritualistic and
formalistic process of contract formation. 86 Professor Peter Tiersma
summarized Llewellyn's argument:
[A] definite offer can be accepted in any reasonable way of
expressing agreement unless the offeror specifically requires
otherwise. Real people outside of lunatic asylums do not offer a
promise for a promise. What businessmen offer is an assurance that
after a deal is 'on,' it will not be withdrawn, and that performance
will occur in due course. 87
Perhaps the most vocal critic of the unilateral contract concept
itself was Professor Stoljar, whose attack on unilateral contract theory
as insufficiently protective of reliance interests likewise resonates well
in the modem legal world.
[T]he distinction between bilateral and unilateral contracts is
false because it establishes a contrast between expectation- and
receipt (for life insurance) is operative. See WIDISS, supra note 3, § 2.3, at 43-62. But these
cases largely involve the application of the binder or receipts language rather than doctrinal
questions of contract formation.
85 See supra notes 37-43 and accompanying text (discussing Brooklyn Bridge hypothetical
and flagpole hypothetical); infra Part III.A (discussing the focus of unilateral contract doctrine
and the debate on contract formation).
86 See Llewellyn, On Our Case-law of Contract (Part I), supra note 5, at 36; Llewellyn, Our
Case-law of Contract (Part II), supra note 42, at 788-89.
87 See Tiersma, supra note 44, at 9.
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restitution-contracts but totally ignores the reliance-bargain. The
distinction completely obscures the logical interrelation involved in
the protection of the three contractual interests. If our law of
contract at one end protects restitution (and indeed must protect
promised restitution if promises are to be enforceable at all), and at
the other end protects promised expectations (including purely
aleatory expectations), the law must logically also protect actual
reliance justifiably induced by the promisor. Again, by confusing
two different meanings of acceptance, the distinction disregards a
third type of acceptance and hides the identity of acceptance and
reliance in the reliance-bargain. The promisee's reliance is as much
a manifestation of assent to the exchange which the promisor
proposes in his promise as is the counter-promise in the bilateral
contract.88
To the extent that these criticisms have any weight at all, they are
more compelling in the insurance context, perhaps particularly so
because of the asserted "reverse-unilateral" nature of insurance
contracts as compared to other species of unilateral contract. To echo
Professor Stoljar's concern, reliance interests are at particularly high
tide where insurance is concerned. Trite as it may sound, policyholders
do pay premiums in order to obtain the "peace of mind" of knowing that
they are protected from potential liability or loss. 8 9 Insurance is defined
as the incurring of a small but certain loss (the premium payment) in
return for protection against a larger but contingent loss. 90 Putting the
peace of mind concept more technically, the policyholder as part of a
risk management plan devotes a set portion of its resources to the
purchase of contractual protection against contingent risk.91 Premiums
are prepaid (at least prior to any loss if not prior to inception of the
contract) so that the insurer may obtain the investment benefits as part
of a comprehensive system of social risk-spreading and financing of
risk management.
In addition, the policyholder has relied not only by spending
money that it could have otherwise invested itself for self-insurance or
other gain, but also by forgoing the opportunity to purchase alternative
insurance products. The policyholder is now highly dependent on the
insurer for performance. After a loss or liability event has occurred, the
policyholder is effectively precluded from purchasing insurance from
88 See Stoljar, supra note 1, at 534 (citing Llewellyn, On Our Case-law of Contract (Part 1),
supra note 5, at 33-36; Llewellyn, Our Case-law of Contract (Part 11), supra note 42, at 792-98).
89 See, e.g., Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636, 642 n.10 (1975); Apartment Inv. &
Mgmt. Co. v. Nutmeg, 593 F.3d 1188, 1194 (10th Cir. 2010); Schwartz v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co.,
539 F.3d 135, 150 (2d Cir. 2008).
90 See ABRAHAM, supra note 3, at 3-4; FISCHER ET AL., supra note 3, § 1.02, at 14.
91 See ABRAHAM, supra note 3, at 4-7; DORFMAN, supra note 2, at 2-8; FISCHER ET AL.,
supra note 3, §§ 1.01-1.02; REJDA, supra note 2, at 20-22; VAUGHAN & VAUGHAN, supra note 2,
at 12-14; see also DORFMAN, supra note 2, ch. 3.
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another carrier. 92 Even commercial entities with solid balance sheets
depend on insurance to maintain liquidity. If an insurer fails to perform
without coercion, a policyholder may be substantially hurt even if it
later prevails in coverage litigation. Without the expected insurance
protection (which usually includes legal defense to liability claims as
well as payment to enable repair and rebuilding in property claims)
promptly provided, even commercial policyholders may face cash flow
problems and perhaps even insolvency as well as severe damage to
reputation and ability to continue operations. Individual policyholders
may lose homes, opportunity for medical care, or experience financial
ruin. 93
To the extent that unilateral characterization of contracts is
conceptually problematic in general, the discord is heightened when
unilateral contract doctrine is applied to insurance. Of course, some
degree of intellectual incoherence may be justified in the service of a
needed concept. However, the Llewellyn and Stoijar criticisms strongly
suggest that the concept is unnecessary, especially when applied to an
area of law in which there is relatively little dispute over matters of
contract formation. Although not attacking the unilateral contract
concept itself, two commentators recently found it to be essentially
useless as a legal tool, even in the context of contract formation: "The
important question is how a court determines whether there is a
contract, not whether courts continue to use the phrase 'unilateral
contract.' . . . The words 'unilateral contract' are no more important in
answering these 'real world' questions than the words 'Denny
Crane.' 94
92 After filing a claim for a loss, a policyholder will often not be able obtain insurance, at
least under normal circumstances and for reasonable rates. There are, however, instances in
which an insurer will underwrite coverage after the loss or liability event. For example,
billionaire financier Warren Buffett's companies have been known to issue liability policies
covering a pipeline of anticipated claims, expecting to make money if correctly calculating the
amount of premium dollars and investment income that can be collected in relation to the
eventual final tally of payments necessary to resolve pending claims. See Jeffrey W. Stempel,
Assessing the Coverage Carnage: Asbestos Liability and Insurance After Three Decades of
Dispute, 12 CONN. INS. L.J. 349, 467 (2006). Another example was provided when liability
insurance was sold (undoubtedly at high premium) to the MGM Grand Hotel and Casino after a
tragic fire spurred many claims, with MGM "offloading" the risk of paying for complete
resolution of the claims to the insurer, which collected the large premium, invested it, and then
attempted to pay claims as parsimoniously and gradually as possible so as to profit from the
arrangement. See In re MGM Grand Hotel Fire Litig., 570 F. Supp. 913, 928 (D. Nev. 1983).
93 For examples of how fragile a grip on solvency may be held by individuals and small
businesses, see Robert M. Lawless, Bankruptcy Filing Rates After a Major Hurricane, 6 NEV.
L.J. 7 (2005); Katherine Porter, Going Broke the Hard Way: The Economics of Rural Failure,
2005 Wis. L. REV. 969 (2005).
94 See Epstein & Liebesman, supra note 9, at 307 (referring to the rakish main character-a
senior attorney played in typical over-the-top fashion by the irrepressible actor William Shatner
of Star Trek and Priceline fame-in then-popular television program Boston Legal (ABC
television network 2004-2008)).
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The unilateral/bilateral distinction focuses almost exclusively on
matters of contract formation and revocation. The substantial body of
ink spilled during the twentieth century on the topic centered on the
factors that made for creation of a contract and on whether one offering
a unilateral contract could "pull the plug" on an unsuspecting incipient
acceptor after it had begun to perform the requested act sought by the
offeree. The horrible hypotheticals surrounding the issue, such as
walking across the Brooklyn Bridge, were exclusively focused on
whether the promisor would evade a contract when the performer was
only a few yards from making it to the other borough and emphasized
that the contract formed by performance rather than a return promise.
Although the Brooklyn Bridge problem was (and to some extent
remains) fascinating and fun stuff for the classroom, it focuses-like
much of the standard contracts course-excessively on issues of
formation relative to their importance in the real world. 95 In most
contracts litigation, no question exists that there is a contract. The
parties are fighting over construction and application of the agreement,
not its existence or whether an offer was revoked or a deal improperly
rescinded. Particularly since the rise of promissory estoppel and
creation of contract by detrimental reliance, the classic brainteasers
about contract formation are relatively unimportant for most practicing
attorneys. Except for counsel representing real estate brokers,
companies running contests, or employers concerned over deviating
from the at-will doctrine through publication of rules or handbooks, the
95 Contract scholarship and legal education have generally tended to give inordinate attention
to issues of contract formation relative to the degree to which such issues arise in the real world,
where issues of interpretation, breach, materiality, and damages appear to dominate the case
reports. See, e.g., E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, WILLIAM F. YOUNG, CAROL SANGER, NEIL B.
COHEN, & RICHARD R.W. BROOKS, CONTRACTS: CASES AND MATERIALS (7th ed. 2008)
(roughly 200 pages of 958-page text devoted to issue of contract formation and 320 pages
concerning contract construction); CHARLES L. KNAPP, NATHAN M. CRYSTAL & HARRY G.
PRINCE, PROBLEMS IN CONTRACT LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS (6th ed. 2007) (350 or more
pages in 1046-page text deal with contract formation matters); ROBERT E. SCOTT & JODY S.
KRAUS, CONTRACT LAW AND THEORY (4th ed. 2007) (450-500 pages in 1070-page text devoted
to matters of contract formation). An arguable exception to this overall tendency is STEWART
MACAULAY, JOHN KIDWELL & WILLIAM WHITFORD, CONTRACTS: LAW IN ACTION (2d ed.
2003) (80 pages in an 1100-page book devoted to contract formation). Perhaps not
coincidentally, Professor Perillo's casebook is among the most interested in contract formation
issues. See PERILLO, supra note 2 (arguably as many as 500 pages of 885-page book focusing on
contract formation and related issues).
To be sure, classification of contract casebook coverage can involve characterization
questions as debatable as whether insurance policies are unilateral or bilateral contracts (e.g., is
material on the statute of frauds, incapacity, or unconscionability within the domain of contract
formation?). Even if our classification is debatable, it remains obvious that contracts scholars pay
a good deal of attention to contract formation, perhaps too much in relation to the attention paid
to contract construction and remedies for breach, which appear to dominate actual contract
litigation. The focus on contract formation dwarfs the attention given to assignment, intended
and incidental beneficiaries, and consideration of parol/extrinsic evidence, topics that get little
attention in law school but may be frequently litigated.
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unilateral/bilateral distinction is likely not germane to their practices or
their clients' lives.
This is especially the case with insurance. Nearly all insurance
litigation focuses not on whether an insurance policy is in effect, but on
whether there is coverage under the terms of a concededly operative
contract. The issue is usually "is this loss or liability covered?" not "is
the purported insurance policy in force?" There are, of course, more
than a few insurance disputes involving rescission. However, these are
not cases involving revocations of an offer. Instead, the typical
rescission case alleges that the applicant-cum-policyholder made a
material misrepresentation inducing conceded issuance of the contested
insurance policy. The unilateral/bilateral distinction is irrelevant to
resolution of such a case.
Alternatively, insurance litigation may address whether insurance
is in force prior to the formal issuance and delivery of an insurance
policy. Most commonly, this occurs when a life, health, or disability
applicant/policyholder suffers loss while the application is processing.
Where the applicant has not yet paid the premium and received a
conditional receipt, the insurer typically wins easily because it does not
"accept" the applicant's offer to buy insurance until it issues the policy.
As discussed in Part III.B below, the insurer's issuance of the policy as
a promise to cover contingent losses or liabilities is better viewed as
acceptance of the applicant's offer than as a mere precursor to
performance of a unilateral contract. If the insurer has issued a
conditional receipt, the case will usually be resolved based upon
interpretation of the conditional receipt rather than upon concepts of
unilateral and bilateral contracts. 96
In addition, as with other areas of the law, obligations may be
created by acts or words reasonably inducing detrimental reliance. 97
Consequently, an insurance agent's statement that an applicant or
policyholder is "covered" may be enough to establish the existence of
an insurance policy even without formal application processing and
insurer issuance of a policy form.98 However, the precise contours of
coverage remain open for determination based on the type of policy at
issue; the agent's statement, even if sufficient to establish an insurer-
policyholder relationship, does not necessarily bind the insurer to
provide coverage for the loss at issue. This fact of legal life also
undermines the potential importance of any difference between
unilateral contracts and bilateral contracts.
96 See WIDISS, supra note 3, at 42-64; infra Part III.B.
97 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 90 (1981).
98 See, e.g., Bill Brown Constr. Co. v. Glens Falls Ins. Co., 818 S.W.2d I (Tenn. 1991);
Dixon v. Pickle, 327 S.W.2d 50, 52 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1959).
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In addition, as contrasted to typical contract relations, the law
generally views the insurer-policyholder relationship as somewhat
fiduciary in nature (for most first-party insurance) or even fully
fiduciary (for liability insurance where the insurer is charged with
defending and settling claims). 99 Although the fiduciary-like duties of
the insurer do not accrue until there is an insuring agreement in place,
the special relationship of the parties and the duties of insurer to
policyholder logically increase the importance of protecting reliance-
based interest. Even for non-insurance contracting, duties of minimal
good faith may attach during negotiation'00 that prevent sharp practices,
a duty logically enhanced in the insurance context.
In the same vein, state law or regulation usually restricts an
insurer's right to cancel, further minimizing the possibility that
unilateral/bilateral concepts can conceivably impact issues of formation,
rescission, continuation, or modification of an insurance policy.' 0'
Although the insurer may usually reserve a right to modify policy terms,
at least when renewing (and sometimes even during the policy period),
insurers are also usually required to disclose any coverage-reducing
changes in the policy.102
The nature of insurance has thus created an environment in which
contract formation generally is not much of an issue and in which the
unilateral/bilateral distinction is even less of an issue, at least in the vast
bulk of insurance matters and disputes. It therefore seems wasteful and
misleading to devote significant attention to the unilateral/bilateral
distinction because it falsely implies that contract formation is a major
problem of insurance jurisprudence.
In short, the unilateral/bilateral distinction appears to have nothing
positive to contribute to insurance law. As demonstrated in Part III.C
below, the distinction has adverse effects in disputes surrounding
insurance contract performance. Further, as outlined in Part III.B
below, the classification of insurance policies as unilateral or reverse-
unilateral contracts appears incorrect when one appreciates the actual
operation of insurance contracting.
99 See ANDERSON ET AL., supra note 3, §§ 11.02, 11.06; ROBERT H. JERRY, II & DOUGLAS
RICHMOND, UNDERSTANDING INSURANCE LAW § 25G (4th ed. 2007); STEMPEL ON INSURANCE
CONTRACTS, supra note 3, § 10.01.
100 See E. Allan Farnsworth, Precontractual Liability and Preliminary Agreements: Fair
Dealing and Failed Negotiations, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 217, 272 (1987) (explaining the concept of
precontractual good faith).
101 See FISCHER ET AL., supra note 3, § 4.08; STEMPEL ON INSURANCE CONTRACTS, supra
note 3, § 3.16.
102 See, e.g., Canadian Universal Ins. Co. v. Fire Watch, Inc., 258 N.W.2d 570 (Minn. 1977);
see also STEMPEL ON INSURANCE CONTRACTS, supra note 3, §§ 4.09, 4.13.
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B. Characterization Concerns: Insurance Policies as Better
Resembling Bilateral Contracts
For the most part, insurance scholars have devoted almost no
attention to the issue of whether insurance policies are unilateral or
bilateral contracts. 103 Those that have touched on the issue at all have
largely reiterated, with little or no comment, the conventional view that
insurance is a unilateral arrangement-a view largely put forth by
contracts authorities who conducted relatively limited insurance
scholarshipl 04 -or suggest that the unilateral/bilateral classification is
unimportant. 0 5
As noted above, the most influential and authoritative modem
voice in the classification debate, one strongly supporting the unilateral
denomination, has been that of Professor Perillo. His popular treatise
characterizes the insurance policy as a reverse-unilateral contract
because the offeror-applicant-policyholder "performs" or fulfills its
contract obligations in advance by paying a premium in return for the
insurer's promise of coverage in the event of loss.1 06 The Calamari and
Perillo treatise is unusual in that it both focuses on insurance as a type
of unilateral contract and uses the term "reverse-unilateral" to more
closely describe the transaction and bring insurance policies into the
realm of unilateral contracts. Most mainstream contracts treatises and
casebooks not only give little attention to insurance, but also give little
or no attention to the question of whether insurance contracts are
unilateral or bilateral. 107
As a result, the limited exploration on the unilateral/bilateral
question in the context of insurance has largely been the province of
contract generalists rather than insurance specialists. Literature labeling
insurance as a unilateral contract has perhaps for that reason tended to
overlook or under-appreciate specific aspects of insurance that cast
doubt on the unilateral characterization. When viewed in a
comprehensive, practical, and ongoing fashion, the insurance policy
begins to look much more like a bilateral contract.
Consider the basic manner in which insurance is sold. Insurers are
ubiquitous advertisers. Standard contract law doctrine establishes that
an advertisement is normally not an offer, but instead is an invitation for
103 See supra note 2.
104 See supra note 3.
105 See JERRY, supra note 82, § 31, at 224; see also sources cited supra note 3.
106 See PERILLO, supra note 2, § 2.10, at 57-58.
107 See supra note 3.
[Vol. 32:1110
2010] MISCLASSIFYING THE INSURANCE POLICY 111
the prospective customer to make an offer.108 Insurers in particular
attempt to benefit from this construct because the prospective
policyholder normally must not only ask for insurance but also
complete an application for insurance that can be reviewed by the
insurer's underwriting department to determine whether the insurer
wishes to assume the risks presented by the particular policyholder for
the type of insurance sought. 109 In addition to giving the insurer the
option of taking a longer, harder look before committing to cover
contingent risks presented by an applicant/policyholder, this structuring
of the transaction permits the insurer to seize upon inaccuracies in the
application and pursue rescission on misrepresentation grounds where
the matter is material and substantially inaccurate.I10
Commonly, the applicant also tenders the first premium with the
application so that coverage is created immediately upon the insurer's
approval of the risk and decision to issue the policy.I1' Life, disability,
and individual health insurance often differ in stating that the insurance
contract is not in effect until the policy is delivered to the
applicant/policyholder,11 2 although decades of case law have largely
turned this into a matter of constructive delivery rather than actual in-
hand receipt of paper by the policyholder.113
In a perhaps inconsistent approach to the contracting process,
insurers also commonly issue a conditional receipt when taking a life,
health or disability application and premium payment.' 14 Although
there are several types of conditional receipts, the most common variety
provides that coverage is considered to begin as of the date of the
application, provided that the applicant is eligible for the coverage
sought according to the insurer's prevailing underwriting criteria." 5 In
this manner, the insurer encourages prepayment of premiums, which it
can invest, and discourages the applicant from pursuing competing
insurance products. The conditional receipt also protects the
108 see CALAMARI ET AL., supra note 83, at 28-29.
109 See STEMPEL ON INSURANCE CONTRACTS, supra note 3, §§ 3.01-3.02, 3.06.
110 See id. §§ 3.07-3.11.
111 See id. § §3.01-3.02.
112 See JERRY & RICHMOND, supra note 99, § 32; STEMPEL ON INSURANCE CONTRACTS,
supra note 3, § 3.06; see also Edwin W. Patterson, Delivery ofa Life-Insurance Policy, 33 HARV.
L. REv. 198 (1919).
113 See JERRY & RICHMOND, supra note 99, § 32; STEMPEL ON INSURANCE CONTRACTS,
supra note 3, § 3.06.
114 See STEMPEL ON INSURANCE CONTRACTS, supra note 3, § 3.05; WIDISS, supra note 3, at
42-63.
115 See JERRY & RICHMOND, supra note 99, § 32; ROBERT E. KEETON & ALAN 1. WIDISS,
INSURANCE LAW: A GUIDE TO FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES, LEGAL DOCTRINES, AND
COMMERCIAL PRACTICES § 2.3 (2d ed. 1989); STEMPEL ON INSURANCE CONTRACTS, supra note
3, § 3.05.
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policyholder from fortuitous injury during the pendency of the
underwriting process, which may take several weeks." 6
By contrast, property and casualty underwriting is more
encapsulated, with insurers tending to accept risks immediately, often
through the authority of the sales agent, so long as the information
provided by the applicant is correct. 17 Property insurers, for example,
issue "binders" rather than conditional receipts and depend on
misrepresentation and other rescission doctrines to protect themselves
from unwanted risks. This is in contrast to the more extensive pre-
policy investigation that accompanies life, health, and disability
insurance. "8
So far, so good for the proponents of reverse-unilateralism. The
applicant is offering to buy insurance and performing its part of the
bargain by paying the premium. In return, the insurer accepts the offer
(and cashes the applicant's check) while promising to cover specified
contingent losses that may take place. Thereafter, however, the
insurance relationship and the typical insurance claim become
considerably more complicated than walking across the Brooklyn
Bridge.
First, there is the practical matter of premium payment. Although
the applicant has paid the initial premium in return for coverage for a
specified period, modern insurance is often not a one-shot transaction.
Rather, it tends-at least for many policyholders and insurers-to be a
classic relational contract.1 9 The first premium payment is often for a
short period, perhaps as little as a month. In order to keep coverage in
force, the policyholder is required to continue making regular payments.
Traditionally, insurance premiums were paid every six months,
although many insurers now bill quarterly. Perhaps more common still
is monthly billing facilitated through the regular debiting of the
policyholder's checking or savings account.120 All of this requires
116 See KEETON & WIDISS, supra note 115, § 2.3; STEMPEL ON INSURANCE CONTRACTS,
supra note 3, § 3.05.
117 See JERRY, supra note 82, § 33 at 245; KEETON & WIDISS, supra note 115, § 2.3; STEMPEL
ON INSURANCE CONTRACTS, supra note 3, § 3.05.
118 See FISCHER ET AL., supra note 3, § 4.03(A); JERRY, supra note 82, § 33, 245; STEMPEL
ON INSURANCE CONTRACTS, supra note 3, § 3.05.
119 A relational contract is one in which the parties are or expect to be engaged in ongoing
interactions and therefore value, among other things, cooperation and flexibility in order to
preserve the relationship. See generally IAN R. MACNEIL, THE NEW SOCIAL CONTRACT: AN
INQUIRY INTO MODERN CONTRACTUAL RELATIONS (1980); Stewart Macaulay, An Empirical
View of Contract, 1985 Wis. L. REV. 465, 467-68 (1985); Ian R. Macneil, Values in Contract:
Internal and External, 78 Nw. U. L. REV. 340 (1983); lan R. Macneil, Contracts: Adjustment of
Long-Term Economic Relations Under Classical, Neoclassical, and Relational Contract Law, 72
NW. U. L. REV. 854 (1978).
120 Twenty or more years ago, such arrangements were sufficiently novel to merit substantial
comment in litigation concerning whether a policy had lapsed due to failure of timely premium
payment. See, e.g., Horace Mann Life Ins. Co. v. Lunsford, 324 S.E.2d 808 (Ga. Ct. App. 1984).
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administrative activity by the insurer, both in establishing a regime of
periodic payment and in tracking and collecting payment.
As a result, what in first-year Contracts class may look like the
policyholder's "complete performance" of its payment obligations in an
insurance contract begins in operation to look much more like a down
payment on the policy with a promise to continue paying premiums on
the policy at regular intervals. Consequently, the exchange between
applicant/policyholder and insurer tends in practice to look more like an
exchange of promises rather than an exchange of performance for
promise-at least for policyholders who are establishing an insurance or
risk management program rather than simply buying short-term
insurance. 121
Proponents of the unilateral school would undoubtedly argue that
the policyholder's promise of a continued stream of premium payments
is not a true bilateral promise because the policyholder is free to stop
making payments at any time without apparent liability to the insurer.
However, to the extent this is true (and as discussed below, it is a
misleading view of the policyholder's prerogatives), the same might be
said of magazine subscriptions, record clubs, yard service, pool service,
or countless other contractual arrangements that are generally regarded
as bilateral (to the extent anyone pauses to classify them at all).
Consider what happens when a policyholder ceases paying
premiums. The insurer typically sends a reminder of delinquency and
permits the policy to be reinstated if the past due premiums are made
good. It is common, particularly for life, health, or disability insurance,
for the insurer to provide for a grace period prior to cancelling the
policy.122 The insurer invests nontrivial administrative resources in
attempting to induce policyholders to keep their at least implicit
promises of continued premium payment. If the policyholder persists in
nonpayment, the policy lapses and become ineffective or expires by its
terms.
Termination of an insurance policy for failure to pay new premium
obligations that accrue is not much different from failing to renew a
Today, such regular (usually monthly) automatic debiting of a bank account for premium
payment is widespread. In addition, other payment arrangements are possible as well. For
instance, insurers may collect premiums after the policy has been issued. See Great Am. Ins. Co.
v. Matzen Constr. Co., 494 N.Y.S.2d 464 (N.Y. App. Div. 1985). They may also accept
promissory notes. See Raney v. Piedmont S. Life Ins. Co., 387 F.2d 75 (8th Cir. 1967).
121 Dean Jerry makes many of these same points in his email exchange with Professor Perillo,
excerpted supra note 83.
122 Dean Jerry views the grace period as the policyholder's temporary indebtedness to the
insurer. JERRY, supra note 82, at 623. If the new premium is paid, coverage continues, but if it is
not, then the policy terminates on the date the premium was due. Id. If the policyholder dies
during the grace period, the policy is in effect and the premium is paid out of the proceeds. Id.;
see, e.g., Furtado v. Metro. Life. Ins. Inc., 131 Cal. Rptr. 250 (Cal. Ct. App. 1976) (calculating
grace period in conjunction with nonforfeiture provision in a whole life policy).
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magazine subscription (which typically earns the subscriber three to
four plaintive entreaties from the publisher seeking renewal, often at
ever more attractive subscription rates). Similarly, when a customer
stops paying for lawn care, pool care, newspaper delivery, or the like,
the vendor attempts to induce the customer to stand by its earlier
implicit promise of patronage and is normally eager to keep the
relational and rolling contract in effect.
Further, if the vendor has rendered continued services after
payment has stopped, the vendor in theory has a cause of action for
breach of contract or at least quantum meruit recovery, unless given
adequate and timely notice by the customer that services were no longer
required, just as the customer would have a claim against the vendor
that failed to show up and provide promised services.123 In practice,
such small claims are almost never brought because the logistical costs
of enforcement exceed any real injury. Vendors who deliver and are
unpaid, however, usually at least bill the nonpaying customer and may
even commence collection actions.124
Where the policyholder announces a desire to end coverage rather
than simply failing to pay newly billed premiums, the bilateralness of
insurance contracts appears more pronounced. For example, a
policyholder on a six-month billing cycle for her automobile policy may
call her agent during the third month and cancel coverage, planning to
switch to a less expensive insurer. As unilateral contract enthusiasts
point out, the insurer cannot compel the policyholder to stay and
commonly returns roughly half of the six-month premium paid some
three months earlier. This hardly means the cancelling policyholder, as
one performing prior to the policy period, was free of obligations
sounding in promise.
In policy termination situations, the insurer usually refunds a
portion of the previous premium payment-but only a portion. The
insurer regards the first three months' premium as "earned" because the
insurer assumed the risk, even if the policyholder had no auto-related
mishaps. The refunded half of the six-month premium is the "unearned
premium." 25 In practical terms, the policyholder is not walking away
123 See EPSTEIN ET AL., supra note 3, at 150 (citing Austin v. Burge, 137 S.W. 618 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1911)) (describing potential customer liability for continuing to receive services despite
tardy or imperfectly expressed intent to cancel or reject). The Postal Reorganization Act of 1970
subsequently made it an unfair trade practice to bill a recipient for unsolicited merchandise sent
through the mail. See id. (citing 39 U.S.C. § 3009).
124 See, e.g., Jim Dwyer, Hello, Collections? The Worm Has Turned, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 29,
2009, at I (describing creditor and law firm's aggressive pursuit of the wrong person in
connection with $919 credit card debt).
125 State laws vary as to whether and how insurers may use a short rate method to recalculate
and retain more than a pro rata share of the unearned premiums when policyholders cancel
prematurely. LEE R. Russ & THOMAS F. SEGALLA, 5 COUCH ON INSURANCE § 79:22 (Westlaw
2010). When permitted, a short rate refund works like a liquidated damages provision and allows
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without any liability to the insurer but rather permissibly breaches the
insurance contract and essentially pays liquidated damagesl 26 based on
an implicit out-of-pocket or restitution1 27 formula for the insurer. The
policyholder has no further obligation and can get a refund of unearned
premium, but the earned premium remains with the insurer-and is
considered earned by the insurer even though the policyholder has
submitted no claims and the insurer has paid nothing (although it did
incur sales and administrative costs). The insurer also gained from
having all premiums previously paid at its disposal for investment.
In some states, however, insurers are not required to refund
premiums on a pro-rata basis and may retain at least a portion of the
unearned premium. To the extent this occurs, the entire process looks
even more like contract "breach" by the policyholder (ending the
insurance policy earlier than promised) that leads to the imposition of a
type of de facto liquidated damages as a result.
If the insurance policy were purely unilateral or reverse-unilateral,
the policyholder's full "performance" through paying the premium
would not logically lead to a withdrawal or repudiation of performance
already delivered. For example, in the Brooklyn Bridge hypothetical,
performance by the offeree trekking the Bridge cannot be undone or
reversed. The same can be said of the flagpole climber in that famous
hypothetical. Although characterizing insurance policies as reverse-
unilateral arguably provides an explanation for this oddity, our view is
that it provides a stronger argument that the insurance policy is better
viewed as bilateral rather than as a mutated species of unilateral
contract.
The policyholder terminating coverage arguably forfeits or loses
the premiums previously paid covering the three months for which the
policyholder received nothing more than the insurer's assurances that it
would provide coverage if the need arose. The better view, however, is
that the policyholder did indeed get what it paid for during those three
months-protection against contingent loss that the policyholder was
fortunate enough not to have incurred during the time the policy was in
the insurer to recalculate the premium based upon "'the customary rates charged for insuring like
property, in a like amount"' for a shorter term and return less than a pro rata calculation. Home
Ins. Co. v. Hamilton, 128 S.W. 273, 274 (Mo. App. 1910); see also Amgro, Inc. v. Lincoln Gen.
Ins. Co., 361 F. App'x 338 (3d Cir. 2010) (discussing a New Jersey statute regarding short rate
premium refund); Argonaut Sw. Ins. Co. v. Amco Mesh & Wire Co., 472 S.W.2d 843 (Tex. App.
1971) (discussing insurance policy language providing for a short rate calculation when insured
cancels prematurely). Regarding premium refunds, see DORFMAN, supra note 2, at 187-88;
VAUGHAN & VAUGHAN, supra note 2, at 122-26.
126 Liquidated damages are a sum stipulated within the contract as the damages for breach.
The sum must be "reasonable in light of the anticipated or actual loss caused by the breach and
the difficulties of proof of loss." RESTATEMENT (SECOND)OF CONTRACTS § 356 (1981).
127 Restitution damages are a sum of damages measured by "the benefit that has been
conferred upon" the liable party. Id. § 371 cmt. a.
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effect. Under either view, however, neither the policyholder nor the
insurer gains because of any unilateral concept of the insurance policy.
The policyholder could just as easily have promised regular payments
and then stopped making payment, rather than paying the initial six
months of premiums and then seeking a refund. If anything, the latter
arrangement is a boon to the insurer by providing it with capital that it
would not otherwise have had if the policyholder had only promised to
pay (rather than paid) at the outset.
In theory, the insurer might be able to seek consequential damages
when a policyholder breaches by cancellation. However, under the
classic common law approach of Hadley v. Baxendale and its
progeny,128 this is unlikely in that the policyholder usually has no
reason to know of any adverse consequences that will befall the insurer
from cancellation.129 Further consequential damages are thus usually
outside the contemplation of the parties and not recoverable. If
permitted by state regulators, however, insurers could probably
structure the transaction to recover actual damages for early
cancellation.
Such damages provisions in policies or full-blown litigation over a
prematurely terminated insurance policy seldom occur, not only because
of the economics of litigation, but also because of prevailing insurer
views regarding effective marketing and customer relations. Insurers
appear to have made the decision not to push the contract doctrine
envelope and seek full compensation from policyholders who walk
away from policies even though it would appear they could make non-
frivolous attempts to do so. Instead, insurers appear content to let
policyholders leave and to concentrate their efforts upon enlisting new
customers rather than pursuing claims against those who leave.
Characterization of the insurance policy as unilateral or reverse-
unilateral does not change this calculus or the options facing insurers
and policyholders. Even where premium payment is regarded as full
performance, seeking a refund of premium after the insurer has
promised coverage for a given time constitutes a breach of any such
reverse-unilateral contract and, as discussed above, entitles the insurer
to retain premium for the time when coverage was provided (and
perhaps some of the unearned premium) even if the policyholder is
allowed to end the arrangement earlier than expected. But if a
consumer insurer (e.g., an auto insurer such as State Farm) were to do
more, such as retaining some of the unearned premium as an
approximation of incidental or consequential damages or suing for such
128 Hadley v. Baxendale, (1854) 156 Eng. Rep. 145 (Exch. Div.).
129 Consequential damages are "those which will not always result from a breach of contract
of the character of the particular breach, but which did flow from this breach and were
foreseeable." WILLISTON, supra note 3, § 66:57.
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damages, the insurer would almost certainly reap significant adverse
publicity. Seldom will an insurer consider this detriment smaller than
the expected value of a full-blown breach of contract claim against the
policyholder who walks out early. In the less public arena of surplus
lines insurance, adverse publicity is less of a problem.
Perhaps more important, most state insurance regulations require
refunds of unearned premium, precluding the insurer from taking a
tough approach to terminating policyholders even if it is convinced that
this is a legally supportable and valid business proposition. Insurance
is, at least as compared to most contractual activity, heavily
regulated. 130 As a result, positive law may circumscribe insurer
behavior, as well as policyholder or applicant behavior. This aspect of
insurance not only tends to make contract characterization issues less
important than might otherwise be the case, but also makes insurance
contracting and the operation of insurance something more than a
purely contractual exercise. The problems of policyholder cancellation
and premium refund illustrate the degree to which the relentlessly
unilateral view of insurance policies seems not to square with the actual
insurer-policyholder relationship in practice.
Insurance is not only publicly regulated, but also reflects a type of
private ordering arrived at by the insurance industryl31 which, because
of exceptions to the antitrust laws, is permitted to collaborate to an
extent not found in most other businesses.132 In addition, the highly
standardized nature of insurance and the use of standardized policies as
components of widely shared risk management goals by certain types of
businesses and individuals makes insurance policies something akin to
products rather than pure contracts.133 Moreover, the importance of
insurance in achieving policy goals and fostering commerce makes it
something of a social institution or instrument for effecting social
policy.134 Although none of these different perspectives strip insurance
policies of their core character as contracts, they make the
unilateral/bilateral distinction and contract formation issues generally
less important than in other areas of contract.
130 See JERRY, supra note 82, at 69-78 (discussing the justifications for state regulation and the
historical rise of comprehensive state regulation of insurance and the influence of the National
Association of Insurance Commissioners); STEMPEL ON INSURANCE CONTRACTS, supra note 3,
§§ 2.03-2.05.
131 See Jeffrey W. Stempel, The Insurance Policy as Statute, 42 McGEORGE L. REV. 203
(2010).
132 See 15 U.S.C. § 1011 (2006).
133 See Daniel Schwarcz, A Products Liability Theory for the Judicial Regulation ofInsurance
Policies, 48 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1389 (2006); Jeffrey W. Stempel, The Insurance Policy as
Thing, 44 TORT TRIAL & INS. PRAC. L.J. 813 (2009).
134 See Jeffrey W. Stempel, The Insurance Policy as Social Instrument and Social Institution,
51 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1489 (2010).
118 CARDOZO LAW REVIEW [Vol. 32:1
In addition, because the insurer-policyholder relationship carries
with it more significant obligations of good faith than found in the
ordinary contract relationship, the insurer is logically restricted in its
options in dealing with the policyholder in any way that may harm the
policyholder.135 Because a "no harm, no foul" ethos and tradition
dominates policyholder cancellation of policies, the issue has not been
well tested. One can make a compelling argument that an insurer with
fiduciary-like duties to the policyholder acts in bad faith if it responds to
the policyholder's termination and request for a refund with undue
efforts to hold the policyholder to the original arrangement or wrings
from the policyholder every last cent in seeking full compensation of
every arguable injury suffered by the insurer when the policyholder
leaves. 136 Good faith requires that the insurer give equal consideration
to the policyholder's interests as to those of the insurer,137 a standard
135 Every contract carries with it an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. See
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) CONTRACTS § 205 (1981); PERILLO, supra note 2, § 11.38, at 412-17;
FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS, supra note 3, § 7.17. However, outside of insurance, the duty has
relatively modest scope and consequences. For example, Article 1 of the Uniform Commercial
Code governing sales defines good faith as mere "honesty in fact and the observance of
reasonable commercial standards of fair dealing." U.C.C. § 1-201(20) (2010).
By contrast, an insurer's duty of good faith toward a policyholder is fiduciary in nature or
even fully fiduciary when the insurer is discharging its role of defense and settlement of liability
claims against the policyholder. Further, most jurisdictions treat an insurer's breach of the
covenant of good faith and fair dealing as a tort and permit an aggrieved policyholder to pursue
tort remedies (which are generally more expansive than contract remedies), including punitive
damages. See FISCHER ET AL., supra note 3, § 14.01; JERRY, supra note 82, § 25[G]; OSTRAGER
& NEWMAN, supra note 3, §§ 12.01, 12.12; STEMPEL ON INSURANCE CONTRACTS, supra note 3,
§ 10.01.
136 Good faith toward a policyholder generally requires that the insurer give the policyholder's
interest at least equal consideration to the insurer's own interests and to refrain from sharp
practices. See FISCHER ET AL., supra note 3, § 14.01; OSTRAGER & NEWMAN, supra note 3, §
12.06, at 862; STEMPEL ON INSURANCE CONTRACTS, supra note 3, § 10.01. Because an insurer
cancelling a policy expects to terminate its responsibility for contingent liability or loss, the equal
consideration principle logically suggests that the insurer facing a policyholder's termination
should happily refund unearned premium, irrespective of whether the insurance policy is viewed
as a unilateral contract or a bilateral contract. Selling insurance and collecting a premium in
advance of acceptance of contingent risk but then refusing to refund unearned premium would
permit the insurer to unfairly elevate its own interests above those of the policyholder. It would
also permit the insurer to take undue advantage of policyholders, particularly less sophisticated
policyholders who have not thought through issues of policy termination and its consequences.
In addition, it should be noted that policy termination by the policyholder is often not the
result of calculating behavior by the policyholder such as bargain-hunting among available
insurance products. For example, a policyholder may wish to terminate a policy and seek a
premium refund because of a job transfer, sale of the insured assets, divorce, death, or other
situations that have changed the policyholder's risk management preferences since the time the
policy was initially purchased.
137 See STEMPEL ON INSURANCE CONTRACTS, supra note 3, § 10.01 (equal consideration
standard for good faith by insurers); see also STEPHEN S. ASHLEY, BAD FAITH ACTIONS:
LIABILITY AND DAMAGES §1.2, at 1-3 (2d ed. 2009) (essentially the same perspective in that the
covenant of good faith requires "each party to refrain from doing anything that would injure the
right of the other party to receive the benefits of the agreement").
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that arguably precludes a scorched earth, retaliatory attitude toward
customers who want to leave.
In addition, the degree of good faith required for insurance greatly
exceeds that imposed on most contractual relations. The insurer-
policyholder relationship is considered semi-fiduciary in all
jurisdictions and fully fiduciary in most jurisdictions in the liability
insurance context where the insurer has the right and duty to defend the
policyholder in litigation and attempt to settle claims, particularly where
there is risk that a resulting judgment could exceed policy limits.
The existence of the substantial good faith duties that attach to
insurance policies tends to undermine the unilateral characterization.
On one hand, treating premium payment by the policyholder as full
performance helps to support the idea that the policyholder is vulnerable
and should not be deprived of the benefit of the bargain in receiving
performance should the insured contingent events take place. But more
important, the good faith obligations of the insurer, combined with the
duties of the policyholder after a claim or loss, tend to show that the
relationship is ongoing rather than fully performed by premium
payment or limited on the insurer's part to mere execution of a simple
task such as traversing a bridge, climbing a flagpole, or handing over an
agreed sum.
Once the insurer "accepts" the policyholder's "offer" to buy
insurance, gives "full performance" through premium payment, and the
insurer issues the insurance policy, the resulting arrangement begins to
look much more like a standard bilateral contract than a vendor paid in
advance to cross the Brooklyn Bridge or shinny up a flagpole. In
addition to the policyholder's implicit promise to continue paying
premiums and to keep the policy in force, there remains, as discussed
above, the strong possibility that the insurer will revise policy terms,
either during the policy period or upon renewal. Although there are
some regulatory and case law constraints, insurers for the most part
have substantial latitude to unilaterally amend the provisions of their
policies, as do most commercial vendors dealing with consumers. 138 In
these other contexts, of course, the contracts involved (e.g., credit card
accounts, utility services, banking accounts) are universally recognized
as bilateral. By contrast, as a theoretical matter, unilateral amendment
of the terms should have no rule in unilateral contracts because, by
definition, there has been no contract formed or the contract is formed
and fully executed at the same moment. Logically, then, the mere
presence of unilateral amendment of contract terms suggests that the
contract in question is not unilateral.
138 See David Horton, The Shadow Terms: Contract Procedure and Unilateral Amendments,
57 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 605 (2010).
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As a matter of classification and nomenclature, any modification to
the original offer to form a unilateral contract is not a change in terms,
but a revision of the offer in question. For example, in the classic
agreed instances of unilateral contracts such as the Brooklyn Bridge
hypothetical, the offeror's sudden reduction of the promised payment
yelled to the walker minutes before she reaches the end of the Bridge is
not a change in contract terms (because the contract is as yet unformed),
but is instead a revoked original offer, a revised offer, or a new offer.' 39
Once it was agreed that the beginning of substantial performance by the
walker precluded revocation of the offer,140 it also logically followed
that the offeror could also not unilaterally alter the offer to the partial
performer's detriment. But for insurance policies, we find unilateral
amendment to be a constant. 141
If the insurance policy were truly unilateral or reverse-unilateral,
full performance through premium payment would logically make such
changes in terms ineffective unless they gave the policyholder greater
protection than promised in the original deal. 142 Unilateral amendments
to contracts are generally justified by those who support them on the
ground that the initial contract gave the vendor the right to such
modification. As Professor David Horton has shown, much of the
rationale undergirding the legal system's toleration of such unilateral
amendment is faulty and a good case can be made for prohibiting such
unilateral rewriting of contracts altogether. 143  Regardless of one's
position on this issue, however, the presence of unilateral modification
of insurance policy terms tends to suggest an ongoing and iterative
relationship between policyholder and insurer, rather than the more
simplified schematic advanced by a unilateral classification of the
insurance policy and the parties' relationship.
139 See supra notes 37-47 and accompanying text (describing unilateral contract theory and its
application).
140 See supra note 44 and accompanying text (describing how the harshness of the original
view that the offeror could revoke after the offeree began performance led to the consensus that
substantial part performance created contract rights for the performing offeree).
141 Skeptical readers need only look at the inserts commonly included with premium billings
from their insurers, which often contain a unilateral change in the terms of the policy. Although
the unilateral changes may not become operative until the next pay period (which provides the
additional consideration and de facto acceptance of the new terms required in some states), the
practical impact is a pure unilateral amendment. This is because the typical insurance
policyholder, particularly a consumer policyholder, routinely keeps paying the premium without
reading the insert. See Stempel, The Insurance Policy as Social Instrument, supra note 134, at
1502 n.38 (noting that consumers regularly pay insurance premium billings in a timely fashion,
considering them to be second in importance only to monthly mortgage payments).
142 If the reverse-unilateral characterization were correct, then the insurer, having received full
performance from the policyholder, would logically be powerless to change the terms of the
agreement just as the person offering money in the Brooklyn Bridge hypothetical could not
unilaterally decide to pay less than the promised $100 after the offeree had already traversed the
Bridge.
143 See Horton, supra note 138.
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Even where an insurer is not routinely making unilateral changes
to policy terms, the insurer will at the very least offer the insurance at
different (usually higher) premium prices during subsequent time
periods. These offers are commonly accepted by policyholders who
write new (and usually ongoing) premium checks, in effect accepting
insurer offers seriatim over the years. Rather than a one-time performer
in a unilateral contract, the policyholder begins to look more like a
regular customer at a local retailer such as a grocery store, returning to
the store with regularity, but often paying a different price for slightly
different products.'"
By offering to continue coverage and sending a bill, the insurer has
engaged in nontrivial administrative costs. When the policyholder pays,
usually by check, the policyholder is in effect promising that the funds
will clear and that the premium will be paid, as much as it is paying the
premium. The process at that point begins to look more like a series of
bilateral contracts or a larger, more comprehensive relational contract in
which mutual promises are exchanged rather than an act induced by
promise or promise induced by an act.
Perhaps more important, however, the policyholder will not reap
any benefit from the insurer's promise of payment in the event of loss
unless the policyholder keeps several promises made as part of the
insuring arrangement. Consequently, it is inaccurate to assume-as
have the unilateralists-that upon payment of the premium, the
policyholder has no further obligations. If the policyholder wants
defense against liability claims or indemnity for loss, it will need to
keep several promises contained in the insurance contract.
The standard insurance policy lists these promises under the often
misleading heading of "conditions" of the policy. Under standard
contract law, a condition is an event that must occur before a given
contracting party is obligated to perform.14 5  Most obviously for
144 Similarly, retail customers of this type may have fully performed common side agreements
such as opening a preferred customer account entitling them to discounts on merchandise or the
accrual of bonus points and coupons. Traditionalists could argue that such arrangements are
another form of unilateral contract, but this also seems incorrect because the retailer's promised
performance is so nebulous, consisting of whatever favors the retailer may wish to convey to its
most loyal customers in order to retain their loyalty. In theory, the customer could enroll in such
a program, faithfully swipe his or her member card (or punch in a phone number at checkout) and
never receive any benefit other than those available to other shoppers not enrolled in the program.
Only market forces prompt the retailer to do anything for the loyal customer in the program. This
may make such contracts illusory, or perhaps not contracts at all. But once again, characterizing
them as unilateral adds little or nothing helpful to assessing such arrangements.
145 See PERILLO, supra note 2, § 11.2, at 361; FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS, supra note 3, § 8.2.
Historically, conditions were often divided into "conditions precedent"-those that must occur
before there is any obligation to perform-and "conditions subsequent," which will extinguish
the duty to compensate for a breach after the breach has occurred. RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF
CONTRACTS § 250 (1932). The Restatement (Second) of Contracts has abolished the terms and
speaks only of "conditions." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) CONTRACTS § 224 (1981). However,
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insurance, there must be a covered (or at least a potentially covered)
event before the insurer is obligated to do anything other than collect
premiums and maintain the paperwork required by the insuring
arrangement. In liability insurance, for example, there must first be a
lawsuit against the policyholder.146 For property insurance, there must
be damage to the property from a covered cause.14 7 For life insurance,
the person whose life is insured must die.148 Similar conditions exist for
disability insurance, health insurance, or more specialized lines such as
political risk insurance, pollution abatement insurance, workers'
compensation insurance and so on. 149 The need for a covered event
constitutes a true condition precedent to receiving insurance coverage.
In contrast, many of the "conditions" of common insurance
policies are in reality promises the policyholder must keep in order to
obtain the promised coverage. Although the policyholder need not
fulfill these promises in the sense that there is seldom liability imposed
upon the policyholder for breach, in the actual operation of insurance,
the policyholder that fails to satisfy conditions of a policy suffers
through being unable to receive the insurance coverage it purchased in
the past by "performing" through the payment of premium. In this
sense, a policyholder not only performs through the initial premium
payment, but also makes multiple promises (disguised or mislabeled as
conditions), just as in the most involved of bilateral contracts.
The policyholder that fails to keep a promise embodied in the
insurance policy's conditions may be worse off than the typical bilateral
contracting party. Where the typical promise is breached or unfulfilled,
a contracting party may avoid penalty if the failure to keep the promise
is not material,15 0 or may have contract rights diminished
proportionately.' 5' By contrast, the policyholder who fails to satisfy the
courts and counsel continue to use the precedent and subsequent terminology. CALAMARI ET AL.,
supra note 83, at 412-17; FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS, supra note 3, § 8.2.
146 Regarding the operation of liability insurance generally, see JACK P. GIBSON ET AL.,
COMMERCIAL LIABILITY INSURANCE (1999); JERRY, supra note 82, § 65(C); STEMPEL ON
INSURANCE CONTRACTS, supra note 3, ch. 14.
147 Regarding the operation of property insurance generally, see JERRY, supra note 82, § 42;
LINDA G. ROBINSON & JACK P. GIBSON, COMMERCIAL PROPERTY INSURANCE (1989).
148 Regarding the operation of life insurance generally, see JERRY, supra note 82, § 13[A](b);
STEMPEL ON INSURANCE CONTRACTS, supra note 3, ch. 18; LESTER W. ZARTMAN & WILLIAM
H. PRICE, LIFE INSURANCE (2d ed. 2003).
149 See generally JERRY, supra note 82 (surveying insurance, generally, and types of
insurance); STEMPEL ON INSURANCE CONTRACTS, supra note 3, §§ 4.01-4.08 (same).
150 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 241, 241 cmt. a (1981) (only a material
breach terminates contract rights or permits a non-breaching party to avoid contract; an
immaterial breach gives rise to a claim for damages but otherwise does not alter operation of
contract).
151 See id. & cmts. b, c (even where a clear beach exists, a contract is not abrogated and a
breaching party does not forfeit all contract rights unless a breach is sufficiently material; where a
breach does not require forfeiture of contract rights, damages paid by the breaching party should
be proportional to injury caused by the breach).
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conditions/promises of the policy may suffer total forfeiture of the
contract benefits it purchased through prepayment and on which it
relied. 152 Where the design of the insurance sought is to protect the
policyholder from catastrophic loss or liability, the loss of insurance
coverage becomes forfeiture on steroids.
If a court adjudicating coverage takes a strict view of required
compliance with conditions and finds substantial compliance
insufficient and even immaterial breach to negate coverage, the
punishment of the policyholder for failing to keep a promise is severe
indeed. Similarly, the insurer's failure to keep a promise of providing
coverage, if sufficiently unreasonable, may give rise to bad faith
liability, and even punitive damages if the insurer's unreasonable
behavior was in willful or wanton disregard of policyholder rights.153
Taking a functional perspective on the insurance policy-rather than
formally labeling it unilateral and deeming the policyholder's promises
to be conditions simply because these promises are contained in a
"conditions" section of the policy-suggests that the insurance policy
operates more like a bilateral exchange of important promises with
substantial consequences.
Regarding the actual operation of many "conditions" as promises,
consider the typical general liability policy. Among the conditions of
any liability policy is the requirement that the policyholder provide to
the insurer reasonably timely notice of an incident, claim, or suit against
the policyholderl 54 and that the insurer be provided with sufficient
detail to investigate the matter 55 so that it can, if required, assume
defense of the matter and seek to settle the claim if this is a prudent
course of action.
152 See infra Part III.C; see, e.g., P.R. Mallory & Co. v. Am. Cas. Co., 920 N.E.2d 736, 746-47
(Ind. Ct. App. 2010) (failure to comply with policy conditions precludes any recovery by
policyholder irrespective of magnitude of non-compliance); Vitto v. Davis, 23 So. 3d 1048, 1052-
54 (La. Ct. App. 2009) (same). To avoid such harsh results, courts, in addition to finding
substantial satisfaction of a condition to be sufficient, have tended to treat many conditions as
promises. As such, they apply materiality analysis rather than the historical rule that conditions
must be strictly satisfied to permit contractual recovery. See, e.g., Jackson v. Richards 5 & 10
Inc., 433 A.2d 888, 895 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1981).
153 See JERRY, supra note 82, § 25[G](d)(2)-(3); STEMPEL ON INSURANCE CONTRACTS, supra
note 3, §§ 10.01, 10.05.
154 The notice provision of a commercial general liability (CGL) policy usually requires the
policyholder to give notice "as soon as practicable" of any accident or offence that may result in a
claim and of any lawsuit brought against the policyholder. See, e.g., Insurance Services Office
(ISO), CG 00 01 12 04, Part IV, Condition 2 (2003), reprinted in DONALD S. MALECKI &
ARTHUR L. FLITNER, CGL, COMMERCIAL GENERAL LIABILITY, app. I, at 10 (8th ed. 2005).
155 The notice provision of most policies provides that notice must include the date, time, and
location of any "occurrence" giving rise to liability as well as names and addresses of injured
persons or witnesses and the nature of the injury or damage. See, e.g., ISO, CG 00 01 12 04, Part
IV, Condition 2 (2003), reprinted in MALECKI & FLITNER, supra note 154, app. I, at 10.
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Historically, late notice was regarded as the failure of a condition
precedent that prevented the otherwise promised insurance coverage
from becoming applicable.156 The modem rule (now established in
roughly forty states) is that late notice prevents coverage only if the
insurer has been prejudiced by the delay, usually with the insurer
required to prove any asserted prejudice.' 57 However, if notice were a
true condition precedent-something that both contractually and
logically must happen as specified in the contract in order to trigger
contractual obligations-the insurers who once won these battles over
whether prejudice was necessary to use late notice as a defense would
have continued winning. Instead, from the 1970s forward, insurers have
almost always lost these battles as jurisdiction after jurisdiction has
embraced the "notice-prejudice" rule. As most courts have acted to
soften the traditional no-prejudice-required rule, they have implicitly
recognized either that prompt notice is not a true condition precedent or
that forfeiture of otherwise available coverage is too high a price to pay
for failure to satisfy the condition.
The modem judicial view of notice is indubitably correct. It makes
no sense to deprive the policyholder (who long before paid cash to the
insurer that benefited from investing it) of insurance coverage just when
the aleatory contingency arises. The policyholder purchased insurance
for just that purpose. If law generally abhors a forfeiture, it surely must
detest stripping a policyholder of promised insurance due to tardy notice
if there has been no harm to the insurer. Denying coverage in such
circumstances gives the insurer an undeserved windfall and makes the
insurance policy fail its intended purpose as well as its social and
economic function.
But despite the modem trend, courts occasionally continue to
adhere to the historical rule, in part because of the formal logic that
failure of a condition precedent leaves contract obligations untriggered.
Although excessive formalism is hardly rare in cases involving bilateral
contracts, classifying insurance policies as unilateral arguably
contributes to these errors and impedes analysis, even in jurisdictions
that appear at times to embrace the sensible functionalism and
abhorrence of forfeiture reflected in the modem notice-prejudice rule.
For example, in 2010, the Arkansas Supreme Court embraced with
156 See P.R. Mallory & Co., 920 N.E.2d at 746-47 (traditional rule requiring strict compliance
with prompt notice provisions of insurance policy or coverage was lost).
157 See RANDY J. MANILOFF & JEFFREY W. STEMPEL, COMMERCIAL GENERAL LIABILITY
COVERAGE: KEY ISSUES; EVERY STATE ch. 2 (forthcoming 2010) (noting that at least thirty-eight
states have clear precedent requiring that there be prejudice to an insurer from late notice, with
most placing the burden on the insurer to prove prejudice; only a handful of states clearly
continue to follow the old majority rule finding even slight or unimportant delays in giving notice
to preclude coverage); OSTRAGER & NEWMAN, supra note 3, § 4.02(c)(2) (same); STEMPEL ON
INSURANCE CONTRACTS, supra note 3, § 9.01[I] (same).
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vigor the historical rule that no prejudice to the insurer was required to
sustain a late notice defense so long as the notice provisions of the
policy were clearly denominated as a condition precedent to
coverage.' 5 8 Talismanically intoning that "a condition precedent is still
a condition precedent,"1 59 the court distinguished seemingly
inconsistent case law, which had led federal courts applying Arkansas
law to employ a notice-prejudice rule, on the ground that in cases
requiring the insurer to show prejudice, the notice provisions of the
policy "did not indicate that the giving of proper notice was a condition
precedent to recovery" making it "proper to require that the insurance
company show prejudice."1 60
158 See Fireman's Fund Ins. Co. v. Care Mgmt., No. 09-662, 2010 Ark. LEXIS 131 (Ark. Mar.
4,2010).
This court has applied the general rule, that where an insurance policy provides
that the giving of notice of a loss, claim, or lawsuit is a condition precedent to
recovery, the insured must strictly comply with the notice requirement, or risk
forfeiting the right to recover from the insurance company. The insurance company
need not show that it was prejudiced by any delaying in or lack of notification.
However, if the notice provision is not a condition precedent, the insured does not
automatically forfeit the right to recover. Instead, the insurance company must show
that it was prejudiced by noncompliance with the terms of the policy. The insurance
company may be prejudiced if the delay in notice was unreasonable.
Id. at *6.
The Care Management opinion has an almost childlike focus on the magic words condition
precedent, as though it were the insurance law equivalent of "Open Sesame" or "Abracadabra."
Apparently, if the magic words are used in the policy labeling notice as a condition precedent,
tardy notice justifies severe forfeiture even if there is no prejudice to the insurer. However, if the
notice requirement of a policy is not so labeled, notice can be eons late and the insurer must still
demonstrate prejudice. But the notice provisions of all insurance policies serve the same purpose
and function regardless of how they are packaged or labeled. The Arkansas Supreme Court
elevates form over substance to an astonishing degree, an error that arguably was aided by the
unilateral view of insurance policies and its tendency to treat conditions as absolute while
bilateral contract breaches are usually fatal only if material.
The policyholder in Care Management was not particularly sympathetic. It was accused of
mistreating an elderly patient and, with no apparent excuse, waited a long time to notify its
liability insurer. The policyholder was sued in June 2006 but did not notify the insurer until
September 2008, with the case scheduled for final hearing in October 2008. Although the Court,
hearing the matter pursuant to a certified question from the Eighth Circuit, did not address the
issue of prejudice, the potential for a finding of prejudice from this sort of delay is obvious.
Ruling against the policyholder on notice-prejudice grounds would have been a much more
defensible resolution of a case where the bench may have viewed the policyholder as
undeserving. Instead, the Court embraced a jurisprudential approach that has been in decline for
a half-century. See id. (reaffirming approach of Teutonia Ins. Co. v. Johnson, 82 S.W. 840 (Ark.
1904)); see also id. at *6 n.1 (citing Alcazar v. Hayes, 982 S.W.2d 845 (Tenn. 1998))
(acknowledging that "many states are increasingly" adopting the notice-prejudice rule as though
development of the issue had ceased in the twentieth century). Nearly forty states have embraced
the notice-prejudice rule, including longtime traditional rule state New York. N.Y. INS. LAW §
3420(a)(5) (McKinney 2010); MANILOFF & STEMPEL, supra note 157.
159 See 2010 Ark. LEXIS 131 at *6 n.1.
160 See id. at *12. In addition to embracing historical rule precedents dating from 1903, the
Care Management court overruled Members Mut. Ins. Co. v. Benefield, 499 S.W.2d 608 (Ark.
1973), which appeared to adopt the notice-prejudice rule. 2010 Ark. LEXIS 131 at *13.
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Rather than viewing notice as a condition precedent to coverage,
however, it makes at least as much sense to regard the policyholder as
promising adequate notice (reasonably prompt, or at least without
prejudicial delay) if it is to receive the promised coverage. Material
breach of the promise results in forfeiture of coverage. Although not
explicit, this view in effect recasts the "condition" as a promise and the
contract as bilateral.
Liability insurance policies also state that the policyholder must
cooperate in the insurer's defense of a claim.161 Property insurance
imposes a similar requirement that the policyholder cooperate "in the
investigation or settlement of a claim." 62 If the policyholder breaches
this promise and fails to cooperate, coverage may be completely lost,
even when it is uncontested that the loss or claim involved falls squarely
within the scope of the insurance policy. Although the cooperation
requirements have often not been stringently enforced by courts and
anything resembling substantial compliance is usually enough, the
cooperation clause of insurance policies operates in practice as a
promise by the policyholder in that it involves activity largely under the
policyholder's control. Policyholder cooperation is not "an event, not
certain to occur" (as set forth in the Restatement),163 but instead is a
representation by the policyholder that it will assist the insurer in
implementing the policy. Where the policyholder is uncooperative, this
looks more like breach of a promise than failure of a true condition.
In liability insurance and in other types of insurance, the
commercial policyholder also promises to submit to a "premium audit"
in which the insurer checks the books of the policyholder (usually with
the policyholder required or promising to submit data to the insurer) to
determine if it has paid the required premium. The premium is initially
set based on underwriting criteria such as the policyholder's number of
employees, volume of business, etc. at the time the policy period began.
It is recalibrated according to the actual experience of the policyholder
during the time insured.16 4 Here the policyholder is indeed promising to
permit the insurer to reassess the cost of insurance and promising to pay
161 See, e.g., ISO, Commercial General Liability Form, CG 00 01 10 01, Section IV, Condition
2(c), reprinted in FISCHER ET AL., supra note 3, app. E, at 13.
162 See, e.g., ISO, Commercial Property Form, CP 00 10 04 02, Loss Condition 3(a)(8) (2001),
reprinted in ALLIANCE OF AMERICAN INSURERS, THE INSURANCE PROFESSIONAL'S POLICY KIT:
A COLLECTION OF SAMPLE INSURANCE FORMS 227 (2004).
163 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) CONTRACTS § 224 (1981) (defining "condition").
164 Regarding premium audits and retroactive revision of premiums in light of the
policyholder's actual loss experience, see REJDA, supra note 2, at 612, 624 (retrospective rating
means that "the insured's loss experience during the current policy period determines the actual
premium paid for that period."); VAUGHAN & VAUGHAN, supra note 2, at 124 ("A deposit
premium is charged at the inception of the policy and then adjusted after the policy period has
expired, to reflect actual losses incurred."); see also id. at 133-34 (illustrating application of
retrospective rating formula).
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any funds that may be owed the insurer after the premium audit is
concluded. 165
This aspect of insurance dramatically undercuts the contention of
the unilateralists that the policyholder has satisfied its obligations
through complete performance at the outset of the policy. On the
contrary, the policyholder has made a promise to pay additional
premiums if necessary and does not satisfy this promise until much
later, often after the conclusion of the policy period. Unlike a
policyholder's decision to switch insurers and seek a refund of unearned
premium, the commercial policyholder's failure to pay adjusted
premiums will in all likelihood lead to a collection action by the insurer
for the additional amounts owed.
Most important, however, the premium audit condition found in
most commercial liability insurance policies (and in many commercial
first-party policies as well) demonstrates that the policyholder is not
performing the entirety of even its solely monetary contractual
obligations to the insurer at the outset of the insurance relationship.
Rather, the policyholder is making a promise regarding potentially
adjusted premium payments in return for the insurer's promise of
coverage. This alone makes the insurance policy contract more bilateral
than unilateral. 166
Another common condition in insurance policies, both liability and
property, commercial and personal, is the policyholder's promise to
cede to the insurer any legal rights it may have against persons causing
injury or damage. 167 These contractual subrogation clauses are
165 A standard premium audit provision provides that the insurer "will compute all premiums
for this Coverage part in accordance with our rules and rates" and that:
Premium shown in this Coverage as advance premium is a deposit premium only. At
the close of each audit period we will compute the earned premium for that period and
send notice to the [policyholder]. The due date for audit and retrospective premiums is
the date shown as the due date on the bill. If the sum of the advance and audit
premiums paid for the policy is greater than the earned premium, we will return the
excess to the [policyholder].
[The policyholder] must keep records of the information we need for premium
computation, and send us copies at such times as we may request.
ISO, CG 00 01 12 04, Part IV, Condition 5 (2003), reprinted in MALECKI & FLITNER, supra note
154, app. 1, at 11; see also ISO, Common Policy Conditions, IL 00 07 11 98, Condition C (1998),
reprinted in ALLIANCE OF AMERICAN INSURERS, supra note 162, at 214 ("We may examine and
audit your books and records as they relate to this policy at any time during the policy period and
up to three years afterward.").
166 See ISO, Common Policy Conditions, IL 00 07 11 98, Condition D (1998), reprinted in
ALLIANCE OF AMERICAN INSURERS, supra note 162, at 214 ("We have the right to: a. Make
inspections and surveys at any time; b. Give you reports on the conditions we find; and c.
Recommend changes.").
167 In the standard CGL policy, the provision reads:
If the insured has rights to recover all or part of any payment we have made under this
Coverage Part, those rights are transferred to us. The insured must do nothing after
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promises by the policyholder both to let the insurer sue on its behalf for
recompense of loss caused by others as well as a further promise to
cooperate with the insurer in pursuing any such actions. Once again, it
appears that, far from just paying a premium and waiting, the
policyholder has promised something of value to the insurer in return
for the insurer's valuable promise of coverage in the event of liability or
loss.
Other provisions of insurance policies tend to establish promissory
obligations of the policyholder-at least if it wants to collect on the
coverage it has purchased in the event of litigation or loss. For
example, liability policies often provide for a reduction in benefits paid
by the policy to the extent there is other available insurance and usually
attempt to require that other insurers pay before the instant insurer is
responsible, typically establishing a manner of pro-rating available
coverage from two or more insurance policies.168 Some liability and
property policies go so far as to eviscerate coverage completely if there
is other insurance covering the claim or loss.1 69 In these latter instances
in particular, the policyholder is in essence promising that it will not
purchase any additional insurance on the risk if it wishes to collect from
the insurer. 170
loss to impair them. At our request, the insured will bring "suit" or transfer those
rights to use and help use enforce them.
ISO, CG 00 01 12 04, Part IV, Condition 8 (2003), reprinted in MALECKI & FLITNER, supra note
154, app. I, at 12.
Subrogation arrangements are even more common in property insurance and may arise by
operation of law even in the absence of specific policy language. However, most property
insurance policies expressly provide that the policyholder will permit the insurer to pursue such
actions. For example, the standard ISO Commercial Property policy provides:
If any person or organization to or for whom we make payment under this Coverage
Part has rights to recover damages from another, those rights are transferred to us to the
extent of our payment. That person or organization must do everything necessary to
secure our rights and must do nothing after loss to impair them. But you may waive
your rights against another party in writing:
Prior to a loss to your Covered Property or Covered [Lost Business] Income [as a
result of property loss].
After a loss to your Covered Property or Covered Income only if, at the time of
loss, that party is one of the following: Someone insured by this insurance; A business
firm: Owned or controlled by you; or That owns or controls you; or Your tenant.
ISO, Commercial Property Form, CP 00 90 07 88, Condition I (1987), reprinted in ALLIANCE OF
AMERICAN INSURERS, supra note 162, at 216.
168 See STEMPEL ON INSURANCE CONTRACTS, supra note 3, §§ 13.02, 13.03; ISO, CG 00 01
12 04, Part IV, Condition 4 (2003), reprinted in MALECKI & FLITNER, supra note 154, app. I, at
12.
169 See STEMPEL ON INSURANCE CONTRACTS, supra note 3, §§ 13.02, 13.03 (discussing
application of such "escape" clauses that, if enforced literally, relieve insurer of coverage
obligation if there is any other applicable insurance covering the risk).
170 One of the authors regards at least some of the exclusions within a policy as containing
implicit promises to refrain from those behaviors. For example, a policyholder's de facto
executory promise required for insurability is provided by a core exclusion found in liability
policies that provides that there is no coverage for injury that is "expected or intended" by the
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Property insurance policies often contain other "loss conditions"
that are in practical terms promises obligating the policyholder and
providing that if the promise is breached, there will be reduced coverage
or loss of coverage. In a typical property policy, for example, the
policyholder is required to take reasonable action to preserve the
property after loss and prevent losses from exacerbating due to neglect,
exposure to the elements, looting, vandalism, and the like.17 1 The
policyholder must also provide as requested a "complete inventory of
the damaged and undamaged property, includ[ing] quantities, costs,
values and amount of loss claimed," 72 as well as submit a signed,
policyholder. See, e.g., ISO, CG 00 01 12 04, Part IV, Condition 4 (2003), reprinted in MALECKI
& FLITNER, supra note 154, app. I, at 2 ("This insurance does not apply to" bodily injury or
property damage "expected or intended from the standpoint of the insured.") (providing an
exception to the exclusion where bodily injury results "from the use of reasonable force to protect
persons or property"). This exclusion is generally described as one that gives definition to the
concept that insurance covers only fortuitous loss rather than intentionally caused loss. See
STEMPEL ON INSURANCE CONTRACTS, supra note 3, § 1.06. However, it can also be viewed as a
promise that the policyholder will not intentionally injure others or engage in activity
substantially certain to cause such injury if it is to receive liability coverage. Breach of this
promise through intentionally inflicted injury to a third party prevents coverage under the liability
policy.
Likewise, first party insurance will not pay for claims that are the result of a policyholder's
intentional desire to bring about the loss through misbehavior such as arson, staged auto wrecks,
self-inflicted wounds (for fraudulent disability or workers compensation claims), or murder (of a
person insured by a beneficiary or where the policyholder is someone other than the person whose
life is insured). STEMPEL ON INSURANCE CONTRACTS, supra note 3, § 1.06[A]. These sorts of
"Double Indemnity" (DOUBLE INDEMNITY (Paramount Pictures 1944)) or "Body Heat" (BODY
HEAT (Warner Bros. 1981)) style murders for insurance are proscribed by law, public policy, and
morality. But, one might also view these restrictions on insurance coverage as implicit promises
made by the policyholder, or others, to refrain from certain improper behavior where breach of
the promise, if detected, is treated as inherently material and results in withdrawal of insurance
benefits that would have otherwise been available in the event of loss. For insurance, as with any
bilateral contract, substantial breach of a policyholder's promises in the agreement itself and
failure to conform to overarching legal and ethical rules can result in forfeiture of contract
benefits.
In addition, many of the exclusions listed in an insurance policy can be viewed as not only
attempts to reduce and tailor the coverage provided in the insuring agreement, but also as
promises by the policyholder that it will not engage in certain activity in return for receiving
coverage. For example, a life insurance policy typically excludes coverage for suicide during the
first two years the policy is in effect and also excludes coverage for death due to war. More
particularized life insurance policies may also exclude coverage for death resulting from
skydiving, spelunking, or other high risk activities. To the extent that the policyholder has some
control over whether it enters into such activities, the policyholder is, in effect, promising not to
commit suicide, enlist, skydive, explore caves, and the like if it wishes to collect life insurance
benefits.
171 See, e.g., ISO, Commercial Property Form, CP 00 10 04 02, Loss Condition 3(a)(4) (2001),
reprinted in ALLIANCE OF AMERICAN INSURERS, supra note 162, at 226 ("Duties In the Event of
Loss or Damage" include requiring policyholder to "[t]ake all reasonable steps to protect the
Covered Property from further damage and keep a record of your expenses necessary to protect
the Covered Property." In addition, the policyholder should "if feasible, set the damaged property
aside and in the best possible order for examination.").
172 See, e.g., id at 226 (Loss Condition 3(a)(5)).
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sworn proof of loss to the insurer within a specified time.173 The
policyholder also promises to permit the insurer to "inspect the property
proving the loss or damage and examine [the policyholder's] books and
records." 74 Property insurance coverage is also typically restricted,
suspended or unavailable when the insured property is "vacant," as
defined in the policy,' 75 for more than a specified period of time,
typically sixty days.176
Property policies patterned after marine insurance also may include
a "sue and labor" clause, which provides that the policyholder will
make reasonable efforts to prevent future related losses and to minimize
the damage wrought by a covered peril.' 77 For example, if a vessel's
hull is damaged and develops a leak, the policyholder should attempt to
save as much cargo as possible by relocating it away from the source of
water intrusion and may be required to effect repairs at sea or to put into
the nearest port rather than continuing to sail and permitting additional
damage to cargo.
In addition, property insurance typically has a "co-insurance"
clause that requires the policyholder to insure property at eighty percent
of its value.' 78 Failure to do so results in a proportionate reduction of
insurance payments after loss.1 79 The policyholder's promise to meet
the co-insurance clause and "insure to value" on the property is one
where breach does not typically result in litigation against the
policyholder by the insurer, but often results in the insurer imposing its
own brand of liquidated damages by reducing coverage payments after
loss.
Property insurance policies also may void coverage or provide for
a retroactive premium increase in the event of loss if there is an
"increase" of the "hazard" posed to the insurer in covering the property
or a heightened risk of loss due to a change in use of the property.s 0
For example, if a farm is turned into a factory, the insurer originally
underwriting the property as a farm can rightfully claim that the change
173 See, e.g., id. at 227 (Loss Condition 3(a)(7); policyholder must send insurer proof of loss
within sixty days of insurer's request).
174 See, e.g., id. at 226-27 (Loss Condition 3(a)(6)).
175 See, e.g., id. at 227-28 (Loss Condition 6).
176 See, e.g., id. at 228 (Loss Condition 6(b); where building "vacant for more than 60
consecutive days" insurer will "not pay for any loss or damage caused by .. . Vandalism;
Sprinkler leakage; Building glass breakage; Water damage; Theft; or Attempted Theft" and all
other payments for covered causes of loss will be reduced by fifteen percent).
177 Regarding the sue and labor concept, see generally STEMPEL ON INSURANCE CONTRACTS,
supra note 3, § 15.05.
178 See, e.g., ISO, Commercial Property Form, CP 00 10 04 02, Loss Condition Fl (2001),
reprinted in ALLIANCE OF AMERICAN INSURERS, supra note 162, at 228-29.
179 See STEMPEL ON INSURANCE CONTRACTS, supra note 3, § 8.03.
180 See id. §§ 8.03, 15.01 [A] (discussing coinsurance generally and coinsurance in property
insurance, which should not be confused with the co-pay or coinsurance provisions of health
insurance policies or plans).
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in function logically abrogates the insuring arrangement. Alternatively,
the insurer can argue that the change in use at least requires that the
policyholder pay premiums commensurate with the risks posed by a
factory (rather than the generally less liability-producing farm) if
coverage is to remain in force.
Insurance policies also typically contain a condition in which the
policyholder essentially agrees that it may not assign the insurance
policy to a third party, including a successor company, without the
insurer's consent. 81 Such clauses are usually enforced by courts, at
least with respect to contingent risks.182 In this way, the insurance
policy differs from most contracts, where assignment of contract rights
and delegation of duties is rather freely permitted in the interest of
freedom of contract and economic efficiency provided that this does not
increase the risk of breach or nonperformance to the other party.
Like the increase of hazard provision, this aspect of insurance
attempts to prevent the original policyholder from providing insurance
to another, riskier potential policyholder that the insurer has not had the
opportunity to investigate and underwrite. The potential unfair
forfeiture risks of strict enforcement of this language is softened by the
general rule that, while insurance on a contingent risk may not be
assigned without insurer consent, assignment of rights under a policy
after the occurrence of the contingent events is permitted
notwithstanding policy language.183  However, insurers have had
significant recent success in invoking the anti-assignment clause and
principle to avoid coverage in matters of complex corporate
succession.184
As with other "pseudo-conditions" in insurance policies, breach of
an increase-of-hazard clause or an anti-assignment clause in a policy
seldom, if ever, results in suit against the breaching policyholder (save
for a possible declaratory judgment action to rescind the policy).
However, breach of one of these clauses effectively places the
policyholder in breach of the policy and imposes upon it the liquidated
181 See, e.g., ISO, Common Policy Conditions:
Your rights and duties under this policy may not be transferred without our written
consent except in the case of death of an individual named insured. If you die, your
rights and duties will be transferred to your legal representative but only while acting
within the scope of duties as your legal representative.
ISO, Common Policy Conditions, IL 00 07 11 98, Condition F (1998), reprinted in ALLIANCE OF
AMERICAN INSURERS, supra note 162, at 214.
182 Even a church's attempt to assign its insurance policy to another church is usually barred
by anti-assignment clauses. See Christ Gospel Temple v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 417 A.2d 660
(Pa. Super. Ct. 1979), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 955 (1980).
183 See STEMPEL ON INSURANCE CONTRACTS, supra note 3, § 3.15.
184 See Henkel Corp. v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 62 P.3d 69 (Cal. 2003); Glidden Co.
v. Lumbermens Mut. Cas. Co., 861 N.E.2d 109 (Ohio 2006); STEMPEL ON INSURANCE
CONTRACTS, supra note 3, § 3.15.
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damages of no coverage, even though liability or loss facing the
policyholder would otherwise fall within the scope of an insurance
policy's coverage.
A typical property policy also requires that the policyholder submit
to dispute resolution by appraisal in the event of a valuation
controversy. Property and other insurance policies may also require that
the policyholder agree to arbitration or mediation of coverage disputes
or may bind the policyholder to selected forums or jurisdictions in
pursuing resolution of coverage disputes. Property policyholders also
commonly agree to allow examination under oath regarding the
circumstances of a loss if the insurer desires.18 5
In addition to largely ignoring many of the particular features of
insurance policies and the operation of insurance products in the
marketplace, scholarly discussion of unilateral and bilateral contracts
has also largely overlooked the aleatory nature of insurance policies.
An aleatory contract is distinguished from a commutative contract in
that the latter involves exchange of consideration of equal value, while,
in the former, the contracting parties accept at the outset that the dollar
value of their exchange may not be equal due to the contingent nature of
the risks accepted and coverage provided.186 Insurance is aleatory in
that the arrangement between policyholder and insurer is often one of
unequal exchange. If the policyholder pays premiums for years and
suffers no significant loss, the insurer effectively received much more
than the policyholder (notwithstanding the well-established nostrum that
with insurance, the policyholder is purchasing peace of mind).
Conversely, if the policyholder holds a policy for only two months and
then incurs a house fire, auto collision bills or liability, or suffers
disease or disability, the insurer will surely pay far more than it has
collected in premiums from the policyholder. Although insurance
differs significantly from gambling, there are surely elements of
gambling in the risk transfer and distribution of insurance.1 87
By contrast, in nearly all other contracts, the exchange between the
parties is essentially equivalent, at least as measured by the parties' own
valuation of the items involved in the contract. If a homebuyer pays the
prevailing local market price to a seller for a three-bedroom rambler,
185 See, e.g., ISO, Commercial Property Policy:
We may examine any insured under oath while not in the presence of any other insured
and at such times as may be reasonably required, about any matter relating to this
insurance or the claim, including an insured's books and records. In the event of an
examination, an insured's answers must be signed.
ISO, Commercial Property Policy, CP 00 10 04 02, Loss Condition E.3.b., reprinted in ALLIANCE
OF AMERICAN INSURERS, supra note 162, at 227.
186 See DORFMAN, supra note 2, at 163; REJDA, supra note 2, at 99; VAUGHAN & VAUGHAN,
supra note 2, at 168.
187 See DORFMAN, supra note 2, at 163; VAUGHAN & VAUGHAN, supra note 2, at 168.
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lawyers and economists largely see the contract as one of equal
exchange. The buyer gets what it paid for, measured relatively
objectively by the market for home sales in the vicinity. Even where a
purchaser pays what others might consider an outrageous price for an
item, economists regard the exchange as equivalent because of the
incommensurability of respective parties' valuations of goods, services,
and promises. One may think a portrait or piece of sculpture ugly and
worthless, but if another patron finds the work breathtaking and pays
$100,000 for it, the buyer has received something worth $100,000, at
least to the buyer.' 88
For aleatory contracts such as insurance, there is unequal exchange
because the respective final monetary outcomes of the arrangement are
unknown at the time of contracting.189 Consequently, the promise made
by the insurer is dramatically more contingent than that made by most
contracting parties and of much more attenuated value to the
"performing" (through premium payment) policyholder. For certain
types of insurance policies, the possibility of performance may be so
unlikely as to make coverage "illusory" or the arrangement
unconscionable, such as when disability coverage attaches only if the
policyholder cannot work at all and only after social security or other
benefits have been exhausted.190 Even in less extreme circumstances,
an insurer's promise of coverage may realistically be quite modest
where the "small print" in a policy takes away that which the "large
print" appears to have promised in return for the policyholder's
premium payment/performance.
Insurance policy sales thus appear quite distinct from the classic
types of unilateral contracts. In insurance, as opposed to the famous
Brooklyn Bridge hypothetical, the offeror takes considerable risk by
both prepaying for an aleatory contract and relying on a promisor who
188 In addition, purchasing decisions can be motivated by factors other than the buyer's
evaluation of the product itself. See, e.g., JOHN GRISHAM, THE APPEAL 41-45, 70-71 (2008)
(describing an instance where the "villain," a wealthy corporate executive attempting to alter the
composition of a state supreme court to avoid environmental liability, pays several million dollars
at a charity auction for a piece of avant garde sculpture that he hates but that his wife covets for
the prestige the purchase will bring).
189 The psychic reassurance or "peace of mind" obtained by the policyholder, through having
insurance in place that promises to respond to contingent losses, could conceivably serve the
same purpose as idiosyncratic artwork and make insurance non-aleatory for the policyholder who
pays high premiums for years and never suffers loss or liability. Notwithstanding the general rule
of incommensurability of value between persons, legal scholars and the insurance community
generally accept that insurance contracts often do not involve equal exchange. See, e.g., Jeffrey
W. Stempel, Assessing the Coverage Carnage: Asbestos Liability and Insurance After Three
Decades ofDispute, 12 CONN. INS. L.J. 349,471-72 (2005).
190 See, e.g., discussion and case excerpts in ABRAHAM, supra note 3, at 391-420. Regarding
the concept of insurance coverage as illusory generally, see Beth Skillem & Linda M. Bolduan,
Insurance Coverage for Employment-Related Claims: Real or Illusory? (ALI-ABA Course of
Study, Nov. 13, 1997), WL SB96 A.L.I.-A.B.A. 87.
CARDOZO LAW REVIEW
may not fulfill the promise under circumstances where the offeror has
little leverage over the promisor. In addition, the policyholder cannot
revoke its offer readily, the insurer has substantial ability to shorten the
window for revocation (e.g., by cashing the premium check and issuing
a binder or conditional receipt), and where later withdrawal by the
policyholder results in only a partial refund of premiums by an insurer
that earned investment income in the interim and, in the vast majority of
cases, was not required to do anything of substance for the policyholder.
At least the offeror in Professor Wormser's famous Brooklyn Bridge
hypothetical had the advantage of watching the other party trek across
the famous Bridge and even (prior to the Restatement) had the
opportunity to harass the other party through last minute revocation.
Other classic unilateral contract situations also seem far afield from
insurance. Although insurance has aspects of gambling, the
policyholder is not "rewarded" if it suffers a liability or loss event as are
the performers in the reward, contest, or prize cases of unilateral
contract lore.191 Even a suffering performer such as Mrs. Carlill of
Carbolic Smoke Ball fame, who contracted influenza despite assurances
otherwise, was not a victim of fate to the degree found with most
policyholders suffering loss or liability.192 She gambled on the efficacy
of the device and was disappointed, but had not relied on the smoke ball
to indemnify or protect her from catastrophic loss.
Likewise, performing brokers in those unilateral contract cases
take on the credit and collection risks that sellers or buyers will attempt
to avoid payment, a risk quite different from depending on the
promising party to cover a risk the performer cannot shoulder itself.
Similarly, employees seeking to enforce employer promises as a result
of continuing to work,193 although sympathetic, still probably have
more economic options than a policyholder who has lost a house or
faces major litigation liability. Those claiming government entitlements
under unilateral contract theoryl 94 may be so close to the edge that
191 See Chenard v. Marcel Motors, 387 A.2d 596 (Me. 1978) (affirming judgment for plaintiff
who scored a hole-in-one in a golf tournament where defendant delearship had donated an
automobile as a prize for holes-in-one-also much better than insured event, no matter how bad
the weather or how mediocre the golf course outing); Lefkowtiz v. Great Minneapolis Surplus
Store, Inc., 86 N.W.2d 689 (Minn. 1957) (finding a valid contract based on a retail advertisement
that promised the first customer to arrive at a store a one dollar fur coat-which, to everyone but
hardcore PETA members, certainly beats a home fire, lawsuit, hospitalization, disability, or
death).
192 See Carlill v. Carbolic Smoke Ball Co., [1893] 1 Q.B. 256 (Ct. App.) (U.K.), which is
reprinted in nearly every contracts casebook; see also BARNETT, supra note 3, at 350-52
(providing additional background information on Carlill and noting that the active ingredient in
the smoke ball appears to have been a carcinogen).
193 See Pettit, supra note 4, at 559-67.
194 See id. at 570-73, 589-91.
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unfair payment denials are similarly devastating,195 but the government
benefit sought, although important, is often not of such life-and-death
magnitude.
More important, in all these other cases arguably involving
unilateral contracts, the party seeking compensation (be it promisor or
performer) is engaged in a commutative contract of equal exchange of
value, rather than depending on another promisor or performer who may
forsake them when they are unable to obtain substitute performance and
who may profit handsomely as a result of good luck effectively
releasing it from its aleatory obligations.
In sum, the insurance policy is simply quite different than other
arrangements viewed as unilateral contracts, a difference that cannot be
effectively explained away by deeming insurance to be a reverse-
unilateral contract. Insurance policyholders appear to promise
substantially more than appears to have been appreciated by those
promoting the unilateral characterization of insurance policies. The
promising insurer also often has performance obligations due to
regulation and the duty of good faith. Further, the insurer is allowed to
give highly contingent promises and, through adequate risk pooling,
exploit the aleatory nature of the insurance policy. As a result of these
factors, characterizing the insurance contract as unilateral appears not to
be an accurate assessment, notwithstanding that most judicial precedent,
formed by early-twentieth century academic assessments, does not
square with traditional contract interpretation. Unfortunately, as
discussed in Part III.C below, classification of insurance policies as
unilateral is not a purely academic exercise, but has largely negative
ripple effects in the real world of coverage litigation.
C. Impact Concerns: Ways in Which the Detriments of the Unilateral
Characterization Exceed Purported Benefits
As discussed above, we find the legal profession's historic fixation
on unilateral and bilateral contracts misguided and view the traditional
unilateral (or reverse-unilateral) label inaccurate as applied to insurance,
which we regard as primarily bilateral in nature. The unilateral
characterization of insurance policies not only errs as a matter of
classification, but also has important intellectual, doctrinal, and practice
consequences. Several practical effects flow from characterizing the
insurance contract as unilateral. First, as outlined in Parts III.A and
195 See, e.g., Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970) (finding recipient of public assistance
benefits is entitled to due process before subsistence level benefits may be terminated, including
adequate notice, explanation of government action, and determination by a sufficiently neutral
government officer).
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III.B above, the unilateral characterization fails to appreciate the
nuances and actual operation of insurance and errs in failing to
appreciate the degree to which the insurer-policyholder relationship is
indeed promissory. Second, any presumption that an insurance contract
is unilateral 96 rather than bilateral conflicts with the overarching
contracts Grundnorm that, wherever possible, contracts should be
construed as bilateral in order to afford more protection to the parties.197
Third, characterizing insurance contracts as unilateral results in an
impoverished conception of the respective responsibilities of
policyholders and insurers. By pretending that policyholders make no
promises to insurers and instead describing everything the policyholder
must do under the contract as a condition rather than a promise,198 the
traditional view impedes application of the rich complexities of the
concepts of good faith, substantial performance, and material breach.
Depending on the circumstances, these errors of analysis may unfairly
impact either policyholders or insurers. Courts that take a strict view on
compliance with conditions may impose unfair forfeiture on the
policyholder. Other courts spend inordinate amounts of energy
attempting to soften the harshness of the law's historic all-or-nothing
approach to conditions and the draconian effects of strict compliance
and forfeiture, an endeavor that sometimes assists policyholders even to
the detriment of insurers.
Fourth, the characterization of insurance as a unilateral contract has
limited the application of anticipatory repudiation, a doctrine that allows
parties to restore a contractual relationship or move on. The doctrine of
anticipatory repudiation has been traditionally inapplicable to contracts
196 See, e.g., Winters v. State Farm & Fire Cas. Co., 35 F. Supp. 2d 842, 845 (E.D. Okla.
1999); Nat'l Union Fire Ins. Co. v. FDIC, 957 P.2d 357, 363 (Kan. 1998) ("Customarily, all
forms of insurance are presumed to be unilateral contracts."); see also Combs v. Int'l Ins. Co.,
354 F.3d 568, 600 (6th Cir. 2004) (explaining that a director and officer liability policy is
unilateral and characterizing all insurance policies as generally unilateral).
197 The Restatement (First) of Contracts expressed the view that bilateral construction was
preferred. See RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONTRACTS § 31 (1932). The Restatement (Second) of
Contracts abandoned the language of unilateral and bilateral contracts, but retains a preference
for the mutuality of a bilateral formation. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 62
(1981) (providing that where an offeree may accept by performance or promise, the tender of the
beginning or beginning of the performance operates as a promise, thus favoring a bilateral
construction).
Case law continues to express a preference for bilateral contracts. See, e.g., Fosson v.
Palace (Waterland), Ltd., 78 F.3d 1448, 1454 (9th Cir. 1996) (rebuttable presumption that
contract is bilateral); Motel Servs., Inc. v. Cent. Me. Power Co., 394 A.2d 786, 788 (Me. 1978)
("contracts are presumed to be bilateral"); Rode Oil Co. v. Lamar Adver. Co., No. W2007-02017-
COA-R3-CV, 2008 WL 4367300, at *6 (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 18, 2008) (collecting citations and
stating "we note that many authorities speak of a long-established presumption against finding a
unilateral rather than a bilateral contract where there is doubt as to which type of contract was
intended").
198 See Winters, 35 F. Supp. 2d at 845 (insured's undertakings are conditions of coverage, not
affirmative promises).
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that are fully executed on one side. 199 Courts that follow this rule and
presume that the insurance contract is unilateral leave policyholders
with inadequate remedies for an insurer's prospective repudiation. 200
Fifth, characterization of an insurance contract as unilateral focuses
too much attention upon the act of paying the premium. 201 In fact, as
outlined above, policyholders often make and insurers often accept
promises to pay premiums, 202 partial payments with implied promises to
pay more later, and financed payments. 203 By labeling the act of paying
the premium as the sine qua non of formation, courts are unnecessarily
forced to agonize over lost mail, dishonored checks, and all the other
potential payment glitches that might mean forfeiture of coverage. The
machinations courts must use to pigeonhole these contracts into a
unilateral construction ignores the complicated courtship of offer and
acceptance and the promises exchanged between policyholders and
insurers within a complex, ongoing relationship.
1. The Destructive Force of Construing Policyholder
Duties as Conditions
By definition, only one party in a unilateral contract makes a
promise. 204 In a unilateral insurance contract, the insurer is regarded as
the only promising party. "Because a 'unilateral contract' is one in
which no promisor receives promise as consideration for his promise,
199 See FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS, supra note 3, § 8.18, at 532.
200 See WILLISTON, supra note 3, § 63:63 (discussing divided approaches to application of
anticipatory repudiation for an insurer's prospective repudiation).
201 See Warren v. Confederation Life Ass'n, 401 F.2d 487, 489 (1st Cir. 1968) ("A life
insurance policy is a unilateral contract-the applicant may pay the premium, or not, as he
chooses; he is under no legal obligation to do so."); La Salle Cnty. Farm Bureau v. Thompson,
Gen. No. 7,712, 1927 WL 4140, at *3 (Ill. App. Sep. 24, 1927) ("[T]here was no promise to pay
on the part of the member or nothing which could be tortured into an undertaking on the part of
the member to pay for any definite length of time; that the whole scheme of insurance is based on
a contract purely unilateral and whether the payment for insurance be termed a premium or an
assessment, the right of the association or company is to declare a forfeiture for nonpayment of
premium or assessment and not a right to recover the assessment or premium in a suit; that a
contract for insurance in any benevolent association is a unilateral contract and the member's
failure to pay is his declaration of severance and that the forfeiture as provided in the by-laws was
self-executing and the member, without any action on the part of the association, by mere force of
his failure to pay ... ceased to be a member."); Gibson v. Megrew, 56 N.E. 674 (Ind. 1900)
(holding that as a unilateral contract, failure to pay a premium is not an indebtedness, but failure
of a condition precedent and a forfeiture of the contract).
202 See Kelly v. Great W. Accident Ins. Co., 189 P. 785 (Cal. Ct. App. 1920) (insured
promised to pay for life insurance annually for a term of five years).
203 See Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Doerr, 115 N.E. 700 (Ind. Ct. App. 1917) (insured paid with a
promissory note).
204 See PERILLO, supra note 2, § 2.10(a), at 56-57 (in a unilateral contract, "only one party has
made a promise and therefore only this party is subject to a legal obligation").
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only one party is bound." 205  Thus, in a consummated insurance
contract, only the insurer is bound to the insured; the policyholder has
completely performed by paying the premium and may now unilaterally
walk away without breach simply by failing to renew or even by
terminating the policy and seeking a refund of unearned premium. In
this section, we discuss two negative effects that result from construing
the policyholder's obligations as conditions. The first is that a failure of
a condition will result in forfeiture unless the court intervenes with a
judicially established anti-forfeiture device, such as the requirement in
most states that the insurer establish prejudice from failure to satisfy the
condition of prompt notice. 206 The second is that, by construing the
policyholder's obligations as conditions, the law asks too little of the
policyholder and diminishes the relational aspects of the contract.
If it is true that the policyholder has completely performed simply
by paying the premium, then anything the policyholder does or fails to
do during the policy period is not a breach of the insurance contract
because the policyholder did not promise to do or refrain from doing
anything. Yet during the life of an insurance contract, its provisions
seem to provide that the policyholder is expected to "do" quite a bit,
including such things as providing notice of claims, proof of loss, and
giving cooperation to the insurer. 207
If the policyholder is not "bound" by the contract and has made no
promises, the only alternative is to label the policyholder's enumerated
responsibilities in the insurance contract as conditions. 208  "The
difference is not only one of semantics but also of substance; it
determines the rights and responsibilities of the parties...." 209
Constructing the policyholder's return obligations as conditions
deprives courts of material breach and substantial performance as tools
to forgive trivial breaches.
Conditions traditionally demand "strict compliance," and the
failure to strictly comply with a condition extinguishes any promissory
duty on the other side. 210 Simply put, failure to comply with a condition
205 S. Trust Bank v. Williams, 775 So.2d 184, 188 (Ala. 2000).
206 See supra notes 154-58 and accompanying text (discussing law of late notice and
importance ofjudicial attitudes toward conditions in shaping that law).
207 Winters v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 35 F. Supp. 2d 842, 845 (E.D. Okla. 1999)
("'[D]espite the many acts to be done by the insured under a fire policy, the fire contract is a
unilateral contract."' (quoting Nat'l Union Fire Ins. Co. v. FDIC, 957 P.2d 357, 363 (Kan.
1998))). Some of the insureds' undertakings include paying premiums, providing notice of
claims, cooperating in documenting claims, and in the case of liability insurance, assisting in the
defense of the claims.
208 Id. at 842. The Restatement (Second) of Contracts defines a condition as "an event, not
certain to occur, which must occur, unless its non-occurrence is excused, before performance
under a contract becomes due." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 224 (1981).
209 Williams, 775 So.2d at 188.
210 Professor Farnsworth explains the consequences of characterizing a term as a condition: "If
the occurrence of a condition is required by the agreement of the parties, rather than as a matter of
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will result in forfeiture of the benefits under the contract. In the
insurance context, this means that when a policyholder does not strictly
comply with the insured's duties, such as notice and cooperation, the
policyholder puts both the premiums paid and the coverage promised at
risk.211
Faced with the harsh consequence of forfeiture, courts frequently
strain to apply anti-forfeiture tools excessively and sometimes without a
principled framework. In the context of insurance conditions, judicial
devices to avoid forfeiture have seemingly swallowed the rule that
conditions must be strictly met.2 12 Courts employ a variety of equitable
doctrines to overcome the harsh consequence of forfeiture-indulging
waiver or estoppel analysis213-by requiring some showing of prejudice
before allowing forfeiture. 214 Even courts that do not adopt a prejudice
rule can use other tricks to avoid forfeiture, such as generously
permitting excuses 215 or prolonging the time of reasonableness. 216  Of
law, a rule of strict compliance traditionally applies." FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS, supra note 3,
§ 8.3, at 422-23. In addition, the entire contract is imperiled when a condition does not occur:
The nonoccurrence of a condition of an obligor's duty may have two distinct effects.
First, the obligor is entitled to suspend performance on the ground that the performance
is not due as long as the condition has not occurred. Second, if a time comes when it is
too late for the condition to occur, the obligor is entitled to treat its duty as discharged
and the contract as terminated.
Id. at 421.
211 Then-Judge Cardozo explained:
Cooperation with the insurer is one of the conditions of the policy. When the condition
was broken, the policy was at an end, if the insurer so elected. The case is not one of
the breach of a mere covenant, where the consequences may vary with fluctuations of
the damage. There has been a failure to fulfill a condition upon which obligation is
dependent.
Coleman v. New Amsterdam Cas. Co., 160 N.E. 367, 369 (N.Y. 1928).
212 See STEMPEL ON INSURANCE CONTRACTS, supra note 3, § 9.01[B], at 9-10 (Supp. 2008)
("The word 'reasonable' rings throughout so much of this and other formulations of the duty as to
suggest a tautology. It is a concept and doctrine rooted in common sense but one nonetheless
surrounded by inconsistent and sometimes unfair judicial results.").
213 JERRY, supra note 82, at 192 (observing that waiver and estoppel can prevent insurers from
enforcing a timely notice provision); see also PERILLO, supra note 2, § 11.29, at 397-98.
214 JERRY, supra note 82, at 635 ("Under the modem view, late notice does not discharge the
insurer's duties unless the insurer is prejudiced as a result of the late notice.").
215 See 13 COUCH ON INSURANCE, supra note 125, § 186.5 (discussing the historical
development of notice and proof of loss requirements).
In addition, where the consequences of late notice are substantial and where the insurer
need not show prejudice, courts in New York have provided that notice that is
chronologically late may nonetheless be excused under appropriate circumstances so
that late notice will not defeat coverage. A valid excuse makes the notice timely in
terms of legal effect ....
STEMPEL ON INSURANCE CONTRACTS, supra note 3, § 9.01 [B], at 9-12 (footnotes omitted).
216 According to one treatise:
There exists a wide range as to what constitutes timely notice or insufficient notice.
All other things being equal, it appears that states that require insurers to demonstrate
prejudice from late notice are more likely to find notice timely, in part because the
insurer's failure to show prejudice in the instance case suggests that the notice was not
in fact too late....
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course, not all courts are merciful when it comes to the law of
conditions. However, strictly construing the so-called conditions in an
insurance policy may be principled at the expense of fairness. 217
As another device to avoid forfeiture, courts sometimes engraft a
version of substantial performance onto the law of conditions, 218 but as
a doctrinal matter substantial performance is not supposed to have any
role in construing conditions. 219 Nevertheless, while characterizing the
insured's responsibilities as conditions precedent, courts may not ask
for strict performance, but instead may examine the "materiality" of the
insured's performance or the "substantial" character of the insured's
failure to comply. 220
A second consequence of characterizing the insured's obligations
as conditions is that the policyholder cannot breach the contract.221
However ... courts in "no prejudice required" states also display variance in
views regarding permissible delay. .. . To avoid denying coverage to a policyholder,
even where the insurer has suffered no prejudice, courts in such states are undoubtedly
tempted to apply a liberal yardstick as to what constitutes tardiness or permit the
tardiness to be excused.
STEMPEL ON INSURANCE CONTRACTS, supra note 3, § 9.01[B], at 9-13.
217 See JERRY, supra note 82, at 634 ("The traditional rule, and one that is still followed in
some jurisdictions, is that timely notice is a condition precedent to coverage, and unexcused delay
in giving notice will relieve the insurer of its obligations to the insured, whether or not the delay
prejudiced the insurer.").
218 See, e.g., MXL Indus. v. Mulder, 623 N.E.2d 369, 375 (Ill. Ct. App. 1993) (explaining that
substantial performance applies to constructive conditions of exchange but not to express
conditions; "an express condition precedent, unless otherwise excused, operates by agreement of
the parties to define the satisfaction of a necessary antecedent to a party's performance under the
contract and is subject to the rule of strict compliance, unless such compliance is waived").
219 See Oppenheimer & Co. v. Oppenheim, Appel, Dixon & Co., 660 N.E.2d 415, 418 (N.Y.
1995) ("Express conditions must be literally performed, whereas constructive conditions, which
ordinarily arise from language of promise, are subject to the precept that substantial compliance is
sufficient.").
220 Burmac Metal Finishing Co. v. West Bend Mut. Ins. Co., 825 N.E.2d 1246, 1258 (Ill. Ct.
App. 2005) (substantial compliance with conditions precedent); Watson v. Nat'l Sur. Corp., 468
N.W.2d 448, 451 (Iowa 1991) (express conditions in an insurance contract require substantial
rather than strict compliance); Hoekstra v. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co., 382 N.W.2d 100, 106
(Iowa 1986) (adopting substantial performance to insurance conditions); Haynes v. Dairyland
Mut. Ins. Co., 199 N.W.2d 83, 87 (Iowa 1972) (construing notice and cooperation as conditions
precedent and stating insured has the obligation of showing "substantial performance"); PAJ, Inc.
v. Hanover Ins. Co., 243 S.W.3d 630, 644 (Tex. 2008) ("Texas law, for example, has long
recognized that 'substantial compliance' with a policy's notice or proof-of-loss provisions will
suffice and that trivial missteps in complying with notice or other policy requirements are
excused."); Munchenbach v. Nationwide Mut. Fire Ins. Co., No. CL-2005-6226, 2007 WL
6002108, at *4 (Va. Cir. Ct. 2007) (notice is a condition precedent requiring substantial
compliance).
221 Even good faith and fair dealing is not expected of a performing party in a unilateral
contract. See E.B.C. Trust Corp. v. JB Oxford Holdings, Inc., No. CV-00-8812-RMT (Mcx),
2004 WL 5641999, at of (C.D. Cal. Oct. 26, 2004) (holding that because a promissory note is a
unilateral contract, the lender completed the contract by lending the money, and "the implied
covenant of good faith and fair dealing cannot create a claim against the party that has already
fully performed under a unilateral contract").
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Using Professor Wormser's enduring Brooklyn Bridge hypo, 222
Professor Perillo explains:
The distinction between an express condition and a promise is
critical. While failure to perform a promise, unless excused, is a
breach, failure to comply with an express condition is not a
breach... . If B does not walk the Bridge, B will not be liable
because B did not promise to walk. One cannot be liable for breach
of contract unless one breaches a promise. 223
Thus, if insurance is a unilateral contract, a policyholder must
strictly meet conditions to obtain coverage (unless an anti-forfeiture
device is applied), but a policyholder cannot breach the insurance
contract by not meeting those conditions.
For example, in a unilateral contract, the policyholder's failure to
"cooperate" with the insurer during the policy period is not a breach
because the policyholder does not promise to cooperate. 224  But
cooperation is a condition of obtaining coverage, and therefore the
policyholder's failure to cooperate can result in forfeiture of coverage,
unless a judicial doctrine ameliorates that result. With forfeiture as the
dire consequence, courts often expend inordinate amounts of effort
determining just how uncooperative a policyholder may be without
forfeiting.
Winters v. State Farm & Fire Casualty Co. 225 illustrates the
challenges courts face when insurance is constructed as a unilateral
contract and the policyholder's duties as conditions of coverage. In
Winters, the policyholder homeowners filed a claim for fire damage.
The state fire marshal suspected the fire was intentionally set and
222 According to Farnsworth, the Brooklyn Bridge hypothetical is "the most durable and
influential hypothetical in American legal education." FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS, supra note 3,
§ 3.24, at 356 (citing its origin as Wormser, True Conception, supra note 25). In brief, party A
states that he will give party B $100 if B walks across the Brooklyn Bridge. If the offer is
construed as an offer for a unilateral contract, A is seeking only the performance. B cannot
accept by promising to walk across the Bridge. B must actually walk across the bridge, and the
contract is formed when B finishes the walk. Unilateral contracts such as this put B in jeopardy,
because of another contract rule-offers are revocable until accepted. That means that B could
begin the perilous walk across the Bridge, and A could call out, "I revoke." Hence, Restatement
(Second) of Contracts section 45 was created to protect B while he walked across the bridge by
limiting A's ability to revoke his offer once B begins performance. Yet nothing binds B, who
may decide to abandon the foolhardy stunt without incurring liability for breach. See
FARNSWORTH, supra note 3, § 3.24, at 356-62.
223 PERILLO, supra note 2, § 11.9, at 365-66.
224 Contrary to the rule that a failure to meet a condition is not a breach, courts frequently and
carelessly speak of it as a breach. See U.S.A. Elecs., Inc. v. Aetna Cas. & Surety Co., 120 B.R.
637, 644 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1990) (characterizing cooperation as a condition precedent and failure
to cooperate a "material breach"); Glen Falls Indem. Co. v. Lingle, 133 So.2d 78 (Fla. Ct. App.
1961) (construing a cooperation provision as a condition precedent and explaining that "'a
material breach of such a condition is frequently shown by the insured's refusal to give the
company whatever information he has respecting the claim' (citation omitted)).
225 35 F. Supp. 2d 842 (E.D. Okla. 1999).
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eventually charged the homeowners with arson. 226 Due to the criminal
investigation and pending charges, the policyholders would not make
themselves available for examination under oath, despite their own
concession that "pending criminal charges did not relieve them of their
obligations under the insurance policy to give their examinations under
oath." 227  State Farm then advised plaintiffs that they had failed to
satisfy the conditions of cooperation and examination under oath and
declined payment, while not formally and completely denying the
claim. When the arson charges finally were dismissed against the
homeowners two years later, State Farm, for the first time, was able to
take the plaintiffs' depositions. 228 State Farm claimed that the plaintiffs
had "forfeited their right to recover under the policy by failing to submit
to examinations under oath." 229 But the plaintiffs argued that they had
"substantially complied with the terms of the policy provisions by
providing all relevant documentation and by providing the depositions
that were taken separately in the instant case." 230
The Winters court characterized insurance as a reverse-unilateral
contract. Under this construction, the insured's application and
payment of the premium constituted the offer and "'once the fire insurer
accepts those acts and issues the fire policy, a unilateral contract is
formed, that is, an act for a promise.' 23 1 As a result, "'after the insured
has paid the premium, only the insurer is legally bound (by its promises)
to do anything."' 232 Therefore, "'despite the many acts to be done by
the insured under a fire insurance policy"' the insured is not legally
obligated to perform those acts.2 33  Instead, the court constructed
cooperation as condition of coverage. As the court explained, "[a]
condition is a shield not a sword" and "[c]onditions are usually
precedent to that duty and must occur to trigger the duty contained in
the promise." 234
Faced with the all or nothing choice of coverage or forfeiture, the
court assisted the policyholders by establishing a cooperation-prejudice
rule akin to the notice-prejudice rule. "[T]he purpose of the
examination under oath is to enable the insurance company to
investigate and pay the claim without prejudice, and it too makes sense
that [the insurer] should be required to prove prejudice before denying
226 Id. at 843.
227 Id.
228 Id. at 844.
229 Id.
230 Id.
231 Id. at 845 (citing Nat'I Union Fire Ins. Co. v. FDIC, 957 P.2d 357, 363 (Kan. 1998)).
232 Id (citing National Union, 957 P.2d at 363).
233 Id. (citing National Union, 957 P.2d at 363).
234 Id. (citing National Union, 957 P.2d at 363).
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coverage." 235 Thus the court crafted a solution, because in its view the
policyholder had substantially complied with the requirements and did
not harm the insurer by the delay.
Courts do not need to do violence to the law of conditions to reach
the familiar ground of the law of promises in insurance disputes. 236
Insurance policies, like other contracts, should be construed as
presumptively bilateral. 237  The undertakings prescribed within the
contract, especially when described as "duties," should be interpreted as
expressions of promise rather than as conditions. 238  Similarly,
particularly because the relationship between a policyholder and insurer
is complex and lengthy, the policy is better classified as bilateral rather
than unilateral or reverse-unilateral. In the next section, we demonstrate
that under traditional canons of contract interpretation, a policyholder's
obligations might appropriately be viewed as promises, and propose that
a bilateral construction would have a salutary effect on the performance
of insurance contracts. We discuss several recent cases that found
insurance contracts to be bilateral, and suggest that the results bring
insurance contracts within traditional contract doctrine, rather than serve
as an exception to it.
2. Contract Law's Preference for Bilateral Contracts and Promises
Should Apply to Insurance Contracts
Although contract law has traditionally expressed a strong
preference for a bilateral contract construction, the insurance contract
appears the exception. 239 Similarly, canons of contract interpretation
235 Id. at 846.
236 See Nicholas M. Insua & Matthew J. Delude, The Restatement (Second) of Contracts as a
Useful Tool for Addressing Common Insurance Law Issues, 13 CONN. INS. L.J. 19 (2007)
(asserting that courts can benefit by looking to the Restatement (Second) of Contracts to find
alternative approaches to resolve insurance issues).
237 FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS, supra note 3, § 3.24, at 356-57 (explaining that in doubtful
cases it is preferable to interpret a contract as bilateral in order to protect the offeree from harsh
results); see also Insua & Delude, supra note 236, at 35 ("[T]he Restatement would aid a court's
determination regarding whether the notice provision was a condition precedent or a promise to
exchange performance" and provide "a preference of interpretation .. .for close questions.").
238 For example, in PAJ, Inc. v. Hanover Ins. Co., 243 S.W.3d 630 (Tex. 2008), the majority
expressed doubt that notice provisions are typically conditions precedent rather than covenants. It
noted that although the relevant provisions appeared in a section entitled "'Commercial General
Liability Conditions,"' they were in a subsection labeled "'Duties in the Event of Occurrence'
and contained "language that more closely resemble[d] a covenant." Id. at 636. In the case of
ambiguity,"[c]onditions are not favored in the law; thus, when another reasonable reading would
avoid a forfeiture is available, [the court] must construe contract language as a covenant rather
than a condition." Id.
239 Elsewhere, the Restatement (Second) of Contracts perpetuates the view that insurance is
largely unilateral. For example, section 227 provides for standards of preference with regard to
conditions. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 227 (1981). It states a preference for
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prefer construing clauses as promises, demanding that conditions be
clearly expressed as such. 240  Yet, a typical insurance contract is
ambiguous at best, both with regard to whether it is bilateral or
unilateral, and with regard to whether the insured's obligations are
expressed as conditions, promises, or promissory conditions.
As an example, a typical homeowner's insurance policy begins
with the agreement to insure, often stating that the insurer provides
insurance in return or exchange for payment of the premium and
compliance with the policy provisions. 24 1 A promise to insure in return
interpretations that avoid forfeiture. Moreover, if a provision is expressed as a condition, but the
conditional event is a matter within the control of the party, the Restatement (Second) of
Contracts favors a construction of a duty (promise) to make the condition occur:
The rule in Subsection (2) states a preference for an interpretation that merely imposes
a duty on the obligee to do the act and does not make the doing of the act a condition of
the obligor's duty. . . . Unless the agreement makes it clear that the event is required as
a condition, it is fairer to apply these more flexible rules.
Id. cmt. d. Yet it states that the rule is inapplicable to insurance, based upon some vague "general
understanding that only the insurer undertakes duties, the term will be interpreted as making that
event a condition of the insurer's duty rather than as imposing a duty on the insured." Id.
Furthermore, this standard of preference does not apply when the contract is of a type
under which only the obligor general undertakes duties. It therefore does not apply to
the typical insurance contract under which only the insurer generally undertakes duties,
and a term requiring an act to be done by the insured is not subject to this standard of
preference.
Id.
240 See Oppenheimer & Co. v. Oppenheim, Appel, Dixon & Co., 660 N.E.2d 415, 418 (N.Y.
1995) ("In determining whether a particular agreement makes an event a condition courts will
interpret doubtful language as embodying a promise or constructive condition rather than an
express condition."). The Restatement provides:
§ 227. Standards Of Preference With Regard To Conditions
(1) In resolving doubts as to whether an event is made a condition of an obligor's duty,
and as to the nature of such an event, an interpretation is preferred that will reduce the
obligee's risk of forfeiture, unless the event is within the obligee's control or the
circumstances indicate that he has assumed the risk.
(2) Unless the contract is of a type under which only one party generally undertakes
duties, when it is doubtful whether
(a) a duty is imposed on an obligee that an event occur, or
(b) the event is made a condition of the obligor's duty, or
(c) the event is made a condition of the obligor's duty and a duty is imposed on
the obligee that the event occur, the first interpretation is preferred if the event is
within the obligee's control.
(3) In case of doubt, an interpretation under which an event is a condition of an
obligor's duty is preferred over an interpretation under which the non-occurrence of the
event is a ground for discharge of that duty after it has become a duty to perform.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 227 (1981).
241 Property and casualty insurance policies typically state that the insurer will insure in
"'return for the premium and compliance ... with applicable provisions in this policy."' Martin
v. Safeco Ins. Co., No. 06-6889, 2007 WL 2071662, at *2 (E.D. La. July 13, 2007); accord
Lloyd's of London v. Pagan-Sanchez, 539 F.3d 19 (1st Cir. 2008); Joseph v. Unitrin, Inc., No.
1:08-CV-077, 2008 WL 3822938 (E.D. Tex. Aug. 12, 2008); GuideOne Mut. Ins. Co. v. Hall,
No. 1:06CV315-SA-JAD, 2008 WL 2817098 (N.D. Miss. July 18, 2008); Amica Mut. Ins. Co. v.
Fischer, No. CV-F-07-1410 OWW/DLB, 2008 WL 1970639, at *4 (E.D. Cal. May 5, 2008). A
Commercial General Liability policy provides .' in return for the payment of the premium and
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for payment is merely a recital of the consideration exchanged. That
insuring language does not preclude a bilateral construction of the
contract; after all, it is not uncommon in bilateral contracts to exchange
payment for performance.
Thereafter, in a typical policy, the insurer itemizes obligations of
the policyholder upon a loss in a section of the contract entitled
"Conditions." Within the Conditions section, however, there are
frequently provisions that are not conditions at all; some of the
provisions describe undertakings of the insurer, and others set out
procedures for establishing one's claims.242 It is axiomatic that merely
labeling a contract provision as a condition does not make it so. Again
turning to a homeowner's insurance policy as an example, some of the
enumerated actions the insured must take after a loss are expressed as
duties 243-a word that evokes a promissory obligation. Other
provisions make clear that failure to comply renders the contract
void.244
At least a few courts, most notably in a line of cases in Maryland,
have turned to traditional canons of construction and clearly
transformed the presumptively unilateral insurance contract into a
bilateral contract. 245 These courts have characterized at least some of
subject to all the terms of this policy, we agree to provide the insurance stated in this policy."'
Commerce Bank, N.A. v. AMCO Ins. Co., No. 08-cv-669-JPG, 2009 WL 702220, at *3 (S.D. Ill.
Mar. 17, 2009) (emphasis omitted); accord Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Regency Furniture, Inc.,
963 A.2d 253, 260 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2009).
242 For example, an ISO homeowners policy contains a section labeled "conditions." It
contains provisions identifying duties of the insured, such as providing notice and proof of loss.
But conditions sections also contain provisions that cannot be construed as conditions. For
example, loss settlement provisions describe procedures the insurer follows in valuing and paying
claims. These are not conditions of coverage. See e.g., Goff v. State Farm Fla. Ins. Co., 999
So.2d 684 (Fla. Ct. App. 2008) (describing loss settlement procedures in conditions section of a
homeowner's policy); Landry v. La. Citizens Prop. Ins. Co., 983 So.2d 66 (La. 2008) (same).
243 For example, the liability portion of a homeowner's policy describes "Duties After Loss"
in which it requires the insured to provide notice, information, and the names of witnesses and
possible claimants. See ISO, Homeowner's 3 Special Form Section II Conditions , HO 00 03 04
91 (1990), reprinted in ALLIANCE OF AMERICAN INSURERS, supra note 162, at 42.
244 For example, standard homeowners' policies usually state that "concealment or fraud"
renders the policy void. See, e.g., Lanier v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., No. 5:07CV129-V, 2009
WL 926914, at *5 (W.D.N.C. Mar. 31, 2009).
The term "duty" is frequently associated with promises, and particularly distinguished from
conditions. For example, Farnsworth characterizes duty as a promissory term: "[I]t can be said
that promises, which impose duties, and conditions, which make duties conditional, are the main
components of agreements." FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS, supra note 3, § 8.2, at 414. Calamari
and Perillo employ the term "duty" to refer to the "promisor's duty to perform a promise" as
distinguished from conditions for which a party has no duty. See PERILLO, supra note 2, § 11.2,
at 361. Conceptually, a promise creates a duty to perform and a condition places a limit on that
promissory duty.
245 See Snyder v. Chester Cnty. Mut. Ins. Co., 264 F. Supp. 2d 332 (D. Md. 2003) (construing
cooperation clauses as a covenant requiring substantial compliance); Lindsey v. State Farm Fire
& Cas. Co., No. CIV. A. AW-00-132, 2000 WL 1597763 (D. Md. Oct. 23, 2000) (construing
duties after loss as covenants requiring substantial performance); Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v.
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the undertakings the insured performs under an insurance contract as
promises subject to substantial performance. When an insured enters
into a contract, these courts posit that the insured has made affirmative
promises to the insurer: to cooperate, to give timely notice, to provide
documents, and to participate in the defense of the case under a liability
policy. The effect of constructing these obligations as promissory is
that a judge can invoke substantial performance rather than strict
compliance to decide difficult cases. 24 6 These courts do not need to
painstakingly search for an excuse, prejudice, waiver, or estoppel in
order to avoid forfeiture. 247
Hartford Fire Insurance Co. v. Himelfarb248 illustrates a situation
in which the policyholder's responsibilities under the insurance policy
were construed as promises and the decision more predictably followed
Himelfarb, 736 A.2d 295 (Md. 1999) (construing the sworn proof of loss provision of a
commercial property insurance policy as a covenant calling for substantial rather than strict
compliance).
246 Eugene Anderson, who often writes from the pro-insured position, has argued forcefully
for the application of substantial performance in judging the insured's performance of duties such
as notice and cooperation:
Forfeiture is an unfair, draconian remedy that should no longer be applied in insurance
law, routinely or otherwise. A policyholder who has paid premiums and purchased an
insurance policy that is affected with a public interest should be treated at least as
favorably as a party to any type of contract. In the world of insurance, forfeiture as a
punishment does not fit the crime. Draconian forfeitures can be eliminated by the
simple application of traditional contractual remedies, notably, the doctrine of
substantial performance. When a policyholder has regularly paid premiums on his
policy, courts should find that the insurance policy has been substantially performed
and that the insurance company's recovery for noncompliance with a policy condition
should be limited to damages or recoupment for the harm suffered.
Eugene R. Anderson et al., Draconian Forfeitures of Insurance: Commonplace, Indefensible, and
Unnecessary, 65 FORDHAM L. REv. 825, 861 (1996). We prefer to go to the root of the problem
instead of engrafting substantial performance onto conditions. Courts do not need to recast the
law of conditions. They need only recognize that duties under an insurance policy that sound
"promissory," such as providing notice, cooperation, and proof of loss, should be construed as
promises as provided by traditional contracts law.
247 The substantial performance test is sufficiently nuanced for concepts like prejudice to find
a comfortable home within it. For example, in testing the materiality of a breach, the Restatement
(Second) provides that the following circumstances are significant:
(a) the extent to which the injured party will be deprived of the benefit which he
reasonably expected;
(b) the extent to which the injured party can be adequately compensated for the part of
that benefit of which he will be deprived;
(c) the extent to which the party failing to perform or to offer to perform will suffer
forfeiture;
(d) the likelihood that the party failing to perform or to offer to perform will cure his
failure, taking account of all the circumstances including any reasonable assurances;
(e) the extent to which the behavior of the party failing to perform or to offer to
perform comports with standards of good faith and fair dealing.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 241 (1981). Thus, looking for substantial
performance invites a rich consideration of, among other factors, the harm to the insurer, the
harshness of forfeiture, and the nature of the nonperformance.
248 736 A.2d 295.
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contract law principles. In Himelfarb, a commercial policyholder's
warehouse was burgled. At the time, the insured's premises were leased
to a failing business that was in bankruptcy. 249 Himelfarb reported the
theft to its agent and engaged a public adjuster to assist in pressing its
insurance claim. As provided by the policy, Hartford then requested a
sworn proof of loss within sixty days of the loss. 250 Himelfarb provided
a sworn statement, but Hartford deemed it incomplete because it lacked
an itemized list of losses. In particular, Himelfarb was having difficulty
obtaining an itemized list of property auctioned in the lessee's
bankruptcy proceedings, a necessary crosscheck to determine precisely
what had been stolen. 251 Six months after the sixty-day deadline for
proof of loss passed, Himelfarb finally provided an itemized list of
stolen items. Hartford rejected the claim on the grounds that the proof
of loss was untimely.
Himelfarb filed suit to recover for its losses. 252 On appeal, the
issue was whether the trial court was correct to grant Hartford summary
judgment on the grounds that Himelfarb did not strictly comply with a
condition precedent to coverage. 253 The court first stated that it would
interpret the insurance contract in the same manner as it would "any
other contract," including finding "'the intent of the parties to be
gathered from the words they have employed, and in case of ambiguity,
after resort to the other permissible aids to interpretation."' 254 The court
observed that the proof of loss provisions that Hartford claimed to be
express conditions were ambiguously stated and could be covenants, not
conditions. 255  It explained that although the section containing the
proof of loss provision was labeled "Loss Conditions," not all the
provisions in the section were express conditions precedent; some
described actions that Hartford, not its policyholders, was to
undertake. 256
In addition, while the provisions were labeled as conditions, the
court determined that the obligations were not expressed in the familiar
language of conditions,257 but were expressed as a "duty on the
249 Id. at 297-98.
250 Id. at 298.
251 Id. at 299.
252 Id
253 Id. at 297. The trial court ruled in favor of Hartford, a Court of Special Appeals reversed,
remanding the case for trial. The Court of Appeals of Maryland granted certiorari and affirmed
the reversal. Id at 299.
254 Id. at 300 (quoting Chirichella v. Erwin, 310 A.2d 555, 557 (Md. 1973)).
255 Id. at 300-01.
256 Id. at 300 (observing that one provision discussed Hartford's option of payment or repair or
replacement, and noting that "[p]ayment by Hartford clearly is not a condition precedent to
Hartford's obligation to pay").
257 The court explained, "'[a]lthough no particular form of words is necessary in order to
create an express condition, such words and phrases as 'if' and 'provided that,' are commonly
used to indicate that performance has been expressly made conditional as have the words 'when,'
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insured." 258 "Under these circumstances construction of [the proof of
loss provision] as a covenant, rather than an express condition, is the
preferred construction." 259 Once the proof of loss provision had been
construed as a covenant rather than as an express condition, the court
was free to consider substantial performance in providing proof of loss,
even while not meeting the strict terms of the policy.
Substantial performance by the insured of the covenant as of the
specified date may be found if, by that date, two elements are
present: (1) the insured has furnished the insurer with information
reasonably requested by the insurer to the extent that it is reasonably
possible for the insured to do so, and (2) the insured expressly or
impliedly promises to submit, when and as it is reasonably possible
for the insured to do so, the balance of the information. 260
The appellate court reversed Hartford's summary judgment and
remanded the case for trial, holding that whether Himelfarb
substantially performed under the proof of loss provision was a question
for the trier of fact. 261 Him elfarb's construction of insurance as bilateral
allowed the court to follow contract law's doctrine of substantial
performance in order to protect the policyholder from unfair forfeiture.
In contrast, the construction of insurance as a unilateral contract in
Winters required the court to invent a novel exception to the law of
conditions in order to obtain a just result.
Importantly, once a contract is constructed as bilateral and once a
policyholder owes a return promise, the policyholder's performance
includes an implied promise of good faith. 262 Liberty Mutual Insurance
Co. v. Altfillisch Construction Co.263 is a rare insurance case in which a
court found a promissory exchange of an implied promise of good faith
on the policyholder's part. There, the policyholder's equipment was
damaged by the insured's lessee. The equipment was covered under a
policy with Liberty Mutual. Unbeknownst to Liberty Mutual, the
'after,' 'as soon as,' or 'subject to."' Id. (quoting Chirichella v. Erwin, 310 A.2d 555, 557 (Md.
1973)).
258 Id
259 Id. at 300-01 (citing cases and the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 227(2)
(1981)).
260 Id. at 306.
261 Id. at 306-07. The court observed that the property was not owned by the Himelfarbs, they
did not live in the same city, and they had no way to know what was stolen until they could
compare "the before break-in and after break-in inventories" by obtaining the information from
the bankruptcy. Id.
262 When insurance is construed as a unilateral contract, the insured fully performs by paying
the premium, and cannot thereafter breach. It follows that the insured has made no implied
covenant of good faith and fair dealing to the insurer. See E.B.C. Trust Corp. v. JB Oxford
Holdings, Inc., No. CV-00-8812-RMT (Mcx), 2004 WL 5641999, at *I (C.D. Cal. Oct. 26, 2004)
("[Als a matter of law, the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing cannot create a claim
against the party that has already fully performed under a unilateral contract.").
263 139 Cal. Rptr. 91 (Cal. Ct. App. 1977).
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policyholder had made a prior agreement with the lessee to "insure
lessee against risks resulting from its possession" of policyholder's
equipment. 264 This agreement had the effect of cutting off Liberty
Mutual's opportunity for subrogation for any losses attributable to the
lessee's negligence.
Under the casualty policy, "Condition No. 17" provided for
subrogation and required that "'the insured shall execute and deliver
instruments and papers and do whatever else is necessary to secure such
rights.' 265 Because the side agreement between the policyholder and
its lessee occurred before the loss occurred, Condition No. 17, which
protected the insurer's right of subrogation after loss, did not technically
apply.266
The court considered whether impairing the insurer's potential
right of subrogation violated the policyholder's implied promise of good
faith and fair dealing. Reviewing the rise of insurance bad faith in tort,
the court explained:
Faced with this sweeping and portentous pronouncement on the
force and dignity of such covenants, we find no difficulty in
construing the scope of their impact to devolve alike upon the
insured as well as the insurer and that a breach thereof by the insured
would lead to the same legal consequences as any garden variety
breach of contract. 267
The court then concluded that the policyholder violated the
covenant of good faith in bargaining away and therefore frustrating the
insurer's "expectation of opportunities to subrogate in the event of a
loss caused by the negligence of a third party." 268
Altfillisch recognizes insurance as an ongoing mutual relationship
between policyholder and insurer, and recognizes that the
policyholder's performance is not complete at the time the premium is
paid, at least if the policyholder is to have coverage. Rather, the
policyholder, like the insurer, has made an ongoing promise to engage
in good faith and fair dealing. 269
264 Id. at 92.
265 Id. at 94.
266 Id. at 94-95.
267 Id. at 95.
268 Id.
269 Without addressing the unilateral versus bilateral contract question, a number of courts
have said that good faith and fair dealing is a two-way street in an insurance policy. See, e.g.,
Comunale v. Traders & Gen. Ins. Co, 328 P.2d 198, 200 (Cal. 1958) ("There is an implied
covenant of good faith and fair dealing in every contract that neither party will do anything which
will injure the right of the other to receive the benefits of the agreement. This principle is
applicable to policies of insurance." (citation omitted)); Sargent v. Johnson, 551 F.2d 221, 231-32
(8th Cir. 1977) ("Where a claim is made against an insured which may exceed policy limits, and
where the insured and insurer may each incur liability, then each assumes an obligation to act in
good faith, to face the facts realistically, and to maintain a mutual respect for the interests of the
other.... This standard of good faith and mutual respect applies to both parties to the insurance
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The notion that a policyholder makes ongoing promises subject to
good faith and substantial performance cures a variety of evils. First, it
has a salutary effect on the behavior of policyholders by infusing a
mutual expectation of good faith into their relationship with the insurer.
Second, it removes the hammer of forfeiture that comes with conditions
and allows courts to evaluate conduct through the more reasonable lens
of substantial performance. It thus enables policyholders to obtain
coverage as expected without regard to technical breaches. We also
suspect that lowering the stakes for minor deviations from policy
provisions from all-or-nothing may reduce the allure of litigation and
enable the parties to better self assess where the contractual relationship
stands.
3. The Unjustified Absence of Anticipatory Repudiation
Traditionally, the doctrine of anticipatory repudiation has not
applied to unilateral contracts, although the limitation certainly does not
have universal support. 270 The unilateral construction of the insurance
contract."); Rawlings v. Apodaca, 726 P.2d 565, 570 (Ariz. 1986) ("Thus, firmly established law
indicates that the insurance contract between plaintiffs and Farmers included a covenant of good
faith and fair dealing, implied in law, whereby each of the parties was bound to refrain from any
action which would impair the benefits which the other had the right to expect from the contract
or the contractual relationship."); United Servs. Auto. Ass'n v. Morris, 741 P.2d 246 (Ariz. 1987)
(Holohan, J. dissenting) (asserting that insured owed a duty of good faith to insurer). A
reciprocal implied promise, by itself, necessitates a bilateral construction of the contract, for it
implies that an insured does indeed have return obligations toward the insurer.
270 Criticism of limiting anticipatory repudiation is based on the concept that even in executed
contracts, anticipatory repudiation has an immediate cost. See, e.g., PERILLO, supra note 2, §
12.9, at 440 (taking the view that the exception for unilateral contracts is indefensible);
WILLISTON, supra note 3, § 63.63 (concluding that when an insurer wrongfully refuses to accept
a premium it is not an anticipatory repudiation, but immediate breach and full damages should be
recovered). An early commentator explained the hostility to the limitation:
This basis for the distinction between bilateral and unilateral contracts in regard to
anticipatory breach is, therefore, unsound. "The best reasons for allowing an
immediate action for an anticipatory repudiation are that it frequently causes
immediate loss in property values, it disturbs the mind and serenity of the promisee,
and immediate action makes for an early settlement of the dispute and a timely
payment of damages." These apply to unilateral as well as bilateral contracts.
Repudiation reduces the sale value of the chose in action, for few people care to
purchase a lawsuit. Also, the plaintiff should not be forced to bring a series of lawsuits
for the regular installments, and in the meantime suffer discomfort and poverty.
Comment, Anticipatory Breach of Unilateral Contracts, 36 YALE L.J. 263, 265-66 (1926) (citing
SIR WILLIAM R. ANSON, CONTRACTS 464 (1924)).
Even Professor Wormser, who was once the strongest proponent of aggressive application
of unilateral contract concepts, saw the traditional anticipatory breach as "anomalous" and
restricted to contract conditions rather than a useful rule of damages. See Wormser, Book Revieiv,
supra note 46. Had Professor Wormser been an insurance scholar like Professor Patterson, he
might have also realized the occasional mischief anticipatory breach doctrine worked in the
context of traditional unilateral contract theory. As one court observed:
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contract precludes applying anticipatory repudiation doctrine by those
courts that adhere to the rule that anticipatory repudiation does not
apply when contracts are fully executed on one side. Refusing to allow
policyholders to obtain relief for anticipatory repudiation prevents the
policyholder from obtaining complete relief where an insurer
wrongfully refuses to provide coverage under an ongoing policy.
As a result, the policyholder wrongfully denied coverage may be
required to repeatedly seek relief seriatim as the insurer fails to deliver
promised payment after promised payment. Worse yet, the policyholder
may be required to continue to pretend the contract is in effect and
continue to perform, including paying premiums, 271 even when it is
clear the insurer will not be providing coverage. When an insurer
refuses to perform, the insured should be able to suspend any return
performance, thereby treating the contract as at an end.
Regarding anticipatory repudiation, Restatement (Second) of
Contracts section 253 states the general rule presumptively applicable
to bilateral contracts: "Where an obligor repudiates a duty before he has
committed a breach by non-performance and before he has received all
of the agreed exchange for it, his repudiation alone gives rise to a claim
for damages for total breach." 272
However, under a unilateral contract construction, the policyholder
has given and the insurer has received all of the agreed exchange-the
payment of the premium-when the contract was formed. Thus, if the
language of section 253 is read literally, the insurer's prospective
repudiation should not give rise to an immediate claim for damages;
instead, the insured must wait until the breach actually occurs. 273
Although this seems intrinsically wrong, the authors of the Restatement
There is some disagreement whether the doctrine of anticipatory repudiation
applies only to bilateral contracts or to both bilateral and unilateral contracts.
Insurance policies are generally unilateral contracts. A D&O insurance policy is a
unilateral contract-the insured has already performed by paying the premium in
exchange for the insurance company's promise to provide insurance. Nevertheless,
there is ample authority for the proposition that the promising party can anticipatorily
repudiate a unilateral contract.
Combs v. Int'l Ins. Co., 354 F.3d 568 (6th Cir. 2004) (citations omitted).
271 Situations of this sort make the unilateral characterization of insurance policies and the
traditional view toward anticipatory repudiation look idiotic. The insurance policy is supposed to
be unilateral or reverse-unilateral-yet the policyholder continues to do the act (premium
payment) which supposedly was complete prior to contract formation and the court needlessly
burdens the victim of the contract breach with additional transaction costs that impede relief.
Under these circumstances, insurers have lowered incentives to make reasonable coverage
determinations, especially if the relevant state's bad faith law is weak. In addition, absent an
exception to the traditional American bar on recovery of counsel fees by the prevailing party, a
policyholder wrongfully denied coverage is not made whole.
272 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 253 (1981) (emphasis added).
273 See Davis v. First Nat'l Bank, 605 P.2d 37, 43-44 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1979) (stating that the
insurer "could not breach what had become a unilateral contract until the time for performance
had arrived").
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apparently meant for this result. Commentary to section 253 states "it is
one of the established limits on the doctrine of 'anticipatory breach' that
an obligor's repudiation alone . . . gives rise to no claim for damages at
all if he has already received all of the agreed exchange for it."274
The rationale for the rule that a contract that has been fully
performed on one side cannot trigger anticipatory repudiation stems
from the idea that the non-breaching party cannot be harmed by waiting
for the time of breach. Under this view, the non-breaching party owes
nothing more that could be put at risk by the threatened breach. 275 But
this assessment must be incorrect as applied to insurance in that the
purpose of the insurance policy is risk management, protection against
contingent loss, and "peace of mind." These objectives are threatened
enough merely from the possibility that an insurer will become
insolvent, wrongfully deny a claim, or undervalue a claim. Where the
insurer has already expressed intent to breach, the value of the policy to
the policyholder has been severely undermined and perhaps even
vitiated.
The problem of inadequate resort to judicial relief based upon
anticipatory repudiation sometimes arises in an insurance contract in
which periodic payments are due, such as under a disability insurance
policy. 276 If an insurance policy is unilateral, it follows under the
conventional rule that the policyholder cannot treat the insurer's refusal
to make a periodic payment as a total repudiation. Therefore, the
policyholder is left to other devices, such as filing multiple suits or a
declaratory action. In the courts that follow the conventional rule,
characterizing the contract as unilateral means that a suit for total
repudiation is unavailing. This transforms what might otherwise be an
interesting damage issue into an anticipatory breach problem. This
274 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 253 cmt. c (1981).
275 To understand the basis for the limitation, RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 253
Reporter's Notes cmt. c (1981) directs readers to the dissenting opinion in Federal Life Insurance
Company v. Rascoe. That opinion explains:
Where his part of the contract has been executed by the plaintiff, he has nothing to do but
to wait, and to do so continues to be in his power. His position will not be prejudicially
changed by defendant's repudiation; and hence he will have no estoppel to rely upon to
precipitate the defendant's obligation.
Fed. Life Ins. Co. v. Rascoe, 12 F.2d 693, 697 (6th Cir. 1926) (Denison, J., dissenting).
276 Some courts recognize a "narrow exception" in the case of periodic payments. These
courts distinguish between insurers that repudiate the policy in its entirety and those that dispute
whether payments are owed.
[T]here is a narrow exception to this rule which provides for recovery of future benefits,
where the insurer has repudiated the entire policy. This exception is applicable only
where a plaintiff establishes that the insurer has committed an anticipatory breach by
"disclaim[ing] the intention or the duty to shape its conduct in accordance with the
provisions of the contract."
Wurm v. Commercial Ins. Co., 766 N.Y.S.2d 8, 12 (N.Y. App. Div. 2003) (quoting N.Y. Life Ins.
Co. v. Viglas, 297 U.S. 672, 676 (1936)).
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means that despite a material breach by an insurer (e.g., the refusal to
make periodic payments), a policyholder cannot obtain the full value of
promised coverage and end the relationship with the insurer.277
When a court construes the insurance contract as unilateral,
thereby limiting a policyholder's use of anticipatory repudiation, it
dooms the policyholder to an ongoing relationship with a breaching
party. Consider the problem for Charles Fanning, who purchased an
accident insurance policy from Guardian Life Insurance Company of
America. 278 Fanning was issued a conditional binding receipt. After
Guardian received the premium, but before it issued the policy, Fanning
suffered a serious injury that "totally and permanently disabled him." 279
Guardian declined Fanning's application and denied coverage, claiming
the contract had not yet been formed. 280 The jury rejected the insurer's
position, finding the contract had formed. Fanning also established that
he was permanently disabled and so the jury awarded damages that
reflected the present value of the amount of money owed over his life
expectancy. 281 The jury's award provided Fanning with $27,730, a
lump sum sufficient to pay him $100 per month over his life
expectancy.282
The Washington Supreme Court agreed with Fanning and the jury
that Guardian had erroneously taken the position that there was no
contract, that Guardian had wrongfully refused to pay under any
circumstance, and that this constituted a total breach. Nevertheless, the
court reversed and held in favor of Guardian on the issue of the amount
of damages owed. 283 The court concluded that Fanning could not
obtain damages for total breach. Citing a "great weight of authority,"
the court explained that anticipatory breach applies only to bilateral
contracts, and then sided with "a majority of the jurisdictions [that]
refuse to allow recovery for breach by anticipatory repudiation of a
277 See, e.g., Garage & Serv. Station Emps. Union v. Pac. Mut. Life Ins., 82 Cal. Rptr. 821
(Cal. Ct. App. 1969) (holding that group life insurer's refusal to recognize cancelled life
insurance contract presented a cause of action only as to deceased insured; thirteen living
members had no cause of action based on anticipatory repudiation); Greguhn v. Mut. of Omaha
Ins. Co., 461 P.2d 285, 287 (Utah 1969) (ordering periodic payments until insured recovers or
dies and citing "the great majority of decisions" that allows payment "only of installments
accrued and unpaid").
While adhering to the rule that anticipatory repudiation is inapplicable to unilateral
contracts, some jurisdictions carve out an exception for bad faith, allowing a lump-sum payment
where the insurer has acted in bad faith. See Hangarter v. Paul Revere Life Ins. Co., 373 F.3d
998, 1012-13 (9th Cir. 2004) (applying California law and allowing future payments in tort);
DeChant v. Monarch Life Ins. Co., 554 N.W.2d 225 (Wis. Ct. App. 1996).
278 Fanning v. Guardian Life Ins. Co., 366 P.2d 207 (Wash. 1961).
279 Id. at 208.
280 Id. at 209.
281 Id. at 210.
282 Id. at 209-10.
283 Id.
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unilateral contract or of a bilateral contract that has become
unilateral." 284  The appellate court concluded that it was sufficient to
hold that the insurer owed Fanning continuing monthly payments as
provided by the contract, rather than awarding a lump sum, even though
the insurer's conduct constituted a total breach. 285
Had the court characterized the insurance contract as bilateral, 286
the court might have allowed Fanning a more satisfactory and complete
remedy for Guardian's breach. The court might have recognized that
Fanning and the insurer had made ongoing bilateral promises to one
another-Fanning to continue to cooperate and to submit continuing
proof of disability and Guardian to make ongoing payments. Although
the court acknowledged that Fanning had continuing duties under the
policy to make himself available and submit to periodic physical
evaluations, the court called this duty "too trivial" and
"inconsequential" as to be an bilateral duty under the contract.287
Had the court instead recognized that Fanning had made reciprocal
promises and that a bilateral relationship existed, under the doctrine of
anticipatory repudiation, the court might have terminated Fanning's
continuing obligation to cooperate in light of Guardian's breach and
fashioned a remedy that relieved Fanning of duties to Guardian and
allowed him to sever the relationship. Instead, Fanning was forced to
remain in a lifelong contractual relationship with an insurer-even to
the extent of submitting to regular physical examinations at its behest-
that had breached the contract and wrongfully denied him the disability
benefits he had purchased. In light of the fact that an essential aspect of
insurance is that the policyholder purchases peace of mind that the
insurer will pay in the event of contingent losses, to force the
policyholder to remain in a relationship after breach is particularly
problematic.
The court ignored the bilateral nature of the disability policy. For
example, in order to collect benefits, Fanning had ongoing duties to
establish his disability and to submit proof of his continuing disability.
Once construed as a bilateral contract, the court might have recognized
284 Id. at 211.
285 Fanning argued that the rule adopted was not sound, because "if defendant company
becomes hostile to the insured, plaintiff may be compelled to bring an action on every
installment." Id. at 212. The court rejected that possibility as an unlikely business practice which
could be sanctioned. Id. (citing Cobb v. Pac. Mut. Life Ins. Co., 51 P.2d 84, 88 (Cal. 1935)). The
court also rejected Fanning's argument that the insurer was a foreign corporation, and so future
performance might not be assured. Id.
286 The insured had obligations under the accident policy, including an obligation to pay the
seven dollar balance on his premium payment, and to provide ongoing evidence of his disability
and documents for reimbursement. The court did not address the seven dollar balance, but it
specifically rejected construing the insurer's right to demand an examination to verify the
disability as an exchanged promise. Id. at 210.
287 Id.
154 [Vol. 32:1
2010] MISCLASSIFYING THE INSURANCE POLICY 155
that an absolute refusal to pay the benefits constituted a total breach that
allowed Fanning to terminate the contract and sue for breach. Then the
issue of whether to give Fanning a lump sum award or something else
would have been reduced to a damages issue, as it properly should be.
The court might still not have allowed a lump sum award because that
amount would be speculative, but it might have explored other forms of
damages, such as a sum sufficient to replace the insurance or to
purchase an annuity to reproduce the payments. Instead, by not
allowing anticipatory breach, the court may have left Fanning in a
troubled relationship, yet unable to sever ties.
4. Adherence to a Unilateral Contract Characterization Excessively
Focuses upon the Act of Paying Premiums
There exists yet another inconvenient artifact of a unilateral
construction. When payment of the premium is the sine qua non of
contract formation, missteps in the payment process can have
inappropriately harsh consequences. When the insurance contract is
characterized as a unilateral contract, too much attention must be paid to
the actual payment of the premium as a test of formation.
However, there logically is no single method to form an insurance
contract; "formation depends on the objective reasonable expectations
of the parties." 288 The insurance contract may form with a formal
document, an oral agreement, through the acts of an agent, with an offer
from the insured accepted by the insurer, with an offer from the insurer
accepted by the insured, or through bilateral promises.289  "Many
insurers will issue a policy premised on a policyholder's promise to pay
premiums when billed, and this promise is also effective as
consideration." 290 Such varied practices suggest that insurers do not
necessarily regard the payment of the premium as a condition precedent
to formation.
When courts construe payment as a condition precedent to the
formation of the contract, they then must unnecessarily struggle with
formation issues concerning payment by check, payment by check with
insufficient funds, or lost payments. 291 In a bilateral construction,
288 3 HOLMES' APPLEMAN ON INSURANCE, supra note 3, § 10.2.
289 Among the varied methods of formation, see generally id. § 10.1 (formation through
formal written contracts); id. § 10.2 (oral formation); id. (formation through agents of the insured
or insurer); id. § 10.5 (formation without payment of first premium).
290 STEMPEL ON INSURANCE CONTRACTS, supra note 3, § 9-144.3 to 9-144.4 (3d ed. 2008
Supp.); see supra note 120 (describing the variety of methods of payment).
291 3 HOLMES' APPLEMAN ON INSURANCE, supra note 3 §10.5; 5 HOLMES' APPLEMAN ON
INSURANCE, supra note 3, at 24.2; JERRY, supra note 82, § 71[a]-[g], at 613-23 (describing
payment problems and formation); see Hartline v. Nat'1 Grange Mut. Ins. Co., 394 F. Supp. 2d
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payment also serves as a promise to pay, and that means that dishonored
checks, 292 errors in mailing, 293 partial payments, 294 or any other of
myriad payment glitches that might befall an insured will not result in a
risk of forfeiture. Moreover, the view that a policyholder's acceptance
of insurance indicates a promise to pay for that insurance reflects a
more realistic intent of both parties.
One of the reasons the insurance policy is viewed as unilateral is
that it achieves an expectation the parties seem to share that the insurer
has no cause of action against the policyholder for failure to pay the
premium. As Dean Jerry explains, "If . .. the insured fails to perform
the duty to pay premiums, the insurer is ordinarily not entitled to force
the insured to make the payments or to collect damages for the insured's
nonperformance." 295 In Dean Jerry's view, "paying the premium is
more a condition .. . than it is a duty," and thus the "insurer does not
have the remedy of suing the insured for the unpaid premium."296
Under the unilateral concept of the insurance policy, payment of
the premium is a "'condition precedent to the liability of the insurer'
and not "a 'debt' in the sense that the insurer can enforce payment of
the premium." 297 Thus, as in any unilateral contract, nonperformance
by the non-promising party is not regarded as a breach of contract.
[C]ourts and texts often refer to a "duty" of the policyholder to pay
premiums, but that is not strictly accurate since the policyholder
suffers no liability for breaching its promise to pay by rejecting a
policy that has been issued and seldom is sued for breach if it elects
to stop paying the premium. 298
Nevertheless, both the policyholder's right to reject the insurance
(by not paying the premium), as well as the insurer's right to terminate
470 (D.R.I. 2005) (finding that a policy lapsed where check for renewal premium was overdue
and dishonored for insufficient funds); Johnson v. Dairyland Ins. Co., 398 So.2d 317 (Ala. Civ.
App. 1981) (affirming finding of no coverage where initial premium check was dishonored for
insufficient funds); Tallent v. Tenn. Farmers Mut. Ins. Co., 785 S.W.2d 339 (Tenn. 1990)
(concluding that a dishonored premium check was not sufficient to renew coverage); Ancro Fin.
Co. v. Consumers USA Ins. Co., No. 02A01-9708-CV-00177, 1998 WL 684838 (Tenn. Ct. App.
1998) (holding that no policy was in effect where a premium check did not clear because of an
alleged bank error that led to a stop-payment order).
292 See 5 HOLMES' APPLEMAN ON INSURANCE, supra note 3, § 24.6 (discussing various
approaches to dishonored check cases where payment of the first premium is a condition
precedent).
293 Id. § 24.2.
294 Id. § 27.10 (discussing the legal effect of partial payments).
295 JERRY, supra note 82, § 71[b], at 612.
296 Id There are cases where insurers or agents do file suit for payment of the premium rather
than terminate the policy. See, e.g., In re Miller Estate, No. 6-78-630, 1980 WL 845 (Pa. Ct.
Com. Pl. 1980) (holding that insurer may waive the right to terminate for nonpayment of
premiums and instead keep a delinquent policy in force and collect the premiums owed).
297 5 HOLMES' APPELMAN ON INSURANCE, supra note 3, § 24.2 (quoting Presentation Sisters
v. Mut. Benefit Life Ins. Co., 189 N.W.2d 452, 458-59 (S.D. 1971)).
298 STEMPEL ON INSURANCE CONTRACTS, supra note 3, §§ 9.06[A], 9-145.
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the coverage for non-payment, remain rights that can be preserved in a
bilateral construct. Even in a bilateral contract formed by a promise to
provide insurance coverage and an exchange promise to pay a premium,
the insurer will likely elect not to sue the policyholder for an unpaid
premium, but instead will terminate for nonpayment and waive
damages. 299 An advantage of bilateral characterization is that it allows
the policyholder to avoid the many dangerous formation issues that
arise when a payment glitch jeopardizes coverage.
CONCLUSION
The traditional view of the insurance policy as a unilateral or
reverse-unilateral contract is both largely incorrect and generally
unhelpful in resolving the types of contract issues that surround the
insurance relationship, creating several pernicious side effects.
Characterizing insurance contracts as bilateral relationships is both
appropriate and advantageous. First, in moving toward recognition of
insurance as bilateral, courts can adhere to familiar, traditional canons
of contract interpretation and abandon a presumption that seems without
rationale. Second, a bilateral construction allows courts to avoid the
rigidity of the law of conditions and instead more consistently and
transparently employ the doctrines of substantial performance,
mutuality of good faith and fair dealing, and anticipatory repudiation.
These doctrines provide stability and fairness for the insurer-
policyholder relationship. Finally, a bilateral construction pays less
attention to the roles of premium payment and the usually unimportant
issue of contract formation, and better recognizes the complexities,
nuances, and overall objectives of the insurer-policyholder relationship.
299 Practically speaking, when it occurs with the first payment, the insurer has suffered little
damage. On the other hand, when the insurer has provided coverage for a period of time, it may
desire to collect the premium owed. "[1]nsurers often forgo efforts to collect where the premium
due is relatively small, where it was at risk for a short period of time and incurred no claims, or
where collection efforts would be bad public relations for the insurer." Id. § 9-145 n.417.

